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Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring 
for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster 
Munition Coalition (CMC). For more information visit  www.the-monitor.org or 
email monitor2@icblcmc.org.
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor makes every effort to limit the environmental 
footprint of reports by publishing all our research reports online. This report is available 
online. 
Detailed country profiles are available online at  www.the-monitor.org/cp 
INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is committed to the 1997 Mine Ban 
Treaty (or “Ottawa Convention”) as the best framework for ending the use, production, 
stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines and for destroying stockpiles, clearing 
mined areas, and assisting affected communities
The ICBL calls for universal adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty and its full implementation 
by all, including:
  No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel 
landmines by any actor under any circumstances;
  Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines;
  More efficient clearance and destruction of all emplaced landmines and 
explosive remnants of war (ERW);
  Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all landmine and ERW victims.







LANDMINES AND EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR
Peace agreements may be signed and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict. 
Antipersonnel mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, 
or contact of a person. This includes improvised landmines, also known as improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), with those same victim-activated characteristics. Antivehicle mines 
are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as 
opposed to a person. Landmines are victim-activated and indiscriminate; whoever triggers 
the mine, whether a child or a soldier, becomes its victim. Mines emplaced during a conflict 
against enemy forces can still kill or injure civilians decades later.
ERW refer to ordnance left behind after a conflict. Explosive weapons that for some reason 
fail to detonate as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These unstable explosive 
items are left behind during and after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines. 
Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) are explosive weapons that have not been used 
during armed conflict but have been left behind and are no longer effectively controlled. 
ERW can include artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster 
munition remnants. Under the international legal definition, ERW consist of UXO and AXO, 
but not mines. 
Both landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians. These weapons 
can be found on roads, footpaths, farmers’ fields, forests, deserts, along borders, in and 
surrounding houses and schools, and in other places where people are carrying out their 
daily activities. They deny access to food, water, and other basic needs, and inhibit freedom 
of movement. They endanger the initial flight and prevent the repatriation of refugees and 
internally displaced persons, and hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid. 
These weapons instill fear in communities, whose citizens often know they are walking 
in mined areas, but have no possibility to farm other land, or take another route to school. 
When land cannot be cultivated, when medical systems are drained by the cost of attending 
to landmine/ERW casualties, and when countries must spend money clearing mines rather 
than paying for education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause appalling human 
suffering, but that they are also a lethal barrier to sustainable development and post-conflict 
reconstruction.
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There are solutions to the global landmine and ERW problem. The 1997 Mine Ban 
Treaty (officially the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction) provides the best framework for 
governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by antipersonnel 
mines. Governments who join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production, and 
transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel 
mines within four years and clear all antipersonnel mines in all mined areas under their 
jurisdiction or control within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so 
must provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine survivors, their families 
and communities, and support for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent mine 
incidents. 
This legal instrument provides a framework for taking action, but it is up to governments 
to implement treaty obligations and it is the task of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
to work together with governments to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations. 
The ultimate goal of the ICBL and its sister campaign, the Cluster Munition Coalition 
(CMC), is a world free of landmines, cluster munitions, and ERW, where civilians can walk freely 
without the fear of stepping on a mine, children can play without mistaking an unexploded 
submunition for a toy, and communities don’t bear the social and economic impact of mines 
or ERW presence for decades to come.
INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES 
The ICBL is a global network in some 100 countries, working locally, nationally, and 
internationally to eradicate antipersonnel mines. It received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize 
jointly with its founding coordinator Jody Williams in recognition of its efforts to bring about 
the Mine Ban Treaty.
The campaign is a loose, flexible network whose members share the common goal of 
working to eliminate antipersonnel landmines. 
The ICBL was launched in October 1992 by a group of six NGOs: Handicap International 
(now Humanity & Inclusion), Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory 
Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These 
founding organizations witnessed the horrendous effects of mines on the communities they 
were working with in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, and saw how mines 
hampered and even prevented their development efforts in these countries. They realized 
that a comprehensive solution was needed to address the crisis caused by landmines, and 
that the solution was a complete ban on antipersonnel mines.
The founding organizations brought to the international campaign practical experience 
of the impact of landmines. They also brought the perspective of the different sectors 
they represented: human rights, children’s rights, development issues, refugee issues, and 
medical and humanitarian relief. ICBL member campaigns contacted other NGOs, who 
spread the word through their networks; news of this new coalition and the need for a treaty 
banning antipersonnel landmines soon stretched throughout the world. The ICBL organized 
conferences and campaigning events in many countries to raise awareness of the landmine 
problem and the need for a ban, and to provide training to new campaigners to enable them 
to be effective advocates in their respective countries.   
Campaign members worked at the local, national, regional, and global level to encourage 
their governments to support the mine ban. The ICBL’s membership grew rapidly, and today 
there are campaigns in some 100 countries. 
The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada. 
It was due to the sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL that the Mine Ban Treaty 
became a reality. 
Part of the ICBL’s success is its ability to evolve with changing circumstances. The early days 
of the campaign were focused on developing a comprehensive treaty banning antipersonnel 






mines. Once this goal was achieved, attention shifted to ensuring that all countries join 
the treaty and that all States Parties fully implement their treaty obligations. Today, the 
campaign also encourages States Parties to complete their major treaty obligations by 2025, 
a target agreed in the 2014 Maputo Declaration.
The ICBL works to promote the global norm against mine use and advocates for countries 
who have not joined the treaty to take steps to do so. The campaign also urges non-state 
armed groups to abide by the spirit of the treaty. 
Much of the ICBL’s work is focused on promoting implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. 
This includes working in partnership with governments and international organizations on 
all aspects of treaty implementation, from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim 
assistance.
The campaign has been successful in part because it has a clear campaign message 
and goal; a non-bureaucratic campaign structure and flexible strategy; and an effective 
partnership with other NGOs, international organizations, and governments.
In January 2011, the ICBL merged with the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) to become 
the ICBL-CMC, but the CMC and the ICBL remain two distinct and strong campaigns.
LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the ICBL and 
the CMC and is formally a program of the ICBL-CMC. It is the de facto monitoring regime for the 
Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It monitors and reports on States 
Parties’ implementation of, and compliance with, the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions, and more generally, it assesses the international community’s response 
to the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other explosive 
remnants of war (ERW). 
In June 1998, the ICBL created Landmine Monitor as an ICBL initiative, for the first 
time bringing NGOs together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor 
humanitarian law or disarmament treaties and to regularly document progress and problems. 
In 2008, Landmine Monitor also functionally became the research and monitoring arm of the 
CMC. In 2010, the initiative changed its name from Landmine Monitor to Landmine and Cluster 
Munition Monitor (known as “the Monitor”) to reflect its increased reporting on the cluster 
munition issue. The Monitor successfully puts into practice the concept of civil society-based 
verification that is now employed in many similar contexts.
Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and Research 
Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board. The ICBL-CMC produces 
and publishes Landmine Monitor and Cluster Munition Monitor as separate publications.
The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an 
attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have taken 
on with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive 
collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available information. Although in some cases 
it does entail investigative missions, the Monitor is does not send researchers into harm’s way 
and does not include hot war-zone reporting.
Monitor reporting complements transparency reporting required of states under international 
treaties. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual collaboration are crucial 
elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. 
The Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and 
evaluation.
The Monitor aims to promote and advance discussion on mine-, cluster munition-, and ERW-
related issues, and to seek clarifications to help reach the goal of a world free of mines, cluster 
munitions, and ERW. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about 
issues it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole.
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The Monitor system features a global reporting network and an annual report. A network of 
more than two dozen researchers and an Editorial Team gathered information to prepare this 
report. The researchers come from the CMC and ICBL’s campaigning coalitions and from other 
elements of civil society, including journalists, academics, and research institutions.
Unless otherwise specified, all translations were done by the Monitor.
As was the case in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report is 
limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. The Monitor is a system that 
is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections 
from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search 
for accurate and reliable information on an important subject.
ABOUT THIS REPORT
This is the 20th annual Landmine Monitor report. It is the sister publication to the Cluster 
Munition Monitor report, first published in November 2010. Landmine Monitor 2018 provides 
a global overview of the landmine situation. Chapters on developments in specific countries 
and other areas are available in online Country Profiles at www.the-monitor.org/cp. 
Landmine Monitor covers mine ban policy, use, production, trade, and stockpiling, and also 
includes information on contamination, clearance, casualties, victim assistance, and support 
for mine action. The report focuses on calendar year 2017, with information included up to 
November 2018 when possible
IN MEMORIAM KOFI ANNAN
We would like to express our mourning over the passing 
away of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on 18 
August and convey our sympathies to his family and 
collaborators who over the years stood by him in the 
causes he led to make the world a better place. The 
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor team wishes 
to pay special tribute to him and acknowledge the 
important contributions he has made to a world free 
of landmines.
We recall and appreciate the words he shared at the 
March 2016 pledging conference for the Mine Ban 
Treaty (pictured right):
In 1997 the international community responded 
with unprecedented multilateral cooperation and 
called for determined action to rid the world of 
landmines.
The signing of the Ottawa Treaty was one of the 
highlights of my career at the United Nations. 
It provided us with great hope, not only for 
the disarmament agenda, but for the power of 
multilateralism in a world facing challenges of 
increasing complexity.
To a large extent, that hope has been validated.
The determination of the States Parties has made 
the Ottawa Treaty one of the great successes of 
international diplomacy.
© Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty Implementation 
Support Unit, March 2016







A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and organizations produced this report. It 
was assembled by a dedicated team of research coordinators and editors, with the support 
of a significant number of donors.
Researchers are cited separately on the Monitor website at www.the-monitor.org. 
The Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed research to this report. We wish 
to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, field 
practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential information. We are 
grateful to ICBL-CMC staff for their review of the content of the report, and their crucial 
assistance in the release, distribution, publication, and promotion of Monitor reports.
Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and 
Research Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board 
comprised of five NGOs as well as Monitor research team leaders and ICBL-CMC staff. 
The committee’s members include: DanChurchAid (Charlotte Billoir), Danish Demining 
Group (Richard MacCormac), Human Rights Watch (Stephen Goose), Humanity & 
Inclusion (Alma Taslidžan Al-Osta), Mines Action Canada (Paul Hannon), Loren Persi 
Vicentic (casualty and victim assistance team coordinator), Amelie Chayer (ICBL-CMC 
government liaison and policy manager), and Jeff Abramson (Monitor program manager) 
and ex officio member Hector Guerra (ICBL-CMC Director). From January to October 
2018, the Monitor’s Editorial Team undertook research, updated country profiles, and 
produced thematic overviews for Landmine Monitor 2018. The Editorial Team included:
  Ban policy: Mark Hiznay, Stephen Goose, Marta Kosmyna, Yeshua Moser-
Puangsuwan, and Mary Wareham;
  Contamination, clearance, and support for mine action: Jennifer Reeves, Amelie 
Chayer, and Marion Loddo; and
  Casualties and victim assistance: Loren Persi Vicentic, Jennifer Reeves, Farzana 
Mursal Alizada, Éléa Boureux, Clémence Caraux-Pelletan, Michael Moore,  and 
Marianne Schulze, with assistance from Clémentine Tavernier.
The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.
mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and 
shared all its country-level landmine reports (from Clearing the Mines 2018) and country-level 
cluster munition reports (from Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018) with the Monitor. The 
Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publication. 
Jeff Abramson of ICBL-CMC provided final editing in October and November 2017 with 
assistance from Morgan McKenna (publications consultant). 
Report formatting and cover design was undertaken by Lixar I.T. Inc. Pole Communication 
printed the report in Switzerland. This report was also published digitally at www.the-monitor.org.
We extend our gratitude to Monitor contributors*. 
  Government of Australia
  Government of Austria
  Government of Belgium
  Government of France
  Government of Germany
  Government of Luxembourg
  Government of Norway
  Government of Sweden
  Government of Switzerland
  Government of the United States of America**
  UNICEF
The Monitor’s supporters are in no way responsible for, and do not necessarily endorse, 
the material contained in this report. We also thank the donors who have contributed to the 
organizational members of the Monitoring and Research Committee and other participating 
organizations..
* List accurate as of November 2018. 
** Specifically for research on mine action, support for mine action, casualties, and victim assistance.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AXO abandoned explosive ordnance
BAC battle area clearance
CCW 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons
CMC Cluster Munition Coalition
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
ERW explosive remnants of war
GICHD Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HI Humanity & Inclusion (formerly Handicap International)
ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IED improvised explosive device
IMAS International Mine Action Standards
ISU Implementation Support Unit
NGO non-governmental organization
NSAG non-state armed group
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
























Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) – Explosive ordnance that has not been used 
during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed 
conflict, and which is no longer under its control. Abandoned explosive ordnance is 
included under the broader category of explosive remnants of war.
Accession – Accession is the way for a state to become a party to an international treaty 
through a single instrument that constitutes both signature and ratification. 
Adherence – The act of becoming a party to a treaty. This can be through signature and 
ratification, or through accession.
“All reasonable effort” – Describes what is considered a minimum acceptable level 
of effort to identify and document contaminated areas or to remove the presence or 
suspicion of mines/ERW. “All reasonable effort” has been applied when the commitment 
of additional resources is considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results 
expected.
Antihandling device – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antihandling device “means 
a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or 
placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or 
otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”
Antipersonnel mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antipersonnel mine “means 
a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and 
that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”
Antivehicle mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antivehicle mine is a mine 
designed “to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed 
to a person.”
Area cancellation – Area cancellation describes the process by which a suspected 
hazardous area is released based solely on the gathering of information that indicates 
that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does not involve the application of any mine 
clearance tools.
Area reduction – Area reduction describes the process by which one or more mine 
clearance tools (e.g. mine detection dogs, manual deminers, or mechanical demining 
equipment) are used to gather information that locates the perimeter of a suspected 
hazardous area. Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed 
not to be mined, can be released.
Battle area clearance (BAC) – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous 
areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.
Casualty – The person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW, or IED incident, either through 
direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.
Clearance – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mine 
and ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.
Cleared land – A defined area cleared through the removal and/or destruction of all 
specified mine and ERW hazards to a specified depth.
Cluster munition – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions a cluster munition is 
a “conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions 
each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions.” 
Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground 
or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (or bomblets) over a wide area. 
Submunitions are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.
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Confirmed hazardous area – An area where the presence of mine/ERW contamination 
has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.
Demining – The set of activities that lead to the removal of mine and ERW hazards, 
including survey, mapping, clearance, marking, and the handover of cleared land. 
Explosive remnants of war (ERW) – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional 
Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned 
explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.
Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) – The detection, identification, evaluation, rendering 
safe, recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance.
Improvised explosive device (IED) – A device placed or produced in an improvised 
manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An improvised explosive device 
(IED) may be victim-activated or command-detonated. IEDs that can be activated by the 
presence, proximity or contact of a person (victim-activated) are banned under the Mine 
Ban Treaty, but command-detonated IEDs are not. 
Improvised mine, also improvised landmine and improvised antipersonnel landmine – 
An IED acting as a mine, landmine or antipersonnel landmine.
International Mine Action Standards – Standards issued by the UN to improve safety 
and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, establishing principles and, in some 
cases, defining international requirements and specifications.
Land release – The process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and 
remove all presence and suspicion of mines/ERW with the minimum possible risk 
involving the identification of hazardous areas, the cancellation of land through non-
technical survey, the reduction of land through technical survey, and the clearance of 
land with actual mine/ERW contamination.
Mine action center – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, 
normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some mine action 
centers also implement mine action activities.
Mine/ERW risk education – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from mines 
and ERW by awareness-raising and promoting behavioral change, including public 
information dissemination, education and training, and community mine action liaison.
Non-state armed groups (NSAG) – For Landmine Monitor purposes, non-state armed 
groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a 
broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy 
forces.
Non-technical survey (NTS) – The collection and analysis of data, without the use 
of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding 
environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW 
contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization 
and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Non-technical survey 
activities typically include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking information from 
central institutions and other relevant sources, as well as field studies of the suspected 
area. 
Reduced land – A defined area concluded not to contain evidence of mine/ERW 
contamination following the technical survey of a suspected or confirmed hazardous 
area.
Residual risk – In the context of humanitarian demining, the term refers to the risk 
remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove and/or destroy 






















Submunition – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition 
(cluster munition). All air-dropped submunitions are commonly referred to as “bomblets,” 
although the term bomblet has a specific meaning in the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions. When ground-launched, they are sometimes called “grenades.” 
Survivors – People who have been directly injured by an explosion of a landmine, 
submunition, or other ERW and have survived the incident.
Suspected hazardous area (SHA) – An area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/
ERW contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.
Technical survey (TS) – The collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical 
interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of 
mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is 
present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-
making processes through the provision of evidence. Technical survey activities may 
include visual search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or full sub-surface 
search.
Unexploded cluster submunitions – Submunitions that have failed to explode as 
intended, becoming unexploded ordnance.
Unexploded ordnance (UXO) – Unexploded ordnance (UXO) refers to munitions that 
were designed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate. 
Victim – The individual killed or injured by a mine/ERW explosion (casualty), his or her 
family, and community.
Victim assistance – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, data collection and 
needs assessment, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, 
psychological support and social inclusion, economic inclusion, and laws and public 
policies to ensure the full and equal integration and participation of survivors, their 
families, and communities in society.
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1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production  
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction
Table Key
States Parties: Ratified or acceded as of  
1 November 2018
Signatory: Signed, but not yet ratified as of  
1 November 2018
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Landmine Monitor 2018, the 20th annual Landmine Monitor publication examining progress 
toward a mine-free world, continues to find that the Mine Ban Treaty regime is a resounding 
success. After two new states acceded in late 2017, 164 countries are now bound by and 
dutifully implementing the treaty’s provisions. The stigma against landmines remains strong. 
Only a small number of non-state armed groups use the banned weapons, often in the 
form of improvised mines. These have again resulted in a high number of casualties in 
2017, with the majority of victims being civilians, nearly half of whom were children. As 
countries continue to work to clear mine-contaminated land, the Monitor identifies much 
that remains to be done, including to support the needs of landmine survivors and their 
communities. Countries both inside and outside the regime are contributing record high 
resources toward mine clearance and other mine action activities,  affirming the impact that 
this first humanitarian disarmament treaty continues to have after 20 years. 
TREATY STATUS
There are 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and one signatory—Marshall Islands—
that has yet to ratify.
  Two countries joined the treaty in 2017, both in December: Sri Lanka acceded on 13 
December, while the State of Palestine acceded on 29 December.
USE
From October 2017 through October 2018, Landmine Monitor has confirmed new use of 
antipersonnel mines by the government forces of one country—Myanmar, which is not party 
to the Mine Ban Treaty. 
  There have been no allegations of the use of antipersonnel mines by States Parties 
to the treaty in the reporting period.
  Landmine Monitor has not documented or confirmed any use of antipersonnel mines 
by Syrian government forces during this reporting period.
2 
Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) used antipersonnel mines in at least eight countries: 
Afghanistan, Colombia, India, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Thailand, and Yemen. 
  Forces of the Islamic State likely continued to use improvised landmines in Iraq 
and Syria, but the lack of access to affected areas by independent sources makes it 
difficult to confirm new use in the reporting period.
  Landmine Monitor was unable to confirm allegations of new antipersonnel mine 
use by NSAGs in Cameroon, Iraq, Mali, Libya, Philippines, Tunisia, and Ukraine in the 
reporting period.
CASUALTIES
2017 was the third year in a row with exceptionally high numbers of recorded casualties due 
to landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW)—including improvised types that act as 
antipersonnel mines (also called improvised mines), cluster munition remnants, and other 
ERW. 
  In 2017, the Monitor recorded 7,239 casualties by landmines/ERW—2,793 people 
were killed, 4,431 people were injured, and for 15 casualties the survival status was 
unknown. 
  The continuing high total was influenced by casualties recorded in countries facing 
armed conflict and large-scale violence, particularly Afghanistan and Syria, as well as 
Ukraine, Iraq, Pakistan, Nigeria, Myanmar, Libya, and Yemen. Accurate data gathering 
for active conflicts, however, remains challenging. 
  The casualty count for 2017 was a decrease on that of 2016, which had marked the 
highest number of annual recorded casualties in Monitor data since 1999, but the 
total remained far higher than the annual casualty rate of five-years ago. 
  For a second year in a row, the highest numbers in Monitor history were recorded 
for annual casualties caused by improvised mines (2,716) and for child casualties 
(2,452).
Casualties in 2017 were identified in 49 countries, of which 35 are States Parties to the Mine 
Ban Treaty, and in four other areas.
  The vast majority of recorded landmine/ERW casualties were civilians (87%) where 
their status was known, an even higher ratio than in recent years.
  In 2017, children accounted for 47% of all civilian casualties where the age was 
known, an increase of 5 percentage points from the 2016 annual total.
  Women and girls made up 13% of all casualties where the sex was known.
  The Monitor has recorded more than 122,000 mine/ERW casualties since its global 
tracking began in 1999, including some 86,000 survivors.
SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION
Donors and affected states contributed approximately US$771.5 million in combined 
international and national support for mine action in 2017, an increase of $203.6 million 
(36%) compared to 2016. 
  This represents the highest combined total of international and national mine 
action funding ever reported in Monitor data, going back to 1996. 
In 2017, international donors contributed $673.2 million to mine action in 38 states and 
three other areas, an increase of $190.3 million (39%) compared with 2016. 
  This represents the highest level of international support ever recorded by the 
Monitor. 
  The top five mine action donors—the United States (US), Germany, the European 
Union (EU), Norway, and Japan—contributed 79% of all international funding, with a 











  The record 2017 total was primarily the result of massive increases in the 
contributions of the US ($309.0 million total, a $156.6 million increase) and Germany 
($84.4 million total, a $47.1 million increase).
  Mine action in five states—Iraq, Syria, Colombia, Afghanistan, and Lao PDR—received 
$435.4 million, or 65% of all international support in 2017.
  The largest increases were for activities in Iraq and Syria, receiving respectively 
$120 million ($207.0 million total) and $70.8 million ($89.4 million total) more than 
in 2016.
  Donor support explicitly dedicated to victim assistance remains low and difficult to 
track, representing only 2% of identifiable international support in 2017. 
Ten affected states reported providing $98.3 million in national support for their own mine 
action programs, an increase of $13.3 million (16%) compared with 2016.
CONTAMINATION AND CLEARANCE
Sixty states and areas are contaminated by antipersonnel mines as of November 2018.
  This includes 34 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 22 states not party, and four 
other areas. 
  Mauritania completed clearance in December 2017. Mozambique, which had declared 
completion in 2015 but subsequently found previously unidentified antipersonnel 
mine contamination in 2016 and 2017, completed clearance in May 2017. 
  Massive antipersonnel mine contamination (more than 100 km2 total per country) is 
believed to exist in Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), 
Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Iraq, Thailand, Turkey, Yemen, and other area Western Sahara.
About 128 km2 of land was reported to be cleared of landmines in 2017, less than the 
145km2 revised total reported for 2016.
  In 2017, more than 168,000 antipersonnel mines and some 7,500 antivehicle mines 
were destroyed. This represented a significant decrease from the 2016 results. 
However, this is an underestimation as some actors do not systematically report 
clearance results.
  In 2017, clearance was reported in two-thirds of the contaminated states and areas: 
29 States Parties, eight states not party, and three other areas.
  The largest total clearance of mined areas in 2017 was achieved in Afghanistan, 
Croatia, Iraq, and Cambodia (the same countries as 2016), which together accounted 
for more than 80% of recorded clearance.
  In 2017, three States Parties used non-technical and technical survey to release 
significant amounts of land—more than 30km2—thus greatly decreasing their 
estimate of remaining contamination: Angola, Cambodia, and Thailand.
  Over the past five years (2013–2017), approximately 830km2 of mined areas have 
been cleared. Some 1.1 million antipersonnel mines and more than 66,000 antivehicle 
mines have been destroyed in the context of mine and battle area clearance.
Twenty-nine States Parties, one state not party, and one other area have completed clearance 
of all mined areas on their territory since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999.
  Jordan and Nigeria, where antipersonnel mine contamination is found, should 
declare that they have obligations under Article 5 and request a new deadline to 
complete clearance. 
  Five States Parties were granted extended clearance deadlines at the Sixteenth 
Meeting of States Parties in 2017: Angola, Ecuador, Iraq, Thailand, and Zimbabwe. 
Seven States Parties requested extended deadlines for approval at the Seventeenth 
Meeting of States Parties in November 2018: BiH, Croatia, Cyprus, Serbia, Sudan, 
Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.
  Only four States Parties appear to be on track to meet their treaty-mandated clearance 
deadlines: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe.
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  The political declaration adopted at the Mine Ban Treaty’s Third Review Conference 
in 2014 includes a commitment to fulfill treaty obligations to the fullest extent 
possible by 2025. Although most countries are not on track with their respective 
Article 5 clearance deadlines, the majority should reach the 2025 clearance goal, 
with sufficient funds and commitment, and where security conditions permit.
  Almost all States Parties with mine contamination have a national mine action 
program or institutions that are assigned to fulfill the state’s clearance obligations. 
In stark contrast, fewer than half of the states not party with landmine contamination 
have functioning mine action programs.
VICTIM ASSISTANCE
In 2017–2018, most States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of mine 
victims lacked suitable resources and practices to fulfill the commitments they have made 
in the 2014–2019 Maputo Action Plan. Findings below relate to 33 States Parties with 
significant numbers of mine victims. The needs for assisting victims remain great, including 
in the newest States Parties Palestine and Sri Lanka.
  In most States Parties, some efforts to improve the quality and quantity of health 
and physical rehabilitation programs for survivors were undertaken. 
  Nevertheless, following reductions in resources in recent years, many countries saw 
near-stagnation in the remaining core assistance services for mine/ERW victims. 
Survivor networks also struggled to maintain their operations as they faced 
decreased resources. 
  Services remained largely centralized, preventing many mine/ERW survivors who 
live in remote and rural areas from accessing those services. Shortages of raw 
materials and financial resources were an obstacle to improvements in the physical 
rehabilitation sector in several countries. 
  Only 14 of the 33 States Parties had victim assistance or relevant disability plans in 
place to address recognized needs and gaps in assistance.
  Approximately two-thirds of the States Parties had active coordination mechanisms, 
and survivors’ representatives participated in 18 of the coordinating processes 
among those 21 States Parties. State initiatives for capacity-building toward 
increased participation of mine victims were almost never reported.
  Significant gaps remain in access to employment, training, and other income-
generation support activities in many of the States Parties where opportunities for 
livelihoods were most needed.
STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION, PRODUCTION, AND TRANSFER
States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have destroyed more than 54 million stockpiled 
antipersonnel mines, including more than 500,000 destroyed in 2017.
  Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of the convention having missed their four-
year deadline to complete destruction of their stockpiles.
  Two States Parties possess more than five million antipersonnel mines remaining 
to be destroyed: Ukraine (4.4 million) and Greece (643,267). Oman (7,630) plans to 
destroy its stocks by February 2019.
In 1999, all states collectively (both treaty signatories and non-signatories) stockpiled about 
160 million antipersonnel mines, but today the global total may be less than 50 million.
Forty-one states have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including four that are not 
party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, Nepal, and the US.
  The Monitor lists 11 states as landmine producers because they have yet to disavow 
future production, unchanged from the previous report: China, Cuba, India, Iran, 











  Those most likely to be actively producing are India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and South 
Korea.
  NSAGs produce improvised landmines in Afghanistan, Iraq, Myanmar, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen. 
   Houthi forces in Yemen were “mass producing” landmines, including victim-
activated IEDs (improvised mines). 
At least nine states not party to the ban have formal moratoriums on the export of 
antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South 
Korea, and the US.
ICBL Ambassador Tun Channareth is giving an interview during the 16th Meeting of 
States Parties, held in Vienna.










Over the past two decades, the Mine Ban Treaty has developed into an international norm 
with impressive universality. A total of 164 States Parties are implementing the treaty’s 
provisions, which prohibit antipersonnel landmines use, production, trade, or stockpiling 
and require victim assistance, clearance of mined areas within 10 years, and destruction of 
stockpiled mines within four years. Most of the 33 countries that remain outside of the treaty 
abide nonetheless by its key provisions. The stigma against landmines remains strong.
During this reporting period, Landmine Monitor documented new use of antipersonnel 
mines by government forces in Myanmar, a state not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.
Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) used antipersonnel mines, particularly improvised 
mines, with a frequency and scale in recent years that is resulting in a palpable increase in 
new mine casualties and threatening progress toward the long-held goal of a landmine-free 
world.1 NSAGs used antipersonnel mines in at least eight countries during this reporting 
period, including in States Parties Afghanistan, Colombia, Nigeria, Thailand, Yemen, and non-
states parties India, Myanmar, and Pakistan. 
In general, States Parties’ implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty 
has been excellent. The core obligations have largely been respected, and when ambiguities 
have arisen they have been dealt with in a satisfactory manner. However, some States Parties 
are not doing nearly enough to implement key provisions of the treaty, particularly mine 
clearance and victim assistance, as detailed in the relevant chapters of this report.
Like-minded governments, United Nations agencies, and international organizations such 
as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) continue to work together with the International Campaign 
1 The Mine Ban Treaty defines an antipersonnel landmine as “a mine designed to be exploded by the 
presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.” 
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or booby-traps that are victim-activated fall under this definition 
regardless of how they were manufactured. The Monitor frequently uses the term “improvised landmine” 
to refer to victim-activated IEDs.
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to Ban Landmines (ICBL) to address Mine Ban Treaty compliance challenges in a cooperative 
manner. The unity demonstrated by this community over the past two decades remains 
strong and focused on the treaty’s ultimate objective of putting an end to the suffering and 
casualties caused by antipersonnel mines. 
USE OF ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINES
There have been no allegations of the use of antipersonnel mines by States Parties to the 
Mine Ban Treaty in the reporting period, from October 2017 through October 2018. However, 
Landmine Monitor documented or confirmed new use of antipersonnel mines by government 
forces in Myanmar. Previously, Landmine Monitor 2017 found that government forces in states 
not party Myanmar and Syria used antipersonnel mines. 
Landmine Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel landmines by NSAGs in eight 
countries in the reporting period, as listed in the table.
Locations of antipersonnel mine use October 2017—October 20182
Use by government 









Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold.
Landmine Monitor has not documented or confirmed during this reporting period any 
use of antipersonnel mines by Syrian government forces or by Russian forces participating 
in joint military operations in Syria. NSAGs likely continued to use improvised landmines to 
defend its positions against attack as in previous years, but access by independent sources 
to territory under NSAG control made it difficult to confirm new use. 
Landmine Monitor was also unable to confirm new antipersonnel mine use by NSAGs in 
Cameroon, Iraq, Mali, Libya, Philippines, Tunisia, and Ukraine in the reporting period. However, 
in many cases, a lack of available information meant that it was not possible to determine if 
mine incidents and casualties were the result of new use of antipersonnel mines or due to 
legacy contamination of mines laid in previous years.3
LANDMINE USE BY GOVERNMENT FORCES
Myanmar
Since the publication of its first annual report in 1999, Landmine Monitor has consistently 
documented the use of antipersonnel mines by government forces, known as Tatmadaw, and 
by various NSAGs in Myanmar. In June 2018, a Ministry of Defense official told Landmine 
Monitor that the Myanmar military uses landmines strictly in self-defense, in well mapped 
2 NSAGs used mines in at least nine countries in 2016–2017, 10 countries in 2015–2016 and 2014–2015, 
seven countries in 2013–2014, eight countries in 2012–2013, six countries in 2011–2012, four countries 
in 2010, six countries in 2009, seven countries in 2008, and nine countries in 2007. In the reporting period, 
there were also reports of NSAG use of antivehicle mines in Afghanistan, Cameroon, Iraq, Kenya, Lebanon, 
Mali, Niger, Pakistan, Philippines, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Yemen. 
3 New use resulting in casualties is confirmed to have occurred in 2017 earlier than October in Iraq and 
Syria, and was suspected earlier than October 2017 in Cameroon and Saudi Arabia, as reported in 
Landmine Monitor 2017. These findings are listed in this year’s Contamination and Clearance chapter, 








areas.4 Previously, in September 2016, Deputy Minister of Defense Major General Myint Nwe 
informed parliament that the army continues to use landmines in internal armed conflict.5
In September 2018, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar 
reported, following their investigations into mine use allegations in September 2017, that it 
had “reasonable grounds to conclude that landmines were planted by the Tatmadaw, both in 
the border regions as well as in northern Rakhine state, as part of the ‘clearance operations’ 
with the intended or foreseeable effect of injuring or killing Rohingya civilians fleeing to 
Bangladesh. Further, it seems likely that new antipersonnel mines were placed in border 
areas as part of a deliberate and planned strategy of dissuading Rohingya refugees from 
attempting to return to Myanmar.”6
In June 2018, the 20th Battalion of NSAG Kachin Independence Army (KIA) shared 
photographs with Landmine Monitor that it said showed mines its forces cleared from the 
villages of Gauri Bum, Man Htu Bum, and Uloi Bai in Danai township. The photographs show 
around 80 antipersonnel mines, all M14 and MM2 types, with marking indicating Myanmar 
manufacture. The KIA alleged that Tatmadaw forces laid these mines in April and May, when 
the government forces left villages after occupying them. The KIA stated that two of their 
soldiers were injured while clearing the mines.7
Landmine Monitor subsequently showed the photographs to an official at the Myanmar 
Ministry of Defense in June 2018 and requested comment. The official noted that one mine 
shown in a photograph was an antivehicle mine and said that government forces do not use 
antivehicle mines against the insurgents as the NSAG do not use vehicles. He said that the 
antipersonnel mines could be copies of Myanmar-made mines that a NSAG planted as he 
said the Myanmar army does not leave landmines behind after an operation.8
LANDMINE USE BY NSAGs
In the reporting period, Landmine Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel landmines 
by NSAGs in Afghanistan, Colombia, India, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Thailand, and Yemen.
Afghanistan 
NSAG use of improvised mines in Afghanistan in 2017 and 2018 resulted in numerous 
casualties.9 The use of improvised mines in Afghanistan is mainly attributed to the Taliban, 
4 Landmine Monitor meeting with Col. (rtd) Min Htike Hein, Deputy Permanent Secretary for the Minister of 
Defense, Ministry of Defense, Naypyitaw, 29 June 2018.
5 “Pyithu Hluttaw hears answers to questions by relevant ministries,” Global New Light of Myanmar, 13 
September 2016, www.burmalibrary.org/docs23/GNLM2016-09-13-red.pdf. The deputy minister stated 
that the Tatmadaw used landmines to protect state-owned factories, bridges, and power towers, and its 
outposts in military operations. The deputy minister also stated that landmines were removed when the 
military abandoned outposts, or warning signs were placed where landmines were planted and soldiers 
were not present.
6 Human Rights Council, “Report of the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding 
Mission on Myanmar,” A/HRC/39/CRP.2, 17 September 2018, p. 288, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.
int/files/resources/A_HRC_39_CRP.2.pdf.
7 The photographs and some documentation were originally published by the Free Burma Rangers. 
Landmine Monitor subsequently sent questions regarding the mines to the KIA for clarification. See, Free 
Burma Rangers, “Burma Army Laying Landmines in Civilian Areas,” 23 June 2018, www.freeburmarangers.
org/2018/06/23/burma-army-laying-landmines-civilian-areas/. The KIA states that the Tatmadaw lay 
mines when they abandon an area, which has led to both civil and military mine casualties. The KIA 
claim to conduct mine-checks on the village path, in and nearby a village before allowing villagers to 
return after the occupation and abandonment by the Tatmadaw. At about the same time, the KIA says 
some of their units lifted 20 landmines deployed by the Tatmadaw in Injang Yang township from a road 
and nearby post and village administrative office, which had been planted by Tatmadaw Light Infantry 
Division 33 before they abandoned a village. Landmine Monitor cannot verify this allegation.
8 Landmine Monitor meeting with Col. (rtd) Min Htike Hein, Ministry of Defense, Naypyitaw, 29 June 2018.
9 In June 2018, Afghanistan stated that that new use of improvised mines and explosive remnants of war 
(ERW) were responsible for killing approximately 171 civilians every month. Statement of Afghanistan, 
Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018, bit.ly/AfgISM18.
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Haqqani Network, and Islamic State forces. According to the UN Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA), “anti-government” forces used victim-activated improvised mines in 
decreasing numbers throughout 2017 and the first half of 2018.10
Colombia 
Government forces reported several seizures or recoveries of antipersonnel landmines 
from NSAGs in Colombia during the reporting period.11 A Colombian Presidential Program 
for Comprehensive Mine Action (Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal-Descontamina 
Colombia, PAICMA) country-wide review of records of landmines cleared by the Colombian 
army during military operations reported landmine casualties and Colombian army seizures 
of improvised landmines. In doing so, it attempted to attribute responsibility for new mine 
use in 2017 and the first half of 2018.12 It found that residual or dissident forces from the 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC) were responsible 
for 306 mine incidents in 2017 and 341 incidents in the first half of 2018, while Unión 
Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Naciona (ELN) forces were responsible for 219 mine 
incidents recorded in 2017 and 48 in the first half of 2018. It also attributed new mine use 
to criminal groups or paramilitaries, often working with drug traffickers. 
India
The police in India attributed new use of improvised antipersonnel mines to the Communist 
Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M) and its armed wing, the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army.13 
In January 2018, a wild elephant was injured by landmines in the Latehar district, Jharkhand 
state, allegedly laid by the CPI-M.14 Previously, in September 2017, an elephant was killed 
after it stepped on a landmine also attributed to the CPI-M in the same area of Jharkhand 
state.15 In July 2017, the Deputy Inspector General of Police in Chhatisgarh state told the 
state news agency, “Pressure IEDs planted randomly inside the forests in unpredictable 
places, where frequent de-mining operations are not feasible, remain a challenge.”16
Myanmar
NSAGs in Myanmar used antipersonnel mines in the reporting period. In June 2018, villagers 
in Kyaukme township of Shan state attributed landmine use, which caused civilian casualties, 
to the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and claimed that the TNLA had warned locals 
10 UNAMA, “Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2017,” Kabul, February 2017, 
p. 31, bit.ly/AfgUNAMA2017; UNAMA, “Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict mid-year 
report 2018,” Kabul, July 2018, p. 5, https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_poc_midyear_
update_2018_15_july_english.pdf.
11 See, for example, Ejercito National, “Ejército destruye 100 minas antipersonal del grupo armado organizado 
residual Frente Primero en el Guaviare,” 9 June 2018, www.ejercito.mil.co/?idcategoria=437712 (100 
mines found in dissident FARC cache); “Ejército desmantela taller de fabricación de explosivos, en 
Chocó,” El Tiempo, 12 June 2018, www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/ejercito-localiza-taller-de-
explosivos-ilegal-en-choco-229562 (177 mines found in ELN cache); and “Armada decomisa 444 minas 
antipersonal en Putumayo,” El Colombiano, 3 October 2017, bit.ly/Colombiano2017Oct3 (444 mines found 
in a dissident FARC cache).
12 Information provided to Landmine Monitor by email from Mariany Monroy Torres, Advisor, Acción Integral 
Contra Minas Antipersonal-Descontamina Colombia, 30 July 2018.
13 The CPI-M and a few other smaller groups are often referred to collectively as Naxalites. The Maoists also 
have a People’s Militia with part-time combatants with minimal training and unsophisticated weapons.
14 “Hurt tusker hints at rebels,” The Telegraph, 15 January 2018, www.telegraphindia.com/states/jharkhand/
hurt-tusker-hints-at-rebels/cid/1361047.
15 A.S.R.P. Mukesh, “Blast in tiger turf kills tusker,” The Telegraph, 21 September 2017, www.telegraphindia.
com/1170922/jsp/frontpage/story_174397.jsp.










not to travel in the area.17 In January 2018, KIA Information Chief Colonel Naw Bu admitted 
use by the KIA, stating, “We use mines on paths approaching our frontline camps and around 
our headquarters. We only plant mines in the conflict area and do not plant mines in places 
where civilians move.”18 In March–April 2018 the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) laid 
new mines in areas Kay Pu and Ler Mu Plaw in response to increased Tatmadaw activity in the 
area. Villagers lost several livestock as a result.19 In April 2018, the KIA stated that they would 
launch an operation to lay mines in the Hukawng Valley in Tanai township of Kachin state.20
Nigeria
In Nigeria, NSAG Boko Haram has used improvised landmines since mid-2014.21 In September 
2018, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) issued a report detailing significant new use of improvised 
antipersonnel landmines by Boko Haram and its splinter groups on roads, in fields, and in 
villages, mostly in Borno state, but also in Yobe and Adamawa states.22
On 6 March 2018, four loggers were killed when they stepped on landmines reportedly 
laid by Boko Haram near Dikwa, 90 kilometers east of Maiduguri in Borno state, after they 
went to retrieve a vehicle abandoned the previous day during a Boko Haram attack.23 
Previously, in early 2017, UNMAS reported extensive use of improvised mines by Boko Haram 
in northern areas of Nigeria.24
Pakistan
In December 2017, Pakistan told Mine Ban Treaty States Parties that NSAGs are using 
antipersonnel mines throughout the country.25 NSAGs in Balochistan, the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa used antipersonnel landmines 
during the reporting period. Public rallies in Pakistan called for the clearance of landmines 
in the country.26
In 2017, landmines were reportedly used by NSAG Tehrik Taliban Pakistan and Balochistan 
groups as well as by various clans.27 Sometimes improvised antipersonnel mines were used 
as detonators for larger explosive devices, or one initiator would set off multiple explosive 
devices.28
17 Lawi Weng, “3 Civilians Reportedly Killed by Landmines in Shan State in June,” The Irrawaddy, 8 July 2018, 
www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/3-civilians-reportedly-killed-landmines-shan-state-june.html.
18 Nang Lwin Hnin Pwint, “Mined areas increase to 11 Townships-original in Burmese language,” The 
Irrawaddy, 13 January 2018, https://burma.irrawaddy.com/news/2018/01/12/149510.html.
19 Unpublished KHRG submission to Landmine Monitor, September 2018.
20 Lawi Weng, “KIA Raids Tatmadaw Base, Claims to Detain More than a Dozen Troops,” The Irrawaddy, 9 April 
2018, www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/kia-raids-tatmadaw-base-claims-detain-dozen-troops.html.
21 See, ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Nigeria: Mine Ban Policy,” 2017, 2016, 2015, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/
reports/2017/nigeria/mine-ban-policy.aspx.
22 MAG, “Out of Sight: Landmines and the Crisis in Northeast Nigeria,” September 2018, p. 4, bit.ly/
MAGNigeria2018. MAG states that their research revealed that almost 90% of victims of explosive 
incidents were from antipersonnel landmines, with a casualty rate of almost 19 per day during 2017 and 
early 2018.
23 “Boko Haram terror continues, 10 killed in fresh attacks,” Telangana Today (AFP), 7 March 2018, https://
telanganatoday.com/boko-haram-kills-nigerian-attacks.
24 UNMAS, “Mission Report: UNMAS Explosive Threat Scoping Mission to Nigeria, 3 to 14 April 2017,” p. 2.
25 Statement of Pakistan, Mine Ban Treaty Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, Vienna, 19 December 2017, 
bit.ly/Pak16MSP. See also, CCW Amended Protocol II, Article 13 Report, Form B, 31 March 2017, bit.ly/
PakCCWII2017.
26 In April 2018, an estimated 60,000 people joined a rally organized by the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement in 
Peshawar calling for the removal of landmines from war-torn provinces along the Afghan frontier as one 
of their main grievances. For more read Pakistan, ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Pakistan: Mine Ban Policy,” 
www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2018/pakistan/mine-ban-policy.aspx.
27 Email from Raza Shah Khan, SPADO, 21 September 2017.
28 Presentation given by Pakistani delegation to the CCW Amended Protocol II Meeting of Experts, 6 April 
2016, bit.ly/PakistanCCW6Apr2016; and Landmine Monitor interview with Pakistani delegation to the 
CCW Amended Protocol II Meeting of Experts, Geneva, 8 April 2016.
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Thailand
The use of improvised landmines by the insurgency in southern Thailand has been reported 
previously and there was evidence of new mine use during this reporting period. On 2 July 
2018, a rubber plantation worker in Yala province’s Krong Penang district, was maimed 
after he stepped on a landmine reportedly laid by an NSAG. A rubber plantation worker 
was seriously wounded by a landmine in Yala’s Yaha district on 28 June 2018, while another 
worker was wounded in a mine incident in Muang district on 2 July.29
Yemen
Houthi forces in Yemen used antipersonnel and antivehicle mines during 2017 and 2018, 
primarily on the west coast of the country near the port of Hodeida. The Yemen Mine Action 
Center (YEMAC) reported that Houthi forces laid more than 300,000 landmines between 
2016 and 2018.30 International media reported that mine clearance teams funded by the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) cleared and destroyed hundreds of Houthi-laid mines in 2018.31
Houthis forces are reported to have used landmines in the past along the coast, along the 
border with Saudi Arabia, around key towns, along roads, and to cover retreats. 
There is no evidence to suggest that members of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition have 
used landmines in Yemen.
UNIVERSALIZING THE LANDMINE BAN
Since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states wishing to join can 
no longer sign and ratify the treaty, but must accede, a process that essentially combines 
signature and ratification. Of the 164 States Parties, 132 signed and ratified the treaty, while 
32 acceded.32
Two countries joined the Mine Ban Treaty in the reporting period, both in December 2017: 
Sri Lanka acceded on the 13 December, while the State of Palestine acceded on 29 December. 
The 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty include the Marshall Islands, which is the 
last signatory yet to ratify.
ANNUAL UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION
Since 1997, an annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution has provided states outside 
the Mine Ban Treaty with an important opportunity to demonstrate their support for the 
humanitarian rationale of the treaty and the objective of its universalization. More than a 
29 Teeranai Charuvastra, “Landmine Wounds Deep South Farmer,” Khaosod, 2 July 2018, www.khaosodenglish.
com/news/crimecourtscalamity/2018/07/02/landmine-wounds-deep-south-farmer/; and Mariyam 
Ahmad, “Thailand: Landmine Injures Fifth Rubber Farm Worker in a Week,” Benar News, 5 July 2018, www.
benarnews.org/english/news/thai/another-landmine-07052018154012.html. See also, Human Rights 
Watch, “Insurgents Use Landmines in South,” 4 July 2018, www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/04/thailand-
insurgents-use-landmines-south; and ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Thailand: Mine Ban Policy,” www.the-
monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2018/thailand/mine-ban-policy.aspx.
30 Conflict Armament Research, “Mines and IEDs Employed by Houthi Forces on Yemen’s West Coast,” 
September 2018, p. 4, www.conflictarm.com/dispatches/mines-and-ieds-employed-by-houthi-forces-on-
yemens-west-coast/.
31 See for example, @LostWeapons, “another couple weeks, another thousand mines cleared in yemen. TM62 
anti tank mines, press plates, cylinder IEDs,” 12 October 2018, Tweet, https://twitter.com/LostWeapons/
status/1050646259185242112/photo/1; and @BrowneGareth, “UAE soldiers prepare a cache of Houthi 
landmines and IEDs for a controlled explosion near Mokha today #Yemen #hodeidah #Aden #IEDS,” 17 
July 2018, Tweet, https://twitter.com/BrowneGareth/status/1019296299391373312/photo/1.
32 The 32 accessions include two countries that joined the Mine Ban Treaty through the process of 
“succession.” These two countries are Montenegro (after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro) and 
South Sudan (after it became independent from Sudan). Of the 132 signatories, 44 ratified on or before 








dozen countries have acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty after voting in favor of consecutive 
UNGA resolutions.33
On 4 December 2017, UNGA Resolution 72/53 calling for universalization and full 
implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted by a vote of 168 in favor, none against, 
and 16 abstentions.34 This is an increase in votes in favor from the 2016 resolution (164) and 
the lowest number of abstentions ever recorded.
A core of 14 states not party have abstained from consecutive Mine Ban Treaty resolutions, 
most of them since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, 
South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan, the United States (US), and Vietnam.35
NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS
Some NSAGs have committed to observe the ban on antipersonnel mines, which reflects the 
strength of the growing international norm and stigmatization of the weapon. None have 
done so during the reporting period. At least 65 NSAGs committed to halt using antipersonnel 
mines since 1997.36 The exact number is difficult to determine, as NSAGs have no permanence, 
frequently split into factions, go out of existence, or become part of state structures. 
Most recently, in November 2016, in 
Colombia, the FARC and the Colombian 
government signed an agreement to 
end the armed conflict. This has largely 
halted the FARC’s widespread landmine 
use and resulted in the surrender and 
destruction of its stockpiled mines. On 
1 October 2017, a ceasefire agreement 
between the government of Colombia 
and the ELN took effect.  Under 
“abstention” the ELN had committed 
not to use antipersonnel landmines that 
could endanger the civilian population.37 
However, the ceasefire ended in January 
2018, and as of September 2018 had not 
been renewed.38
33 This includes: Belarus, Bhutan, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, 
Finland, FYR Macedonia, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, and Turkey.
34 The 16 states that abstained were: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. Oman initially abstained but 
later corrected its vote.
35 Uzbekistan voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997.
36 As of October 2015, 45 through the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, 19 by self-declaration, and four by 
the Rebel Declaration (two signed both the Rebel Declaration and the Deed of Commitment). See, Geneva 
Call, “Deed of Commitment,” undated, www.genevacall.org/how-we-work/deed-of-commitment/. Prior to 
2000, several declarations were issued regarding the mine ban by NSAGs, some of whom later signed the 
Deed of Commitment and the Rebel Declaration.
37 See, “Acuerdo y comunicado sobre el cese al fuego bilateral y temporal entre el Gobierno y el ELN,” Oficina 
del alto comisionando para la paz, Quito, 4 September 2017, bit.ly/AcuerdoELN2017.
38 Adriaan Alsima, “Colombia’s ELN rebels blame government for failure to agree to ceasefire,” Colombia 
Reports, 2 July 2018, https://colombiareports.com/colombias-eln-rebels-blame-government-for-failure-
to-agree-to-ceasefire/.
Campaigners from the region met in Taipei to discuss mine ban 
advocacy during the 2018 Asia Platform to Ban Landmines.
© Eden International, May 2018
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PRODUCTION OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES
More than 50 states produced antipersonnel mines at some point in the past.39 Forty-one 
states have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including four that are not party to 
the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, Nepal, and the US.40
The Monitor identifies 11 states as producers of antipersonnel mines, unchanged from the 
previous report: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, 
South Korea, and Vietnam. Most of these countries are not believed to be actively producing 
mines but have yet to disavow ever doing so.41
Those most likely to be actively producing are India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and South Korea. 
Production of antipersonnel mines by India appeared to be ongoing in 2017 and orders 
indicate that production may have continued into 2018. Purchase order records retrieved 
from a publicly accessible online government transaction database list private companies 
providing component parts for APER 1B antipersonnel mines to the Indian Ordnance 
Factories, a state-owned enterprise, in February 2018.42 In September 2018, Indian military 
officials told the Monitor that the final assembly of complete mine remains under the 
exclusive control of Indian Ordnance Factories.43 In the previous two years, components 
were produced under these contracts and supplied to the Ammunition Factory Khadki in 
Maharashtra State.44
NSAGs have produced improvised landmines in Afghanistan, Colombia,  Myanmar, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Thailand, Tunisia, and Yemen.45 In September 2018, the arms consultancy Conflict 
Armament Research (CAR) reported that Houthi forces were “mass producing” landmines, 
including victim-activated IEDs (improvised landmines). CAR found that this includes the 
39 There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that 
some sources have cited as past producers, but who deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, and 
Venezuela. It is also unclear if Syria has produced antipersonnel mines.
40 Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June 2006. The 36 States Parties to the Mine 
Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines are Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, the United Kingdom (UK), and Zimbabwe.
41 For example, Singapore’s only known producer of antipersonnel landmines, ST Engineering, a 
government-linked corporation, said in November 2015 that it “is now no longer in the business 
of designing, producing and selling of anti-personnel mines.” Local Authority Pension Fund, “ST 
Engineering Quits Cluster Munitions,” 18 November 2015, www.lapfforum.org/wp-content/press/
files/20151118SingaporeTechnologiespressreleasefinal.pdf. However, Singapore is still listed as a 
producer as it has not formally committed to not produce landmines in the future.
42 In February 2018, Supreme Industries Ltd was listed as having concluded a contract for production of 
material for antipersonnel mines on the Indian Ordnance Factories Purchase Orders, http://ofbindia.gov.
in/index.php?wh=purchaseorders&lang=en. However, no other orders were listed as concluded between 
December 2017 and September 2018 for antipersonnel mines. Components and materials for directional 
mines and antivehicle mines were listed.
43 Landmine Monitor meeting with Commodore Nishant Kumar, Ministry of External Affairs, and Col. Sumit 
Kabthiyal, Ministry of Defense, CCW Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), Geneva, 27 August 2018.
44 The following companies were listed as having concluded contracts listed for production of components 
of antipersonnel mines on the Indian Ordnance Factories Purchase Orders between October 2016 and 
November 2017: Sheth & Co., Supreme Industries Ltd., Pratap Brothers, Brahm Steel Industries, M/s 
Lords Vanjya Pvt. Ltd., Sandeep Metalkraft Pvt Ltd., Milan Steel, Prakash Machine Tools, Sewa Enterprises, 
Naveen Tools Mfg. Co. Pvt. Ltd., Shyam Udyog, and Dhruv Containers Pvt. Ltd. In addition, the following 
companies had established contracts for the manufacture of mine components: Ashoka Industries, 
Alcast, Nityanand Udyog Pvt. Ltd., Miltech Industries, Asha Industries, and Sneh Engineering Works. 
Mine types indicated were either M-16, M-14, APERS 1B, or “APM” mines, http://ofbindia.gov.in/index.
php?wh=purchaseorders&lang=en. Indian Ordnance Factories website, http://ofb.gov.in/vendor/general_
reports/show/registered_vendors/820.
45 Previous lists of NSAG producing antipersonnel mines have included Iraq and Syria. However, with the 









standardization and production of explosive charges, pressure plates, and passive infrared 
sensors.46
Previously, in January 2017, MAG reported that Islamic State in Syria and Iraq produced 
near-factory quality improvised landmines on a large scale.47
TRANSFERS OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES 
A de facto global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the 
mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma created by the 
Mine Ban Treaty. Landmine Monitor has never conclusively documented any state-to-state 
transfers of antipersonnel mines since it began publishing annually in 1999. 
At least nine states not party to 
the Mine Ban Treaty have enacted 
formal moratoriums on the export 
of antipersonnel mines: landmine 
producers China, India, Pakistan, 
Russia, Singapore, South Korea, plus 
Israel, Kazakhstan, and the US. Other 
past exporters have made statements 
declaring that they have stopped 
exporting, including Cuba and Vietnam. 
Iran also claims to have stopped 
exporting in 1997, despite evidence to 
the contrary.48
At least five types of antipersonnel 
mines produced in the 1980s have 
been used in Yemen since 2013. None 
of these mines were among the four 
types of antipersonnel mines that Yemen has reported stockpiling in the past, including for 
training mine clearance personnel.
The evidence of further use of antipersonnel mines in 2016 suggests either that the 
2002 declaration to the UN Secretary-General on the completion of landmine stockpile 
destruction was incorrect, or that these mines were acquired from another source after 
2002. In a September 2016 letter, Yemen’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sanaa, controlled 
by the Houthis and the General People’s Congress, alleged that individuals had smuggled 
weapons, including landmines, into Yemen in recent years, noting that their government had 
not been able to control its land or sea borders due to instability and fighting.49 In April 2017, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied that the Sanaa-based Ministry of Defense stockpiles 
antipersonnel mines.50
46 Conflict Armament Research, “Mines and IEDs Employed by Houthi Forces on Yemen’s West Coast,” 
September 2018, www.conflictarm.com/dispatches/mines-and-ieds-employed-by-houthi-forces-on-
yemens-west-coast/.
47 MAG Issue Brief, “Landmine Emergency: Twenty years on from the Ottawa Treaty the world is facing a new 
humanitarian crisis,” January 2017. 
48 Landmine Monitor received information in 2002–2004 that demining organizations in Afghanistan were 
clearing and destroying many hundreds of Iranian YM-I and YM-I-B antipersonnel mines, date stamped 
1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines. Information provided to Landmine Monitor 
and the ICBL by HALO Trust, Danish Demining Group, and other demining groups in Afghanistan. Iranian 
antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were also part of a shipment seized by Israel in January 2002 off the 
coast of the Gaza Strip.
49 Letter from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yemen, to Human Rights Watch, 7 September 2016, 
bit.ly/YemenHRWSept2016.
50 Letter from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yemen, to Human Rights Watch, 2 April 2017, 
bit.ly/YemenLetterApr2017HRW. 
Types of antipersonnel mines previously  
stockpiled by Yemen and types used after 2013
Antipersonnel mines 
originally stockpiled
Antipersonnel mines used  
after 2013
PP-Mi-SR GLD-150A (Claymore-type produced 
  by China)
PMD-6 Gyata-64 (formerly produced by  
  Hungary)
PMN PMN-1 and PMN-2 
POMZ-2 PPM-2 (produced by former  
  East Germany)
PSM-1 (formerly produced by  
  Bulgaria)
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In June 2018, a private Indian arms manufacturer advertised a “bounding mine with fuze” 
in its sales catalogue at the Eurosatory military trade event in Paris. On the second day of 
the event, Eurosatory organizers ordered the display booth of the Indian company closed, 
and removed their entry at the event from the online catalogue.51 Previously in February 
2017, the same Indian arms manufacturer had components for bounding fragmentation 
antipersonnel landmines listed in their sales catalogue on display at the IDEX military trade 
event in Abu Dhabi.52
STOCKPILED ANTIPERSONNEL MINES
STATES NOT PARTY
The Monitor estimates that as many as 30 of 
the 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty 
stockpile antipersonnel landmines.53 In 1999, the 
Monitor estimated that, collectively, states not party 
stockpiled about 160 million antipersonnel mines, 
but today the global collective total may be less than 
50 million.54
It is unclear if all 30 states are currently stockpiling 
antipersonnel mines. Officials from the UAE have 
provided contradictory information regarding its 
possession of stocks, while Bahrain and Morocco 
have stated that they have only small stockpiles 
used solely for training purposes in clearance and 
detection techniques.
States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely 
destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines as an 
element of ammunition management programs and 
the phasing out of obsolete munitions. In recent 
years, such stockpile destruction has been reported 
in China, Israel, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, the US, 
and Vietnam.
NON-STATE ARMED GROUP 
STOCKPILES
Fewer NSAGs appear to be able to obtain factory-made antipersonnel mines now that 
production and transfers have largely halted under the Mine Ban Treaty. Some NSAGs in states 
not party have acquired landmines by stealing them from government stocks, purchasing 
51 Upon being alerted to Ashoka’s presence at the Eurosatory military trade fair, the ICBL contacted the 
French government regarding the sale catalogue’s antipersonnel mine. The brochure was observed on 
display at Eurodatory by Omega Research in June 2018. Emails from Omega Research, 11 & 12 June 
2018. See also, Rachida El Azzouzi, “La planète guerrière défile à Eurosatory,” Mediapart, 15 June 2018, 
www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/150618/la-planete-guerriere-defile-eurosatory.
52 Ashoka Manufacturing Limited, “Marketing Brochure,” undated. Brochure was observed on display at IDEX 
by Omega Research in February 2017. Email from Omega Research, 7 November 2017.
53 Three states not party, all in the Pacific, have said that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines: Marshall 
Islands, Micronesia, and Tonga. 
54 In 2014, China informed Landmine Monitor that its stockpile is “less than” five million, but there is an 
amount of uncertainty about the method China uses to derive this figure. For example, it is not known 
whether antipersonnel mines contained in remotely-delivered systems, so-called “scatterable” mines, are 
counted individually or as just the container, which can hold numerous individual mines. Previously, China 
was estimated to have 110 million antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.
Largest stockpilers of antipersonnel 
mines
Russia 26.5 million
Pakistan estimated 6 million
India estimated 4–5 million
China “less than” 5 million
US 3 million
Total 45 million







































them from corrupt officials, or removing them from minefields. Most that use mines appear 
to make their own improvised landmines from locally available materials. 
The Monitor largely relies on reports of seizures by government forces, reports of significant 
use, or verified photographic evidence from journalists to identify NSAGs possessing mine 
stockpiles. 
STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION BY MINE BAN TREATY 
STATES PARTIES
At least 158 of the 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty do not stockpile antipersonnel 
mines. This includes 92 states that have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction 
and 66 states that have declared they never possessed antipersonnel mines (except in some 
cases for training in detection and clearance techniques). 
Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 54 million stockpiled antipersonnel 
mines, including more than 500,000 destroyed in 2017. 
Two States Parties possess more than 5.0 million antipersonnel mines remaining to be 
destroyed: Ukraine (4.4 million) and Greece (643,267). Oman has a small stockpile (7,630).
Sri Lanka is expected to declare its stockpiled landmines when it submits an initial 
transparency report for the Mine Ban Treaty, due by 28 November 2018. It is uncertain if 
States Parties Somalia and Tuvalu possess stocks of antipersonnel landmines.55
Oman’s 2018 Article 7 transparency report stated that 4,578 antipersonnel mines were 
destroyed during 2017 and indicated that it would finish its stockpile destruction by February 
2019.56 To date, Oman has declared the destruction of 9,156 antipersonnel mines, just over 
50% of its stockpile. 
Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of Article 4 after failing to complete the 
destruction of their stockpiles by their four-year deadline.57 Neither state has indicated when 
the obligation to destroy its remaining stockpiles will be completed. The Cartagena Action 
Plan 2010–2014 called on States Parties that missed their deadline to comply without 
delay, and also to communicate their plans to do so, to request any assistance needed, and to 
provide an expected completion date. The Maputo Action Plan added a call for these states 
to provide a plan for the destruction of their remaining stockpiles by 31 December 2014.
DESTRUCTION OF STOCKPILES BY NSAGS
Disarmament of the FARC in Colombia, including destruction of its antipersonnel landmine 
stockpile and components, occurred under UN supervision and was completed on 22 
September 2017. The UN mission destroyed 3,528 antipersonnel mines formerly belonging 
to the FARC, as well as components, including more than 38,000 kilograms of explosives and 
more than 46,000 detonators.58
55 Tuvalu has not made an official declaration, but is not thought to possess antipersonnel mines. Somalia 
acknowledged that “large stocks are in the hands of former militias and private individuals,” and that it is 
“putting forth efforts to verify if in fact it holds antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.” No stockpiled mines 
have been destroyed since the treaty came into force for Somalia, which had a destruction deadline of 
1 October 2016. It has not provided an annual update to its transparency report since 2014. Mine Ban 
Treaty Initial Article 7 Report (for the period 16 April 2012 to 30 March 2013), Sections B, E, and G, bit.ly/
MBTSomalia2013Art7. 
56 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (in Arabic), 6 June 2018, p. 6. Translation by the Monitor. In 2017, 377 No. 
7 antipersonnel mines, 3,468 PRBM-409 mines, and 733 DM31mines were destroyed. 
57 Greece had a deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine had a deadline of 1 June 2010.




On 22 May 2018 the Polisario Front in Western Sahara destroyed 2,500 antipersonnel 
mines.59 Previously, on 4 November 2017, the Polisario Front destroyed 2,500 antipersonnel 
mines.60 It also announced that it would destroy a 4,985 antipersonnel mines in 2018, which 
would finish the destruction of its declared stockpile.61 From 2006 to 2015, it undertook five 
public destructions of stockpiled antipersonnel mines, pursuant to the Geneva Call Deed of 
Commitment.
MINES RETAINED FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH 
(ARTICLE 3)
Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows a State Party to retain or transfer “a number of anti-
personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or 
mine destruction techniques…The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum 
number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.” 
A total of 70 States Parties have reported that they retain antipersonnel mines 
for training and research purposes, of which 36 retain more than 1,000 mines and two 
(Finland and Bangladesh) each retain more than 12,000 mines. Ninety-one States Parties 
have declared that they do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 36 states that 
stockpiled antipersonnel mines in the past. On 18 September 2017, Algeria destroyed the 
5,970 antipersonnel mines it retained for training purposes after completing its landmine 
clearance program.62
In addition to those listed above, another 34 States Parties each retain fewer than 1,000 
mines and together possess a total of 14,175 retained mines.63
While laudable for transparency, several States Parties are still reporting as retained 
antipersonnel mines devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or 
otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine, including 
by the destruction of the fuzes. Technically, these are no longer considered antipersonnel 
mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty; a total of at least 12 States Parties retain 
antipersonnel mines in this condition.64
The ICBL has expressed concern at the large number of States Parties that are retaining 
mines but apparently not using those mines for permitted purposes. For these States 
Parties, the number of mines retained remains the same each year, indicating none are 
being consumed (destroyed) during training or research activities. No other details have 
been provided about how the mines are being used. A total of eight States Parties have never 
reported consuming any mines retained for permitted purposes since the treaty entered into 
force for them: Burundi, Cape Verde, Cyprus, Djibouti, Nigeria, Oman, Senegal, and Togo. 
59 Geneva Call, “Destruction of 2,500 Stockpiled Antipersonnel Mines in Western Sahara,” 30 May 2018, 
https://genevacall.org/destruction-of-2500-stockpiled-anti-personnel-mines-in-western-sahara/
60 On 4 November at Tifariti in Western Sahara. The Polisario destroyed 2,300 VS-50 (Italy), 100 SB-33 (Italy), 
and 100 M-966 (Portugal) antipersonnel mines. Also destroyed were eight BPRB-M3 antivehicle mines 
used as an explosive booster for the demolition. International Campaign against the Wall of Moroccan 
Occupation in Western Sahara, “The Frente POLISARIO destroys 2500 mines,” 11 November 2017, http://
removethewall.org/the-frente-polisario-destroys-2500-mines/.
61 International Campaign against the Wall of Moroccan Occupation in Western Sahara, “The Frente 
POLISARIO destroys 2500 mines,” 11 November 2017, http://removethewall.org/the-frente-polisario-
destroys-2500-mines/.
62 Three states have not submitted initial transparency reports, which would indicate whether they retain 
antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes: Tuvalu (late) and Sri Lanka and Palestine (due 
date not reached).
63 Netherlands (974), Angola (972), Zambia (907), Mali (900), Honduras (826), BiH (811), Mauritania (728), 
UK (724), Cambodia (720), Portugal (694), Italy (620), Germany (592), South Africa (576), Zimbabwe (450), 
Cyprus (440), Togo (436), Nicaragua (435), Congo (322), Slovenia (299), Cote d’Ivoire (290), Uruguay (260), 
Argentina (212), Bhutan (211), Cape Verde (120), Ethiopia (107), Eritrea (101), Jordan (100), Gambia (100), 
Ecuador (90), Rwanda (65), Senegal (50), Benin (30), Guinea-Bissau (9), and Burundi (4).









States retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines











Finland 16,192 (2017) 16,500 100 2017 -
Bangladesh 12,050 (2016) 15,000 0 2013 -
Turkey 9,313 (2017) 16,000 0 2017 5,159
Sweden 6,014 (2017) 13,948 30 2016 -
Greece 5,627 (2017) 7,224 23 2017 -
Croatia 5,050 (2017) 17,500 477 2017 -
Venezuela 4,875 (2011) 4,960 N/R 2010 -
Belarus 4,505 (2016) 7,530 0 2017 1,484
Tunisia 4,460 (2017) 5,000 49 2017 -
France 3,941 (2017) 4,539 0 2016 -
Yemen 3,760 (2016) 4,000 0 2008 -
Nigeria 3,364 (2011) 3,364 N/R None ever -
Bulgaria 3,324 (2017) 10,466 96 2017 6,446
Thailand 3,162 (2017) 15,604 217 2010 4,517
Serbia 3,134 (2017) 5,000 15 2017 1,970
Djibouti 2,996 (2004) 2,996 N/R Unclear -
Indonesia 2,454 (2015) 4,978 N/R 2009 2,524
Romania 2,395 (2016) 4,000 0 2013 1,500
Czech Rep. 2,206 (2017) 4,859 11 2017 -
Chile 2,197 (2017) 28,647 227 2017 23,694
Belgium 2,118 (2017) 5,980 170 2017 -
Peru 2,015 (2017) 9,526 0 2012 7,487
Oman 2,000 (2017) 2,000 N/R None ever -
Canada 1,878 (2017) 1,781 10 2017 -
Denmark 1,783 (2015) 4,991 N/R 2013 2,900
Tanzania 1,780 (2008) 1,146 N/R 2007 -
Uganda 1,764 (2011) 2,400 N/R 2003 -
Namibia 1,634 (2009) 9,999 N/R 2009 -
Spain 1,547 (2017) 10,000 66 2017 6,000
Mozambique 1,355 (2017) 1,427 0 2012 260
Japan 1,048 (2017) 15,000 214 2017 -
Brazil 1,204 (2017) 17,000 555 2017 -
Slovakia 1,087 (2017) 7,000 42 2017 5,500
Sudan 1,024 (2017) 10,000 100 2017 -
Kenya 1,020 (2007) 3,000 N/R 2007 -
Botswana 1,019 (2011) 1,019 N/R Unclear -
Partial total 125,295 294,384 2,402 69,441
Note: N/R = not reported.
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TRANSPARENCY REPORTING
Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party “report to the Secretary 
General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 
days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken 
to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 
April, on the preceding calendar year.
Sri Lanka and Palestine are required to submit an initial report by 28 November 2018. 
Only one State Party has an outstanding deadline for submitting its initial report: Tuvalu 
(due 28 August 2012).
As of 17 October 2017, 47% of States Parties had submitted annual reports for calendar 
year 2017. A total of 85 States Parties have not submitted a report for calendar year 2017. Of 
this latter group, most have failed to submit an annual transparency report for two or more 
years.65
Iraq, Tunisia, Nigeria, Yemen, 
and other states with recent 
allegations or confirmed 
reports of use of improvised 
landmines by NSAGs have failed 
to provide information on new 
contamination in their annually 
updated Article 7 reports.
Morocco, which is currently 
not party to the treaty, submitted 
a voluntary report in 2017 (as 
well as in 2006, 2008–2011, 
and 2013). In previous years, 
Azerbaijan (2008 and 2009), Lao 
PDR (2010), Mongolia (2007), 
Palestine (2012 and 2013), and 
Sri Lanka (2005) submitted 
voluntary reports.
65 States that have not submitted reports for two or more years are noted in italics: Andorra, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo (Rep of ), Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark, 
Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, 
Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, 
Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova (Rep of), Monaco, Montenegro, Namibia, Nauru, Nigeria, Niue, Panama, Papua 
New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, 
São Tomé & Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Suriname, Tanzania, Timor Leste, Togo, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zambia.
Young Women Leaders delivered a statement at the 16th 
Meeting of States Parties in Vienna.























Marking contamination in Vista Hermosa, Colombia.



















Ten States Parties have residual or suspected contamination (Algeria, Cameroon, Djibouti, 
Kuwait, Mali, Moldova, Namibia, Palau, the Philippines, and Tunisia) and state not party 
Saudi Arabia is also suspected to be contaminated. 































































Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold; other areas are indicated by italics.  
* Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which still contain 
mined areas. 
** Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control.
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The political declaration adopted at the Mine Ban Treaty’s Third Review Conference in 
2014 includes a commitment to fulfill treaty obligations to the fullest extent possible by 
2025. Although most countries are not on track with their respective Article 5 clearance 
deadlines, the majority should reach the 2025 clearance goal, with sufficient funds and 
commitment, and where security conditions permit.
MINE CONTAMINATION IN 20171
Sixty states and areas have an identified threat of antipersonnel mine contamination (34 
States Parties, 22 states not party, and four other areas). It is not possible to provide a global 
estimate of the total area contaminated by landmines, due to a lack of data. Nonetheless, 
some states continued to improve their understanding of the extent of contamination in 
2017 using land release methodologies to cancel suspected areas by non-technical survey 
and to reduce confirmed hazardous area through technical survey. However, in a number of 
countries, extensive recent use of antipersonnel mines—particularly improvised mines—has 
not been fully quantified.
There was new contamination in 2017 and/or 2018 in States Parties: Afghanistan, 
Colombia, Iraq, Nigeria, and Yemen; and in states not party: India, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, 
and Thailand. There was unconfirmed use in States Parties Cameroon, Mali, Tunisia, Ukraine; 
and states not party Libya and Saudi Arabia. (See the Ban Policy chapter for details.)2
This table (right) is based on the information provided by official sources. The extent 
of contamination estimated in some countries may in the future be subject to significant 
revision—either increased or decreased—based on survey results.
States Parties Mauritania and Mozambique3 are no longer on the list of contaminated 
states, as they completed clearance in 2017.
Several of the states for which no estimate is provided are heavily or massively 
contaminated. The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating North Korea and South Korea 
and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ) immediately adjoining the southern boundary of the 
DMZ remain among the most heavily mined areas in the world, but no data is available on 
the extent of contamination.4 Morocco, Myanmar, Russia, and Syria also have widespread 
contamination, but the extent is not known.
1 The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), 
which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine 
reports (from “Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing 
Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented 
online and in its print publications.
2 This year’s Ban Policy chapter reports findings from October 2017 to October 2018, listing a slightly 
different set of countries where landmine use was confirmed or suspected. New use resulting in new 
contamination is confirmed to have occurred earlier in 2017 in Iraq and Syria, and was suspected earlier 
in 2017 in Cameroon and Saudi Arabia, as reported in Landmine Monitor 2017. Those countries are also 
here because this chapter reports on the entirety of 2017.
3 Four small suspected mined areas with a combined size of 1,881m2 remain submerged under water. 
These areas are “suspended” and Mozambique plans to address them once the water level has receded 
and access can be gained. See, Declaration of Completion of Implementation of Article 5, submitted by 
Mozambique, 16 December 2015, p. 5; and statements of Mozambique, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional 
Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2017, and 8 June 2018.
4 Response by the Permanent Mission of South Korea to the UN in New York, 9 May 2006; and K. Chang-
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Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold; other areas are indicated by italics.  
* Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which still contain 
mined areas. 
** Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control. 
*** The known area in Georgia is small, but there also may be mined areas in South Ossetia.
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Ten States Parties5 have residual or suspected contamination: Algeria,6 Cameroon,7 
Djibouti,8 Kuwait,9 Mali,10 Moldova,11 Namibia,12 Palau,13 the Philippines,14 and Tunisia.15 State 
not party Saudi Arabia16 is also suspected to be contaminated.
MINE CLEARANCE IN 2017
Total global clearance of landmines in 2017 was at least 128km2, with at least 168,000 
antipersonnel mines destroyed. However, this is an underestimation as some actors, 
such as armies, police, or commercial operators, may not systematically report clearance 
results. Moreover, in some states, informal clearance or community-based clearance has 
been conducted, which is not subject to quality management and entry into the national 
databases. In some cases, land was cleared that was found to contain no mines. For further 
details of land release results, both survey and clearance, see individual country profiles on 
the Monitor website.17
In 2017, the reported global total area cleared declined for the third year in a row, while 
the number of antipersonnel mines destroyed was lower than the previous year. The decrease 
in reported area cleared between 2016 and 2017 can be mainly attributed to two countries: 
in Iraq improvised explosive device (IED) clearance was not included in the clearance figures 
as it is not known how much of this was contaminated by improvised mines; and in Croatia 
there was a 20% decrease in area cleared, although the amount of land released through 
survey was doubled. The number of antipersonnel mines destroyed fluctuated considerably 
across countries. The main explanation for the decrease in antipersonnel mines destroyed 
in 2017 compared to 2016 is the 62,589 antipersonnel mines destroyed by Algeria, which 
completed clearance that year.
5 In some cases, the Monitor records casualties in countries not listed as having confirmed landmine 
contamination. This happens when the casualties are due to ERW rather than landmines (Indonesia, 
Kenya, Poland, Tanzania, and Uganda), or when it has not been possible for the precise nature of the 
contamination causing casualties to be conclusively verified with regard to Article 5 obligations (Algeria, 
Cameroon, Kuwait, Mozambique, Philippines, and Tunisia).
6 From January to October 2017, 137 “isolated” antipersonnel mines were destroyed. See, Mine Ban Treaty 
Article 7 Report 2018, Form C, p. 26.
7 In Cameroon, allegations of use by Boko Haram of improvised antipersonnel mines have been reported.
8 Djibouti completed its clearance of known mined areas in 2003 and France declared it had cleared a 
military ammunition storage area in Djibouti in November 2008, but there are concerns that there may be 
mine contamination along the Eritrean border following a border conflict in June 2008. Djibouti has not 
made a formal declaration of full compliance with its Article 5 obligations.
9 Antipersonnel mine casualties were reported in Kuwait in 2017.
10 In Mali, there are unconfirmed allegations of use of antipersonnel mines.
11 Moldova, which had an Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2011, made a statement in June 2008 that suggested 
it had acknowledged its legal responsibility for clearance of any mined areas in the breakaway republic 
of Transnistria, where it continues to assert is jurisdiction. However, this statement was later disavowed 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 2 June 2008, 
bit.ly/MoldovaNSA2008.
12 Despite a statement made by Namibia at the Second Review Conference that it was in full compliance 
with Article 5, questions remain as to whether there are mined areas in the north of the country, for 
example, in the Caprivi region bordering Angola.
13 Palau may have residual antipersonnel mine contamination.
14 The Philippines, which has alleged use of antipersonnel mines by non-state armed groups over recent 
years, has not formally reported the presence of mined areas.
15 There were casualties from victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Tunisia in 2015, 2016, 
2017, and 2018. It is likely that these devices were recently laid when they exploded.
16 Reports of mine use and seizures have occurred in southern Saudi Arabia on its borders with Yemen, in 
Aseer and Jazan provinces.

















Clearance of mined area in 2017
State/area Mined area cleared (km2)
Antipersonnel 
mines destroyed Notes
Croatia 30.4 1,393 Includes mines destroyed during EOD
Afghanistan 28.2 14,629 There are discrepancies between data sources. 
A total mined area of 40.04km2 was cleared, 
including areas only contaminated with 
antivehicle mines. Total antipersonnel mines 
destroyed includes those on firing ranges
Cambodia 27.7 5,780 There are discrepancies between data sources
Iraq At least 16.27 At least 12,531 Additionally, 55km2 of IED clearance was 
reported with the destruction of 13,212 IEDs. 
However, as the device types are not specified, 
it is not possible to know how much of this 
was improvised antipersonnel mine clearance. 
Large areas of this land were reported as 
cleared with no devices destroyed
Yemen Unclear 1,729 A total of 8.56km2 of ERW-contaminated land 
was cleared, but mine-contaminated land was 
not disaggregated
Azerbaijan 7.69 42 3.6km2 of land cleared was found to contain 
no mines
Sri Lanka 3.25 31,012 There are discrepancies between data sources
South Sudan 1.7 734
Zimbabwe 1.66 30,533
Jordan 1.4 75 Areas verified 







BiH 0.69 1,749 There are discrepancies between data sources
Israel 0.66 737 Clearance results not available for the Israeli 
Defense Force 
Tajikistan 0.62 6,647
Lebanon 0.51 9,523 There are discrepancies between data sources
Thailand 0.4 10,510 Includes mines destroyed during technical 
survey. There are discrepancies between data 
sources on the reporting of land release as 
clearance or technical survey
Colombia 0.35 244 There are discrepancies between data sources
Nagorno-Karabakh 0.29 226
Western Sahara 0.28 See note East of berm: 0.28km2 cleared but only 
antivehicle mines (32) found
West of berm: An improbable 145km2 reported 
cleared in Moroccan held territory between 
April 2016 and April 2017, resulting in 
destruction of 56 antipersonnel mines 
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Of the 11 states and one other 
area that are massively contaminated 
with more than 100km2 of mine 
contamination, three States Parties 
reported very low clearance results 
of less than 1km2 in 2017: Angola, 
BiH, and Chad.
No mine survey or clearance 
occurred in States Parties Chad 
and Niger, nor in states not party 
Armenia and Myanmar. Only survey 
was conducted in Serbia, during 
which three antipersonnel mines 
were destroyed. No systematic mine 
survey or clearance occurred in state 
not party Lao PDR, although 23 
antipersonnel mines were destroyed 
during EOD operations. 
State/area Mined area cleared (km2)
Antipersonnel 
mines destroyed Notes
DRC 0.23 32 There are discrepancies between data sources
Kosovo 0.23 164 Includes mines destroyed during EOD spot 
tasks
Ukraine 0.22 5 Clearance results not available for national 
operators
Mauritania 0.16 93 Clearance completed
South Korea 0.1 142 Did not report type of mines destroyed
Senegal 0.07 2 Figure includes technical survey. There are 
discrepancies between data sources






Mozambique 0.008 115 Clearance completed of all known, accessible 
areas
Oman 0.002 N/R No details of clearance provided
Morocco See note 69 An improbable 232km2 of cleared area 
reported
Syria See note N/R Clearance is taking place, but results are not 
systematically recorded
Vietnam See note 34 Did not provide details of mine clearance 
in 2017. Three mines destroyed during EOD 
operations
Note: EOD = explosive ordnance disposal; ERW = explosive remnants of war; N/R = not reported.










2017 128 168,000 7,500
2016 145* 232,702 29,000
2015 171 157,672 14,000
2014 201 231,708 11,500
2013 185 275,000 4,500
Total 830 1,065,082 66,500
 * The total amount of land cleared in 2016 has been corrected down 
from 170km2. This is because the 2016 global figure included 22.1km2 of 
clearance in Afghanistan of land that only contained antivehicle mines, and 
because 3.3km2 of the clearance reported for Turkey, on the Syria border as 
part of construction of a border defense, was subsequently revealed to be 

















No mine survey or clearance results were reported for States Parties Eritrea, Ethiopia, and 
for states not party, Cuba, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, Libya,18 North Korea, Pakistan,19 South Korea, 
and Uzbekistan. It was announced that some limited demining in the DMZ between North 
and South Korea commenced on 1 October 2018, as part of joint efforts to exhume the 
remains of troops from the Korean War.20 Although only a small area of land was cleared, 
and to unknown standards, the ICBL has welcomed this confidence-building measure and 
expressed hope that it would help decrease tensions on the Korean peninsula.
China reported that the army had conducted mine clearance between November 2015 
and February 2017.21 Its Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V report 
submitted in March 2018 recorded no change on “landmine clearance,” although the media 
reported that mine clearance had resumed in November 2017.22 Russia reported in its CCW 
Protocol V transparency report that it had conducted antipersonnel mine clearance but did 
not provide details.23
In several countries, mine clearance was known to have occurred in 2017, although it was 
not formally reported. In Syria, international and national operators, both civilian and military, 
have been active.24 There are media reports of clearance in State Party Nigeria,25 and in state 
not party India.26 In Iran, commercial clearance occurred in oil and gas producing areas.27
In Algeria, which declared completion of clearance in 2016, no areas were reported as 
cleared but 137 isolated mines were destroyed.28
IMPROVISED MINES
An improvised explosive device (IED) is a device produced in an improvised manner 
incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. IEDs that are designed to be exploded by the 
presence, proximity, or contact of a person meet the definition of an antipersonnel mine, and 
therefore fall under the Mine Ban Treaty. When victim activated, these devices are known as 
improvised mines.
18 In Libya, several operators were engaged in EOD operations.
19 In Pakistan, the army destroyed 95 unserviceable antipersonnel mines. CCW Amended Protocol II Article 
13 Report (for 2017), Forms B and F.
20 “North, South Korea begin removing landmines to ease tensions,” The Globe and Mail, 1 October 2018, 
bit.ly/KoreaMinesGlobeMailOct2018; “Joint mine removal operation begins in DMZ,” Hankoreh, 7 October 
2018, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/864763.html; and “Landmines in 
DMZ to be cleared from Monday,” The Korea Times, 1 October 2018, www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/
nation/2018/09/356_256216.html. 
21 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2016), Form B. Unofficial translation.
22 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2017), Form B; and “Land mine removal resumes on 
border,” China Daily, 29 November 2017, www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-11/29/content_35118834.
htm.
23 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2016), Form B; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (for 2016), 
Form A.
24 “Russian sappers demined some 890 acres in Aleppo in a single week,” Sputnik, 30 January 2017, https://
sputniknews.com/middleeast/201701301050140911-russian-sappers-demine-aleppo/; and email from 
international mine action operator on condition of anonymity, 3 May 2018.
25 “How Bama IDPs will return home–Gov. Shettima,” Premium Times, 30 March 2018, www.premiumtimesng.
com/regional/nnorth-east/263539-how-bama-idps-will-return-home-gov-shettima.html; and “Nigeria 
Needs Assistance of UN, Others to Demine Sambisa– Buratai,” AllAfrica, 2 April 2017, http://allafrica.com/
stories/201704030012.html. 
26 “Advanced tech to help soldiers map minefields,” The Times of India, 10 July 2017, bit.ly/TimesofIndiaJuly2017; 
and “IEDs pose huge challenge in efforts to counter Naxals: Police,” The Indian Express, 24 July 2017, 
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/ieds-pose-huge-challenge-in-efforts-to-counter-naxals-
police-4764492/. 
27 PEDEC website, www.pedec.ir/en; and email from Reza Amaninasab, Ambassadors for Development 
without Borders, Tehran, 9 July 2018.
28 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form C, p. 26.
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Improvised mines are not new and have been found in many countries for decades. The 
countries here do not comprise an exhaustive list, so the true extent of global improvised 
mine contamination is probably more widespread. In 2017 and 2018, confirmed or suspected 
improvised mine contamination and/or incidents and casualties were reported in the 
following States Parties: Afghanistan, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, 
Sri Lanka, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen; and states not party India, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, 
Pakistan, and Syria.29
States Parties have a number of obligations with regards to improvised mines. Affected 
States Parties must report any confirmed or suspected improvised mine contamination in 
their Article 7 transparency reports. Resources must be made available to assess the extent 
of contamination and develop appropriate strategies to address it. States Parties should 
exchange expertise to ensure that standards are adequate for addressing improvised mines. 
Affected countries and donors must be prepared to cover the costs of equipment and 
resources needed to deal with improvised mines, which maybe higher than dealing with 
manufactured mines. Finally, States Parties should also monitor progress toward meeting 
Article 5 obligations related to improvised mines to ensure compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty.
The global understanding of the extent of contamination has slightly improved since 
2016, but there has been no systematic survey of any improvised mine contamination. In 
2017, Afghanistan reported 20km2 affected by abandoned improvised mines,30 and it has 
yet to reach a reliable estimate of the 248km2 identified through a rapid assessment.31 
Colombia reports a national estimate of 46 km2 of mine contamination, which is largely 
improvised mines, although it has yet to establish a national baseline.32 In Iraq, improvised 
mine contamination has not been subject to large-scale systematic survey, although the 
national authorities report that they cover hundreds of square kilometers.33 In September 
2018, Iraq reported 184km2 of IED contamination as of the end of 2017, which may in fact be 
improvised mines.34 In Syria, improvised mines made up more than three-quarters of items 
destroyed by one international clearance operator around Raqqa and more than 60% of 
items it destroyed in Hassakeh governorate.35
Afghanistan issued a policy paper on Abandoned Improvised Mines (AIM) in May 2018 
that set out a number of principles to be followed by implementing partners.36 In Iraq, the 
Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) introduced a national standard on IEDs in 2016 and is 
working with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to update 
the standard to take into account the experience gained in tackling the dense contamination 
of improvised devices in areas liberated from the non-state armed group Islamic State since 
2016.37
Cameroon and Nigeria should inform States Parties of the discovery of any contamination 
including victim-activated improvised mines. Iraq must consider improvised mine 
contamination as part of its Mine Ban Treaty obligations. It was not included in Iraq’s 2018 
Article 5 mine clearance deadline extension request, nor in its Article 7 report for 2017. 
29 For further details, see individual country profiles on Mine Action and Casualties on the Monitor website, 
www.the-monitor.org.
30 Afghanistan uses the term Abandoned Improvised Mines (AIM), instead of the previously used term 
“Pressure Plate IED,” (PPIED). Email from Habib Khan, Head, Victim Assistance Department, DMAC, 21 
June 2018. See, Directorate of Mine Action (DMAC), “Policy on Abandoned Improvised Mines Demining in 
Afghanistan,” May 2018.
31 Emails from DMAC, 11 April and 18 August 2018; DMAC, “MAPA Fast Facts, Quarterly Update, 4th Quarter 
1396 (January−March 2018).”
32 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form D.
33 Emails from Ahmed Al Jasim, Manager, Information Department, DMA, 6 April 2017; and from Khatab 
Omer Ahmed, Planning Manager, Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA), 8 April 2017.
34 Email from Ahmad Al Jasim, Directorate of Mine Action (DMA), 13 September 2018.
35 Email from international mine action operator on condition of anonymity, 3 May 2018.
36 DMAC, “Policy on Abandoned Improvised Mines Demining in Afghanistan,” May 2018.

















MINE BAN TREATY ARTICLE 5 OBLIGATIONS
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties are required to clear all antipersonnel 
mines as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty. 
States Parties that consider themselves unable to complete their mine clearance obligations 
within the deadline may submit a request for a deadline extension of up to 10 years.
COMPLETION OF ARTICLE 5 IMPLEMENTATION





























* Montenegro declared completion of clearance, but additional contamination was found and 
subsequently cleared in 2016–2017.
** In 2015, Mozambique declared completion of clearance, but additional contamination was found and 
subsequently cleared in 2016–2017.
Mauritania completed clearance in December 2017 and, as of July 2018, the mine action 
program had submitted a proposal to the government that a declaration of compliance with 
their Article 5 obligations be made.38
In addition, state not party Nepal and other area Taiwan have completed clearance of 
known mined areas since 1999. El Salvador, a State Party, completed clearance in 1994 
before the Mine Ban Treaty was created.
Jordan declared completion of clearance under the Mine Ban Treaty in 2012 but is still 
finding antipersonnel mine contamination and therefore does not appear in the table. 
Nigeria declared completion of clearance in 2011, however there have been reports of new 
contamination resulting from use of antipersonnel mines by a non-state armed group. It 
therefore does not appear in the table.
PROGRESS ON MEETING DEADLINES
As of October 2018, only four States Parties appear to be on track to meet their clearance 
deadliness, while 13 appear not to be on track, and the status of seven is unclear. Seven are 
awaiting approval of their extension requests submitted in 2018. Two States Parties that 
have declared completion in the past are still finding antipersonnel mine contamination and 
should request new deadlines. One State Party is ready to declare completion.
38 Email from Alioune ould Menane, National Coordinator, National Humanitarian Demining Programme for 
Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD), 23 July 
2018.
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States Parties with outstanding Article 5 obligations, their deadlines, and status of 
any deadline extensions as of October 2018
States Parties Original deadline Extension period Deadline
On track to meet 
deadline
Afghanistan 1 March 2013 10 years 1 March 2023 Not on track
Angola 1 January 
2013
5 years (1st extn.)
8 years (2nd extn.)
31 December 2025 Unclear
Argentina 1 March 2010 10 years 1 March 2020 No change since 
extension granted
BiH 1 March 2009 10 years 1 March 2019 Interim extension request 
submitted to 2021
Cambodia 1 January 
2010
10 years 1 January 2020 Not on track
Chad 1 November 
2009
14 months (1st extn.)
3 years (2nd extn.)
6 years (3rd extn.)
1 January 2020 Not on track
Chile 1 March 2012 8 years 1 March 2020 Unclear
Colombia 1 March 2011 10 years 1 March 2021 Not on track
Croatia 1 March 2009 10 years 1 March 2019 Extension request 
submitted to 2026
Cyprus 1 July 2013 3 years (1st extn.)
3 years (2nd extn.)
1 July 2019 Extension request 
submitted to 2022
DRC 1 November 
2012
26 months (1st 
extn.)
6 years (2nd extn.)
1 January 2021 On track
Ecuador 1 October 
2009
8 years (1st extn.)
3 months (2nd extn.)
5 years (3rd extn.)
31 December 2022 Unclear
Eritrea 1 February 
2012
3 years (1st extn.)
5 years (2nd extn.)
1 February 2020 Not on track
Ethiopia 1 June 2015 5 years 1 June 2020 Not on track
Iraq 1 February 
2018
10 years 1 February 2028 Not on track
Jordan 1 May 2009 5 years
Declared 
completion in 2012, 
but contamination 
still found
1 May 2012 Should submit extension 
request
Mauritania 1 January 
2011
5 years (1st extn.)
5 years (2nd extn.)
1 January 2021 Ready to declare 
completion
Niger 1 September 
2009
N/A* (1st extn.)
1 year (2nd extn.)
4 years (3rd extn.)
31 December 2020 Unclear 
Nigeria 1 March 2012 Declared 
completion in 2011, 
but contamination 
still found
Should submit extension 
request



















In 2017, five States Parties submitted requests for extended deadlines to complete 
their Article 5 obligations that were granted at the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties in 
December 2017.
  Angola requested until 1 January 2026 with the goal of eliminating 1,465 mined 
areas totaling 221.4km2. It is in the process of completing national non-technical 
survey across the country.39 In granting the extension, States Parties requested 
Angola provide an updated and detailed workplan providing greater clarity on the 
amount of remaining contaminated land and milestones for completion.40 Angola 
pledged to submit this updated workplan by the 17th Meeting of States Parties in 
November 2018.41
39 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), November 2017, pp. 6 and 11.
40 “Decisions on the request submitted by Angola for an extension of the deadline for completing the 
destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention,” Mine Ban Treaty 
Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, 21 December 2017.
41 Statement by Amb. Maria de Jesus Dos Reis Ferreira, Mine Ban Treaty Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, 
Vienna, 21 December 2017.
States Parties Original deadline Extension period Deadline
On track to meet 
deadline
Palestine 1 June 2028 N/A N/A Unclear
Peru 1 March 2009 8 years (1st extn.)
7 years 8 months 
(2nd extn.)
31 December 2024 On track
Senegal 1 March 2009 7 years (1st extn.)
5 years (2nd extn.)
1 March 2021 Not on track
Serbia 1 March 2014 5 years 1 March 2019 Extension request 
submitted to 2023
Somalia 1 October 
2022
N/A N/A Not on track
South Sudan 9 July 2021 N/A N/A Not on track
Sri Lanka 1 June 2028 N/A N/A On track
Sudan 1 April 2014 5 years 1 April 2019 Extension request 
submitted to 2023
Tajikistan 1 April 2010 10 years 1 April 2020 Not on track
Thailand 1 May 2009 9.5 years (1st extn.)
5 years (2nd extn.)
31 October 2023 Unclear
Turkey 1 March 2014 8 years 1 March 2022 Not on track
Ukraine 1 June 2016 N/A N/A Extension requested to 
2021
United Kingdom 1 March 2009 10 years 1 March 2019 Extension requested to 
2024
Yemen 1 March 2009 6 years (1st extn.)
5 years (2nd extn.)
1 March 2020 Not on track
Zimbabwe 1 March 2009 22 months (1st extn.)
2 years (2nd extn.)
2 years (3rd extn.)
3 years (4th extn.)
8 years (5th extn.)
31 December 2025 On track
Note: N/A = not applicable. 
* Niger’s first extension request was granted until 31 December 2015 in accordance with a procedure for mined areas 
discovered after the expiration of the state’s Article 5 deadline.
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  Ecuador was granted a five-year extension until 31 December 2022. It stated that it 
was requesting an additional five years to clear the remaining 0.1km2 of mined areas 
because mechanical assets cannot be used in these areas and operating conditions 
are challenging.42 In granting the extension, States Parties requested that Ecuador 
submit, by 30 April 2019, an updated workplan for the remaining period covered by 
the extension request.43
  Iraq was granted a 10-year extension until 1 February 2028. The extension request 
set out separate two-year and 10-year workplans. It said the two-year workplan 
was based on existing capacity and described the 10-year plan as “aspirational” and 
dependent on attracting donor funding.44 The plans did not address improvised mine 
contamination. In granting the request, States Parties requested that Iraq submit 
to the Fourth Review Conference in 2019 an updated workplan for the remaining 
period covered by the extension request, and every two years following this. The 
meeting noted that success is contingent upon increased funding, the maintenance 
of security, and changes in the political climate to enable access to those hazardous 
areas near international borders.45
  Thailand was granted a five-year extension to 31 October 2023. It had a total 
of 358.81km2 remaining to be released, of which it foresees 86.5% of suspected 
contamination being cancelled.46 States Parties, recalling that the implementation 
of Thailand’s national demining plan may be affected by pending survey and 
demarcation of land boundaries, requested that Thailand submit to the States 
Parties, by 30 April 2019, an updated workplan for the remaining period covered by 
the extension request.47
  Zimbabwe was granted an extension request to 31 December 2025 to complete survey 
and clearance of all mined areas. The Committee on Article 5 Implementation noted 
that the plan presented by Zimbabwe is workable, lends itself well to be monitored, 
and states clearly which factors could affect the pace of implementation.48 States 
Parties requested that Zimbabwe submit, by 30 April 2019, an updated detailed 
workplan for the remaining period covered by the extension.49
In 2018, seven States Parties submitted requests for extended deadlines to complete 
their Article 5 obligations, for approval at the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in 
November 2018.
  BiH submitted an interim two-year extension request to 1 March 2021 in order to 
carry out survey activities to more accurately define the perimeter of mined areas. 
BiH believes it will then be better able to calculate the time required to complete its 
Article 5 obligations. It has pledged to submit a final extension request by 31 March 
2020. During 2019 and 2020, BiH also intends to continue land release operations 
42 Additional information to Ecuador’s deadline Extension Request, 8 September 2017.
43 “Decisions on the request submitted by Ecuador for an extension of the deadline for completing the 
destruction of antipersonnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention,” Mine Ban Treaty 
Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, 21 December 2017.
44 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), August 2017, p. 13.
45 “Decisions on the request submitted by Iraq for an extension of the deadline for completing the 
destruction of antipersonnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention,” 21 December 2017.
46 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), September 2017, pp. 5 and 6.
47 “Decisions on the request submitted by Thailand for an extension of the deadline for completing the 
destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention,” Mine Ban Treaty 
Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, 21 December 2017.
48 “Decisions on the request submitted by Zimbabwe for an extension of the deadline for completing the 
destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention,” Mine Ban Treaty 


















in line with annual workplans,50 however it is not clear how this will be coordinated 
with the national survey.51 The extension request contained conflicting figures for 
the extent of suspected contamination.
  Croatia requested until 1 March 2026 to address its remaining 387.3km2 of mine 
contamination. Croatia intends to use state as well as European Union funds, which 
it is confident it will secure as planned.52
  Cyprus submitted an extension request to 1 July 2022, referring back to its 2015 
second request. The reason cited for the second request was the same as the first, 
namely that Cyprus does not have effective control over remaining contaminated 
areas.53
  Serbia submitted an extension request to 1 March 2023. It includes a workplan 
for the completion of demining of 2.35km2 during the period 2018–2023.54 The 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) noted that the first extension 
request was found by States Parties to lack ambition, that the second extension 
request is for a similar amount of land to be released in a similar amount of time, 
and that it believes that Serbia’s targets could be more ambitious.55
  Sudan submitted an extension request to April 2023. It includes an updated workplan, 
with annual targets for completion, with a total planned release of 53 confirmed 
hazardous areas with a size of 2.42km2 and 45 suspected hazardous areas with a 
size of 16.87km2, as of February 2018. Sudan committed to producing a detailed 
and updated workplan for clearance of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states for 
2019–2023 when security conditions enable full access. It is expected that access 
will result in the cancellation of suspected areas as well as new hazardous areas 
being identified.56
  Ukraine submitted an extension request to 1 December 2021. Ukraine’s preliminary 
estimation is that 7,000km2 of land is contaminated. This is not just antipersonnel 
mine contamination, but also includes ERW. Ukraine also reports the presence of 
improvised mines. The extension request states that the irregular and non-selective 
use of mines currently prevents an understanding of the extent of contamination. It 
also states that, “Currently Ukraine doesn’t have control over the temporary occupied 
parts on Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as over the Autonomous Republic 
of Crimea.” A State Program for Restoration and Development of Peace in Eastern 
Regions of Ukraine has been established, which aims to conduct demining activities 
in 2018—2020, funded by the state budget. The extension request outlines the 
roles and responsibilities of the different actors engaged in mine action, but does 
not provide a workplan. Until the extension request is approved by States Parties, 
Ukraine is in violation of Article 5 for missing its 1 June 2016 clearance deadline.57
  The UK submitted a second extension request through to 1 March 2024. The UK 
expects that eight mined areas, covering an estimated 0.16km2 will remain by March 
2020. These areas are all located in Yorke Bay, an environmentally sensitive beach 
50 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, September 2018, pp. 22 and 27; and “BIH Statement 
on Interim Request for Extension to the Deadline for Fulfilling Obligations as per Article 5,” Mine Ban 
Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7 June 2018.
51 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, September 2018, pp. 22 and 27; and “BIH Statement 
on Interim Request for Extension to the Deadline for Fulfilling Obligations as per Article 5,” Mine Ban 
Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7 June 2018.
52 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 44; and addition information submitted on 21 
June 2019, p. 2.
53 Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2015.
54 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 14 March 2018, pp. 8, 9, 31, and 32.
55 ICBL comments on Serbia’s extension request to the Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, 7–8 June 
2018.
56 Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), 28 March 2018, pp. 8 and 11.
57 Mine Ban Treaty deadline Extension Request, 1 November 2018, pp. 1-3.
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and sand dune area.58 Technical survey at Yorke Bay will be conducted by 1 March 
2019, which will enable the clearance work to be costed.59 The UK stated its “strong 
intention” to complete clearance within five years, but warned that there could be a 
delay in securing further funding.60
MONITORING THE PROGRESS OF STATES PARTIES 
AGAINST THEIR ARTICLE 5 OBLIGATIONS AND THE 
MAPUTO ACTION PLAN 
In the Maputo Action Plan, adopted at the Third Review Conference in June 2014, States 
Parties agreed to “intensify their efforts to complete their respective time-bound obligations 
with the urgency that the completion work requires.”61 Actions #8, #9, and #11 relate to 
clearance.
The Committee on Article 5 Implementation presented its preliminary observations at 
the intersessional meetings in June 2018, reporting on 25 States Parties that had submitted 
information by that date.62
The assessment of progress under the Maputo Action Plan is drawn from both the 
committee’s observations and Landmine Monitor’s review of the progress of States Parties.
MAPUTO ACTION PLAN ACTION #8: QUANTIFICATION 
AND QUALIFICATION OF REMAINING CONTAMINATION 
CHALLENGE
Almost all States Parties need to improve the quantification and qualification of the 
remaining contamination challenge. Only four States Parties have a clear understanding of 
the remaining contamination: Chile, Ecuador, Sri Lanka, and the UK. Thirteen States Parties 
have a good knowledge of the locations of confirmed and 
suspected contamination, but survey is needed to clarify 
the actual extent of contamination within those areas: 
Angola, BiH, Croatia, Cyprus, DRC, Jordan, Peru, Senegal, 
Serbia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. Thirteen 
States Parties have reported on known contaminated 
areas, but do not have a complete picture of the extent 
of contamination, as there are areas that have not 
been surveyed: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, 
Ethiopia, Iraq, Mozambique, Niger, Somalia, South Sudan, 
Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen. Eritrea has not provided an 
update on the estimated extent of contamination since 
the end of 2013. Three States Parties have not formally 
reported the locations of any mined areas: Cameroon, 
Nigeria, and Oman.
There were inconsistencies between the figures 
provided by different sources (such as Article 7 reports, 
Article 5 extension requests, mine action centers, and 
operators) for the extent of remaining contamination at 
the end of 2017 in the following countries: Afghanistan, 
BiH, Iraq, Peru, and Senegal. 
58 Mine Ban Treaty deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2018, pp. 7 and 14.
59 Ibid., p. 4.
60 Ibid., pp. 14 and 15.
61 Maputo Action Plan, 27 June 2014, bit.ly/MaputoActionPlan.
62 Preliminary Observations of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 7–8 June 2018, 
bit.ly/MBT2018ISM. 
Explosives  are  destroyed  while  a  safe  distance 
away  mine-protected  diggers  continue  to 
prepare  land  for  future  clearance at this site 
near Siem Reap, Cambodia.

















The Committee on Article 5 Implementation assessed the degree of clarity of the 
remaining challenge, finding that only seven of the 25 States Parties assessed had provided 
a high degree of clarity in their reporting: Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, 
and Zimbabwe.63
MAPUTO ACTION PLAN ACTION #9: APPLICATION OF 
LAND RELEASE TECHNOLOGIES
Almost all States Parties that implemented systematic mine clearance programs in 2017 
used land release methodologies (survey and clearance). 
In 2017, three States Parties used non-technical and technical survey to release significant 
amounts of land—more than 30km2—thus greatly decreasing their estimate of remaining 
contamination: Angola, Cambodia, and Thailand.
In Angola, re-survey has been completed in 15 of its 18 provinces.64 Jordan continued the 
process of verifying areas for missing mines. In Somalia in 2017, for the first time, survey 
and risk education teams were deployed in all five of southcentral Somalia’s federal states, 
despite security challenges.65 In Sri Lanka, a district-by-district re-survey that began in 2015 
was completed in February 2017, providing far greater clarity on the extent of confirmed 
contamination remaining.66
In some States Parties, plans are underway to increase the use of land release approaches. 
In BiH, a country-wide “assessment” is to be conducted in 2018–2019 to establish a more 
accurate baseline of mine contamination and help to improve the efficiency of follow-
on survey and clearance operations.67 The new Cambodian national mine action strategy 
issued in 2017 emphasized that “it is essential clearance assets are only deployed in areas 
where there is clear evidence of mines,” reacting to a weakness in clearance operations in 
previous years. It said that, in the future, clearance tasks should be prioritized on the basis 
of “effective” non-technical survey.68 In Chad, at the end of 2017, funding was secured to 
conduct survey and clearance.69 Colombia’s strategic plan for 2016–2021 aims to establish a 
national baseline of contamination.
Continuous conflict in State Party Yemen since March 2015 has prevented systematic 
survey. 
However, the committee observed that some States Parties have not adopted the most 
relevant land release standards, policies, and methodologies, in line with the International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS) and in a manner consistent with Action #9 of the Maputo Action Plan.70
MAPUTO ACTION PLAN ACTION #11: ON-TIME 
SUBMISSION OF HIGH-QUALITY REQUESTS
In 2018, six states submitted Article 5 extension requests on time: BiH, Croatia, Cyprus, Serbia, 
Sudan, and the UK. Ukraine submitted a long overdue request in November 2018.
63 Ibid.
64 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for June 2017–April 2018), p. 8; and email from Gerhard Zank, Programme 
Manager, HALO Trust, 11 September 2018.
65 Emails from Claus Nielsen, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 22 March and 10 September 2018.
66 Email from Alistair Moir, Country Director, MAG, 27 September 2017.
67 Email from Ljiljana Ilić, Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMAC), 17 May 2018; BHMAC, 
“Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Annual Report 2017,” January 2018, p. 21; and revised Mine Ban 
Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, September 2018, pp. 6 and 20–21.
68 Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), “National Mine Action Strategy 2017–
2025,” May 2018, pp. 8–9.
69 Responses to questionnaire by Romain Coupez, MAG, 3 May 2017; and by Benjamin Westercamp and 
Seydou N’Gaye, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), 22 March 2017.
70 “Preliminary Observations, Committee on Article 5 Implementation,” Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional 
Meetings, 7–8 June 2018.
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All seven requests included information on progress made 
so far, and some form of political commitment to complete the 
task of mine clearance. Most contained consistent data, detailed 
plans for land release activities during the extension period, 
and milestones to measure progress. However, there was scope 
for improvement in the quality of data and description of plans 
in some extension requests.71
MAPUTO ACTION PLAN ACTION #25: 
ANNUAL SUBMISSION OF HIGH-
QUALITY AND UPDATED INFORMATION
As of October 2018, Article 7 transparency reports for 2017 were 
still outstanding for Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Yemen. Four 
were outstanding in the same month of 2017.
Cameroon has not submitted an Article 7 report since 2009, 
Eritrea and Nigeria since 2014. 
Sri Lanka’s initial Article 7 report is due by 28 November 
2018.
(See the table “Clearance of mined area in 2017” above for notes about the quality of 
information provided on clearance by individual states.)
OTHER ISSUES AFFECTING CLEARANCE OBLIGATIONS
FUNDING
Inadequate funding was cited as a challenge to achieving Article 5 implementation 
deadlines by the following States Parties: Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Ethiopia, 
Iraq, Niger, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Zimbabwe.
Although DRC has stated that it can achieve its Article 5 deadline, it reported funding 
difficulties.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP
Almost all States Parties with mine contamination have a national mine action program or 
institutions that are assigned to fulfill the state’s clearance obligations. 
In Cyprus, the mine action program is managed by UNMAS.72
In Somalia, there was no government funding for the Somalia Explosive Management 
Authority (SEMA), and UNMAS stopped funding SEMA at start of 2016, in expectation that its 
legislative framework was due to be approved by the Federal Parliament and that funding 
for SEMA would be allocated from the national budget.73
In South Sudan, while it is planned that the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) will 
ultimately assume full responsibility for all mine action activities, UNMAS has reported that 
the NMAA’s continued serious financial and technical limitations challenged the effective 
management of operations in 2017.74 In 2018, UNMAS stated that reversing a change in the 
71 See summaries above, and detailed country profiles for further information at www.the-monitor.org/cp.
72 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Joseph Huber, UNMAS, and Maj. Rich 
Pearce, UNFICYP), 11 September 2018.
73 Emails from Terje Eldøen, NPA, 5 June and 14 June 2016. A seven-month grant from UNMAS expired in 
December 2015 under which SEMA was expected to have established itself as a sustainable government 
entity. Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, 8 June 2017.
74 Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.
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United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) mandate that halted the capacity-building 
of government institutions would greatly enhance UNMAS’ ability to support the NMAA.75
In Ukraine, a national mine action program overseen by a national mine action authority 
and center is being developed with support from the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) Project-Coordinator and the GICHD.76 The donors have agreed to 
an extension of the project until the end of 2018 due to delays in the adoption of the mine 
action law.77
In Yemen, the Yemeni Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) has become, de facto, two 
organizations, split between Sanaa, under the control of the Houthis, and the southern 
city of Aden controlled by the Saudi- and UAE-led coalition and Yemen’s internationally 
recognizedbut exiled government. The Sanaa office coordinates operations in the north and 
center of the country while the Aden office oversees operations in southern provinces.78
In Eritrea, the mine action program was not functioning in 2017. States Parties, Nigeria, 
and Oman do not have national mine action programs.
In stark contrast, fewer than half of states not party have functioning mine action 
programs. There were no new mine action programs established among states not party in 
2017. The following 12 states not party do not have national mine action programs: China, 
Cuba, Kyrgyzstan, India, Morocco, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, 
and Uzbekistan. Egypt’s mine action program continued to not function, while the status of 
Iran’s mine action center remained unclear.
CLEARANCE IN CONFLICT
In 2017 and 2018, conflict affected land release operations in 11 States Parties (Afghanistan, 
Cameroon, Colombia, Iraq, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen) 
and four states not party (Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria). Insecurity also restricted 
access to some areas that are or may be antipersonnel mine-affected in States Parties Chad, 
Colombia, DRC, Ethiopia, Jordan, Senegal, Thailand, and Turkey.79
In Afghanistan, some provinces are inaccessible to mine action operators. In 2017, three 
humanitarian deminers were killed and one injured in conflict-related attacks.80
In Colombia, although the 2016 peace deal resulted in an agreement by the government 
and the FARC on demining, by August 2018, the election of a new president made the status 
of some of the pillars of the peace deal uncertain. In some locations, this has had an effect on 
the ability of operators to conduct land release.81 In 2017 and 2018, humanitarian demining 
operators had vehicles seized and damaged by FARC dissidents, in some cases resulting in 
the suspension of operations.82
75 Ibid.
76 “Mine Action Activities,” Side-event presentation by Amb. Vaidotas Verba, Head of Mission, OSCE Project 
Coordinator in Ukraine, 19th International Meeting, 17 February 2016.
77 Email from Miljenko Vahtaric, OSCE PCU, 30 April 2018.
78 Interviews with Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, and Stephen Bryant, Chief Technical Adviser, UNDP, in Geneva, 17 
February 2016; and UNDP, “Support to eliminate the impact from mines and ERW − Phase IV, Annual 
Progress Report 2014,” undated but 2015.
79 See Mine Action country profiles available on the Monitor website, www.the-monitor.org/cp.
80 UNAMA, “Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2017,” February 2018.
81 International Crisis Group, “Risky Business: The Duque Government Approach,” 21 June 2018; and 
interviews with Pauline Boyer and Aderito Ismael, HI, Vista Hermosa, 8 August 2018; with Esteban Rueda, 
and Sergio Machecha, NPA, Vista Hermosa, 9 August 2018; with Hein Bekker, and Emily Chrystie, HALO 
Trust, San Juan de Arama, 10 August 2018; and with John Jimenez, Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines 
(CCCM), Vista Hermosa, 11 August 2018.
82 Email from Vanessa Finson, NPA, 11 May 2018; interviews with Alejandro Perez, CCCM, Bogota, 14 August 
2018; and with Hein Bekker and Emily Chrystie, HALO Trust, San Juan de Arama, 10 August 2018; and 
“Hombres armados detienen equipo de The HALO Trust en Uribe, Meta; amenazan al personal y queman 
una camioneta,” Descontamina Colombia, 19 July 2018.
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In South Sudan, the release of mined areas 
plummeted in 2017 largely due to security 
concerns from the ongoing conflict, which 
significantly impeded mine action operations 
during the year. The program shifted away from 
large area clearance to EOD spot tasks using 
smaller, more mobile teams.83 Four mine action 
personnel were seriously injured in an ambush, 
and there were several instances of criminality 
in which teams were robbed by armed groups.84
In Iraq, Somalia, and Yemen, despite 
insecurity, some progress was reported. In Iraq, 
the main priority was tackling the massive 
contamination by improvised mines and other 
ERW found in areas recaptured from the non-
state armed group Islamic State, to facilitate 
the return of internally displaced people, 
the rehabilitation of public services, and the 
restoration of the economy.85 In Somalia in 
2017, survey and risk education teams were able to be deployed in all five of southcentral 
Somalia’s federal states for the first time. HALO Trust was able to deploy survey and clearance 
teams despite persistently high levels of insecurity. In August 2017, three HALO staff were 
abducted by the non-state armed group Al-Shabaab; one was shot but recovered. All were 
eventually released.86 In Yemen, despite continued armed conflict, the YEMAC expanded 
operations and improved productivity.87
In states not party Libya and Syria, where there is limited clearance capacity, international 
mine clearance operators have continued to focus their efforts on capacity-building and 
training of national actors.88
Occupation and other issues related to the jurisdiction and control of territory also impact 
mine clearance. Cyprus does not have effective control of antipersonnel mine-contaminated 
areas. In Palestine, Israel will not authorize clearance by Palestinians, and most mined areas 
are in zones controlled by Israel or under joint control.89 Ukraine has noted that it does 
83 Emails from Tim Lardner, Chief, Mine Action, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.
84 Emails from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 6 June 2018; and from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 
March 2018.
85 Interview with Baker Saheb Ahmed, DMA, Baghdad, 5 September 2018; and, UNMAS in Iraq website, 
unmas.shorthandstories.com/unmas-in-iraq/index.html.
86 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.
87 UNDP, “YEMAC productivity, January to May 2018,” received by email from Stephen Bryant, UNDP, 15 July 
2018; and Minutes of Yemen Mine Action Technical Working Group Meeting, Amman, 24 July 2018.
88 Libya: UNMAS, “Programmes: Libya,” March 2018; emails from Lyuba Guerassimova, Programme Officer, 
UNMAS, 28 February 2017; and from Dandan Xu, Associate Programme Management Officer, UNMAS, 12 
July 2017; and Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Support Mission in Libya, UN Doc. S/2018/140, 
12 February 2018, p. 12; email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, 21 June 2018; DCA website, www.danchurchaid.
org/where-we-work/libya; telephone interview with Darren Devlin, DDG, 20 June 2018; and email, 4 July 
2018; Syria: Telephone interview with Luke Irving, Specialist Training and EOD Manager, Mayday Rescue, 
28 March 2018; Mayday Rescue, “Syria Civil Defence, Explosive Hazard Mitigation Project Overview, Nov 
2015–Mar 2018,” 1 March 2018; email from international mine action operator on the basis of anonymity, 
3 May 2018; interview with Tim Porter, Regional Director for the Middle East, HALO Trust, in Geneva, 15 
February 2018; emails from Adam Boyd, Programme Manager, HALO Trust Syria/Jordan, and Rob Syfret, 
Deputy Programme Manager and Operations Manager, HALO Trust, 18 May, 13 and 21 June 2018; and 
HALO Trust, “Survey and Explosive Hazard Removal in Dar’a and Quneitra Governorates, Southern Syria,” 
undated but 2018.
89 Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 26 June 2018.
Demonstration at event held for International Day of Mine 
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not currently have access to some mined areas.90 In Azerbaijan, Armenian forces occupy a 
significant area of the country where considerable contamination exists. In Georgia, there 
may be mined areas in South Ossetia, however, South Ossetia is effectively subject to Russian 
control and is inaccessible to the Georgian authorities and international NGOs. In Thailand, 
a high proportion of remaining contamination is located in border areas that are the subject 
of demarcation disputes or security issues.91
COUNTRY/AREA SUMMARIES
Below are brief summaries of contamination and clearance efforts in countries with massive 
contamination of more than 100km2, in addition to Syria where the scale of the extensive 
contamination is not known. (For complete information on all states, see the online mine action 
country profiles at www.the-monitor.org/cp.)
Afghanistan
The Department of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) reported that State Party Afghanistan 
had 205km2 of areas containing antipersonnel mines at the end of 2017.92 Surveys continue to 
find new areas of legacy contamination, and mine/ERW contamination continues to increase. 
The DMAC reported an additional 20km2 of improvised mine contamination, and it has yet 
to reach a reliable estimate of the much larger areas also thought to be contaminated by 
such mines.93 Afghanistan now identifies improvised mines as the greatest challenge for the 
mine action sector.94 Mine clearance is conducted by six national and three international 
NGOs.95 Since 2012, land release has been affected by a sharp downturn in funding as well 
as security constraints.96
Angola
As of April 2018, State Party Angola reported a total 147.6km2 of mined areas: 89.3km2 of 
confirmed hazardous areas and 58.3km2 of suspected hazardous areas. All 18 provinces still 
contain mined areas.97 As of September 2018, national re-survey had been completed in 15 
provinces. Of the remaining provinces, Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul were due to be completed 
in 2018, while re-survey had yet to commence in Cabinda.98 Clearance is conducted by four 
Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED) operators—
the Armed Forces, the Military Office of the President, INAD, and the Police Border Guard, 
as well as commercial companies, and three international NGOs—the HALO Trust, Mines 
Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). Angola faces severe funding 
constraints to achieving its new Article 5 deadline of 2025.99
90 Letter to the UN Secretary General from Ukraine, 1 June 2018; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline 
Extension Request, 1 November 2018, p. 3.
91 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), September 2017, pp. 3 and 21.
92 Emails from DMAC, 11 April and 18 August 2018. However, the Article 7 Report (for 2017) states that 2,088 
antipersonnel mine hazards covering 223km2 remained at the end of 2017.
93 Emails from DMAC, 11 April and 18 August 2018.
94 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Background, p. 5. 
95 National NGOs: Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC), Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA), Mine 
Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA), Mine Detection and Dog Centre (MDC), Organization for Mine Clearance 
and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR), AREA. International NGOs: Danish Demining Group (DDG), HALO Trust, 
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), and Janus Demining Afghanistan (previously Sterling International).
96 Interview with Mohammad Shafiq Yosufi, DMAC, in Geneva, 8 June 2018; email from DMAC, 1 April 2018; 
and UN Mine Action Gateway, “Survey and Clearance of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) 
in 1397 (April 2018–March 2019),” undated.
97 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for June 2017–April 2018), p. 8. 
98 Ibid.; and email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 11 September 2018.
99 Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and from 
Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.
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Azerbaijan
No estimate of the extent of contamination in state not party Azerbaijan was provided 
for the end of 2017, but at the end of 2015, 69.9km2 of area was suspected to contain 
antipersonnel mines.100 In addition, the extent of contamination in areas occupied by 
Armenia is unknown, although the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) has 
suggested that contamination may cover between 350km2 and 830km2.101 The most heavily 
contaminated areas are along the borders and confrontation lines between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, including the area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.102 In 2017, land release was 
conducted by ANAMA and two national NGOs, International Eurasia Press Fund (IEFP) and 
Daya. Land release increased in 2017 to facilitate the return by internally displaced people 
to a village that had been liberated from Armenian occupation in 2016.103 However, of the 
7.69km2 cleared, 3.6km2 was found to contain no mines.104
BiH
State Party BiH has provided conflicting estimates of the extent of contamination at the end 
of 2017, the lowest figure being 1,056km2.105 BiH expects that not all suspected hazardous 
areas are in fact contaminated by mines and that clearance will only need to be conducted in 
relatively small areas.106 An 18-month country-wide assessment is planned for 2018–2019. 
The results of this re-survey will enable BiH to plan for the realization of the new National 
Mine Action Strategy for 2018–2025 and preparation of its final Article 5 extension request 
through to completion.107 In 2017, land release of mined areas was conducted by the BiH 
Armed Forces, Federal Administration of Civil Protection, the Civil Protection of Republic of 
Srpska, 10 NGOs, and four commercial demining companies.108
Cambodia
State Party Cambodia’s antipersonnel mine problem is concentrated in, but not limited to, 
21 northwestern districts along the border with Thailand. As of the end of 2017, the total 
known or suspected contamination is 895km2.109 In 2018, Cambodia launched a new National 
Mine Action Strategy to complete clearance of mines by 2025, beyond Cambodia’s current 
Article 5 deadline of 2020.110 This is dependent on increased donor funding. The strategy 
emphasizes more efficient use of clearance assets.111 Land release is undertaken mainly by 
the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) and two NGOs, HALO Trust and MAG.
100 Email from Tural Mammadov, Operations Officer, Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA), 19 
October 2016.
101 ANAMA, “Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2018,” undated, p. 5.
102 See report on Nagorno-Karabakh on Monitor website.
103 Email from Sabina Sarkarova, ANAMA, 2 May 2018.
104 ANAMA, “Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2018,” undated, p. 14.
105 Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), 7 September 2018, pp. 5, 17, 
and 18. It also reports 1,080km2. See p. 4. The Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form C, reports 
1,061km2 of suspected hazardous area.
106 Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), 7 September 2018, p. 19.
107 Email from Ljiljana Ilić, BHMAC, 17 May 2018; BHMAC, “Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Annual 
Report 2017,” January 2018, p. 21; and Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request 
(Revised), submitted September 2018, pp. 6 and 20–21.
108 Email from Ljiljana Ilić, BHMAC, 17 May 2018; Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), 
Form F; and BHMAC, “Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Annual Report 2017,” January 2018, p. 14. The 
national NGOs are: DEMIRA, Dok-ing Deminiranje N.H.O., EDD Training Centre, Eko Dem, Pro Vita, Stop 
Mines, Udruga “Pazi Mine Vitez,” and, Association UEM. The international NGOs are MAG and NPA. The 
commercial operators are: Detektor, N&N Ivsa, Point, and UEM.
109 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), p. 9.



















As of December 2017, State Party Chad reported a total of 122km2 of confirmed and suspected 
hazardous area.112 However, Chad expects more contaminated areas to be identified in the 
Borkou, Ennedi, Moyen Chari, and Tibesti regions.113 Improvised mines have been reported 
in the Lake Chad region.114 No land release was conducted in 2017. European Union funding 
was received in late 2017 for a project called PRODECO, in which Humanity & Inclusion (HI, 
formerly Handicap International) focuses on survey and clearance in the Borkou and Ennedi 
regions while MAG works in the Tibesti and Lake Chad regions.115 The Swiss Foundation for 
Mine Action (FSD) provides technical support, training, and capacity-building to the National 
High Commission for Demining (Haut Commissariat National de Déminage, HCND).116
Croatia
At the end of 2017, State Party Croatia reported a total of 411km2 of mined area, of which 
270km2 was suspected hazardous area and 142km2 was confirmed hazardous area.117 A 
further 33km2 of confirmed hazardous areas were under military control. Eight of Croatia’s 
21 counties are mine affected.118 Almost all civil clearance is conducted by local companies 
competing for tenders. Twenty-one companies conducted demining in 2017.119 Croatia aims 
to complete clearance by March 2026, according to its second extension request submitted 
in 2018.120
Iraq
The full extent of contamination in State Party Iraq is unknown. The Directorate of Mine 
Action (DMA) and Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Authority (IKMAA) reported a total of 1,219km2. 
However, this is not consistent with the figures provided in the Article 7 report.121 In addition, 
the DMA reported 185km2 of IED contamination, much of which may in fact be antipersonnel 
mines. In 2017 and 2018, Iraq’s priority is the clearance of massive contamination by IEDs, 
including improvised mines from areas liberated from non-state armed group Islamic State, 
in order to facilitate the return of hundreds of thousands of people displaced by conflict, the 
restoration of public services, and economic recovery. Mine action in Iraq is managed along 
regional lines. The DMA coordinates and manages the sector in central and southern Iraq. 
IKMAA manages mine action in the four northern governorates that fall under the Kurdish 
Regional Government. Land release in 2017 was conducted by army engineers, the civil 
112 Email from Soultani Moussa, Manager/Administrator, National High Commission for Demining (Haut 
Commissariat National de Déminage, HCND), 19 June 2018.
113 HCND, “Plan d’action prévisionnel 2014–2019 de mise en œuvre de la composante déminage et 
dépollution de la Stratégie de l’action contre les mines au Tchad” (“Mine Action Plan 2014–2019”), May 
2014.
114 M. P. Moore, “This Month in Mines, February 2017,” 7 March 2017, https://landminesinafrica.wordpress.
com/2017/03/07/the-month-in-mines-february-2017/; “This Month in Mines: April, May and June,” 
https://landminesinafrica.wordpress.com/2017/07/25/the-months-in-mines-april-may-and-june/; “This 
Month in Mines, September and October 2017,” 30 November 2017, https://landminesinafrica.wordpress.
com/2017/11/30/the-months-in-mines-september-and-october-2017/.
115 HI, “Country Profile Chad,” September 2017, www.handicapinternational.be/sites/default/files/paginas/
bijlagen/201710_fp_tchad_fr.pdf.
116 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 14 September 2018.
117 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form C; and email from Davor Laura, Head of 
Quality Control, Croatian Mine Action Center (CROMAC), 6 April 2018.
118 In Croatia’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form C, this was reported to be 
32.66km2; and in Croatia’s 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, as 32km2.
119 Email from Davor Laura, CROMAC, 6 April 2018. See the country profile for the full list of operators in 2017.
120 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2019, p. 8.
121 This is the recent estimate of contamination as of the end of 2017, provided by email from Ahmad Al 
Jasim, DMA, 13 September 2018; and email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 8 May 2018. The Article 7 
report for 2017 reported 1,072km2 at the end of 2017.
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defense, IKMAA, national and international commercial companies,122 and five international 
NGOs (Danish Deming Group (DDG), FSD, HI, MAG, and NPA). Optima provided management 
for Al-Fahad.
Syria
State not party Syria is contaminated by landmines left by successive Arab-Israeli wars since 
1948 but particularly by the conflict since 2011. All regions are affected. Ongoing hostilities 
and reports of continuing use of landmines have prevented systematic survey to determine 
the extent and types of contamination.123 Improvised mines have been used extensively. 
Syria does not have a national mine action authority or a national program for survey and 
clearance. UNMAS operates from Gaziantep, Amman, and Beirut to coordinate support to 
mine action.124 In July 2018, UNMAS signed a memorandum of understanding with the Syrian 
government, which was reported to enable UNMAS to conduct mine risk education.125 In 2017, 
mine action was conducted by a wide range of organizations, including military engineers of 
parties to the conflict, civil defense organizations, humanitarian demining organizations, and 
commercial companies. However, no land release results were available.
Thailand
By the end of 2017, State Party Thailand reported 391km2 of suspected hazardous area.126 
However, it expected that, based on previous survey results, almost 87% of this area would 
be cancelled.127 A potential obstacle to completion of its Article 5 clearance obligations is 
the high proportion—around 90%—of remaining contamination located in border areas that 
are subject to demarcation disputes or security issues.128 In 2017, clearance was conducted 
by the Thailand Mine Action Center’s (TMAC) four Humanitarian Mine Action Units and NPA. 
The Thai Civilian Deminers Association conducted non-technical and technical survey.
Turkey
State Party Turkey reported 164km2of contamination across 3,061 confirmed hazardous areas, 
with a further 701 suspected hazardous areas, for which no estimate of size is available. The 
majority of contamination is along the border with Syria and some sections of the borders 
with Armenia, Iran, Iraq, and Azerbaijan.129 Mines have also been laid inside the country 
around military installations, while improvised mines and other IEDs have been used by 
non-state armed groups.130 In 2017, Turkey completed Phase 1 of the European Union Eastern 
Border Mine Clearance Project on the eastern border with Iran, with clearance conducted 
by commercial company MECHEM.131 The Turkish armed forces also conducted land release 
along the borders with Iran and Syria, including to support the construction of the Border 
Security Surveillance System along the Syrian border.132
122 Iraq Mine and UXO Clearance Company, al-Safsafah Mine Action Company, Akad International Company 
for Mine & UXO Clearance, Al-Fahad Co. for Demining, and Al-Danube.
123 Email from Gilles Delecourt, Senior Programme Manager, UNMAS, 22 May 2018.
124 Interview with Gilles Delecourt, UNMAS, Geneva, 16 February 2018; and email, 22 May 2018; and UNMAS, 
“Programmes in Syria,” updated March 2018.
125 “Syria, UN Mine Action Service, Sign MoU,” Syrian Arab News Agency, 8 July 2018, www.syrianews.cc/syria-
un-mine-action-service-sign-mou/.
126 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form D.
127 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), September 2017, pp. 5 and 6.
128 Ibid., pp. 3 and 21.
129 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form D.
130 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Re quest, 29 March 2013, pp. A-1 and A-5.
131 Email from Lt.-Col. Halil Şen, Turkish Mine Action Center (TURMAC), 21 June 2017; interview with Col. Zaki 
Eren, and Maj. Can Ceylan, TURMAC, in Vienna, 20 December 2018; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report 
(for calendar year 2017), Form A.
132 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form A; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report 


















The extent of contamination in State Party Yemen is unknown. Its latest Article 7 report, 
submitted in 2017, reported suspected and known contamination of 323km2 and noted that 
survey was expected to identify additional contamination.133 Yemen is contaminated with 
mines from conflicts in 1962–1969 and 1970–1983, mines that were laid in border areas 
between North and South Yemen before they unified in 1990, and mines from successive 
conflicts that erupted since 1994, including the ongoing conflict that began in March 2015. 
The latest conflict has involved extensive use of improvised mines.134 All land release is 
conducted by the Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC). Despite the ongoing conflict, 
the YEMAC expanded operations in 2017.135 However, the teams are constrained by a lack of 
training and equipment.
Western Sahara
The exact extent of mine contamination across other area Western Sahara is not known, 
although the areas along the Berm136 are thought to contain some of the densest mine 
contamination in the world.137 To the east of the berm, mine action is managed by the 
Sahrawi Mine Action Coordination Center (SMACO) with the support of UNMAS. The primary 
mine threat east of the Berm, excluding both the Berm itself and the buffer strip, is from 
antivehicle rather than antipersonnel mines; cluster munitions are also a major hazard.138 
During 2018, non-technical survey efforts east of the berm greatly reduced the extent of 
suspected contamination to an estimated 120km2 by September 2018.139 Areas located 
within the 5km-wide buffer strip are inaccessible for clearance.140 Land release east of the 
berm in 2017 was conducted by Dynasafe MineTech Limited (DML) and NPA. The area west 
of the berm is under Moroccan control, and land release is conducted by the Royal Moroccan 
Army. 141 There the extent of contamination west of the berm is unknown.
133 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 1 April 2016 to 31 March 2017), Forms D and L.
134 Conflict Armament Research, “Mines and IEDs Employed by Houthis on Yemen’s West Coast,” September 
2018, pp. 5−6, 11.
135 UNDP, “Emergency Mine Action Project, Annual Progress Report 2017,” January 2018, p. 9.
136 A 2,700km-long defensive wall, the Berm, was built during the conflict, dividing control of the territory 
between Morocco on the west, and the Polisario Front on the east. The Berm is 12-times the length of the 
fromer Berlin Wall and second in length only to the Great Wall of China. 
137 See UNMAS, “About UNMAS in Western Sahara,” updated May 2015; and Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), 
“Making life safer for the people of Western Sahara,” London, August 2011.  
138 Email from Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 1 March 2018.
139 Ibid., 14 September 2018. The buffer strip is an area 5km wide east of the Berm. MINURSO, “Ceasefire 
Monitoring Overview,” undated, https://minurso.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11421&language=en-
US.
140 Clearance of the buffer strip of mines ERW is not foreseen in MINURSO mission agreements. See, “Report 
of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara,” UN doc. S/2017/307, 10 April 2017, 
p. 8.
141 “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara,” UN doc. S/2018/277, 29 






















Nestor shows a map made with community members that identifies mine explosion 
accidents and possible dangerous sites in rural Corinto, Colombia.










High numbers of casualties continued to be recorded in 2017, following the sharp rise in 
2015, with a total of at least 7,239 people killed or injured by antipersonnel and antivehicle 
landmines, including improvised landmines, as well as unexploded cluster submunitions,1 
and other explosive remnants of war (ERW)—henceforth mines/ERW. However, it is certain 
that numerous casualties went unrecorded. Some of the most mine/ERW-affected countries 
do not have national casualty surveillance systems in place, nor do other forms of adequate 
reporting exist.
While remaining very high, the total for 2017 marks a decrease on the casualties recorded 
for 2016. The casualty database for Landmine Monitor Report 2018 includes an updated total 
of 9,437 casualties for 2016 (2,472 killed, 6,937 injured, and 28 unknown). At the time of the 
publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2017, 8,605 casualties had been recorded for 2016 
(2,089 killed, 6,491 injured, and 25 unknown).
More than 120,000 casualties have been included in the Landmine Monitor database in 
the period 1999–2017. 
Of the total of 7,239 mine/ERW casualties the Monitor recorded for 2017, at least 2,793 
people were killed and another 4,431 people were injured; for 15 casualties it was not 
known if the person survived or was killed.2
For a second year the highest number of annual casualties caused by improvised mines 
and the most annual disaggregated number of child casualties were recorded.
1 Casualties from unexploded cluster submunitions (unexploded submunitions), which are cluster 
munition remnants, are included in the Monitor global mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualty 
data. Casualties occurring during a cluster munition attack are not included in this data; however, 
they are reported in the annual Cluster Munition Monitor report. For more information on casualties 
caused by unexploded submunitions for the year 2017, see ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2018, 
www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2018/cluster-munition-monitor-2018.aspx.
2 As in previous years, there was no substantial data available on the numbers of people indirectly impacted 
as a result of mine/ERW casualties and this information was not included in the Monitor mine/ERW 
casualty database.
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Civilians represented the vast majority of casualties compared to military and security 
forces,3 continuing the well-established trend of civilian harm that influenced the adoption 
of the Mine Ban Treaty: 87% of casualties were civilians in 2017 where the status was known.
The country with the most recorded casualties in 2017 was State Party Afghanistan, with 
2,300, followed by state not party Syria with 1,906 casualties reported. Mine/ERW casualties 
were identified in a total of 53 states and other areas in 2017.4 Of the total recorded casualties 
in 2017, 60% (4,355) occurred in 35 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.5
Since the first years of the Mine Ban Treaty, it was certain that many casualties went 
unrecorded. In 1999, the Monitor identified some 9,000 casualties, but estimates indicated 
that there were another 7,000–13,000 annual casualties that were not recorded in the 
available data. From 1999 through 2006 the number of new mine casualties (recorded and 
estimated) each year was between 15,000 and 20,000. For each year between 2009 and 
2014 the Monitor estimated that there have been approximately 1,000 additional casualties 
(an additional 25–30% of the total) that are not captured in its global mine/ERW casualty 
statistics. Subsequently, due to the highly irregular accessibility of data for countries 
experiencing conflict after 2014, estimating the gaps become less viable. However, over time 
new data for past mine/ERW casualties sometimes becomes available. 
The global casualties total since 1999 increases every reporting year, due to new casualties 
recorded, but also with the updating of historical data with newly available statistics. More 
than 122,000 casualties have been recorded by the Landmine Monitor just in the period 
since 1999.6 For all time, more than 500,000 casualties have been reported for affected 
states.7
CASUALTY RECORDING FOR 2017
The 7,239 mine/ERW casualties identified in 2017 only include recorded casualties, not 
estimates.8 It is certain that there are additional casualties each year that are not captured 
in the Monitor’s global mine/ERW casualty statistics, with most occurring in severely affected 
countries and those experiencing conflict. In some states and areas, numerous casualties go 
unrecorded; therefore, the true casualty figure is likely significantly higher in those countries.
3 The category “military” includes police forces and private security forces when active in combat as well as 
members of non-state armed groups and militias. Direct participation in armed conflict, also called direct 
participation in hostilities, distinguishes persons who are not civilians in accordance with international 
humanitarian law, whereby “those involved in the fighting must make a basic distinction between 
combatants, who may be lawfully attacked, and civilians, who are protected against attack unless and for 
such time as they directly participate in hostilities.” ICRC, “Direct participation in hostilities: questions & 
answers,” 2 June 2009, bit.ly/ICRCDirectParticipationFAQ.
4 In 2017, casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, 
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, and 
Zimbabwe, and four other areas Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.
5 Casualties were identified in the following States Parties in 2017, as well as Palestine and Sri Lanka 
which were not yet State Parties, but are now: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Chad, Chile, Colombia, DRC, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, 
Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, 
Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.
6 The Monitor database includes 122,288 casualties for the period 1999–2017.
7 However, cumulative national casualty figures are sometimes multi-annual aggregates or based on 
extrapolations of survey results and therefore may not be included in the Monitor casualty dataset for 
the period 1999–2017.
8 The data collected by the Monitor is the most comprehensive and widely-used annual, and global, dataset 
of casualties caused by mines/ERW. The casualty total for 2017 included datasets or reporting from the 
following types of sources: international organizations, UN and national mine action centers, other UN 








The Monitor identified 1,906 mine/ERW 
casualties in Syria from multiple sources for 
2017.9 However, since the conflict began in 2011, 
annual recorded totals of mine/ERW casualties 
are thought to be an undercount. It is certain 
that the actual number of casualties occurring in 
Syria in 2017, as in past years, was significantly 
higher than the annual total recorded.
As in previous years, it is certain that there are 
many more mine/ERW casualties that occurred 
in Iraq in 2017 that have not been identified. It is 
particularly apparent that improvised landmine 
casualties that occurred in Mosul in 2017 are so 
far vastly underreported.10 It was reported that 
large sections of Mosul were mined and booby-
trapped by the non-state armed group Islamic 
State. In August 2017, the United Nations Mine 
Action Service (UNMAS) was reported as stating 
that since clearance operations began in October 
2016, some 1,700 people had been killed or injured by such explosive hazards.11 The 2017 
total number of mine/ERW casualties recorded for Iraq was 304, with 124 of that number 
occurring in Mosul.
The ongoing conflict in Yemen prevented the operation of a national casualty 
surveillance mechanism. The 160 casualties identified by the Monitor for 2017 is certainly 
an underreporting of the annual total and is much less than the 2016 total of 2,037. In 
2017 and 2018, various Yemeni authorities and human rights organizations reported annual 
totals and cumulative totals for all time. However, their reports rarely describe the source 
or methodology used to compile these figures, and in some cases, do not specify the time 
period. The figures provided differ widely, indicating the challenge of collecting reliable data 
in a context of ongoing conflict. Thus, no significant quantity of disaggregated annual data 
was available for Yemen for 2017. 
Due to the continuing conflict, the national casualty surveillance system in Libya was 
not truly functional. The Libyan Mine Action Center (LibMAC) and the UN Support Mission 
in Libya (UNSMIL) collected information on casualties, but these were not in an integrated 
database. Furthermore, two key sources for Monitor data in previous years were no longer 
available. Therefore, the significant decrease to 184 casualties identified in 2017 from the 
1,610 casualties reported for 2016 may not be indicative of the nature of a trend or scale. 
New information on casualties in Nigeria (235 in 2017) was recorded by Mines Advisory 
Group (MAG), resulting in an improved understanding of the extent of the impact of 
improvised mines in that State Party.
9 Not including the occupied Golan Heights.
10 See, Landmine Monitor 2017 for details on the issues of reporting on improvised mine casualties in Iraq, 
the-monitor.org/LM17.
11 Lucy Rodgers, Nassos Stylianou, & Daniel Dunford, “Is anything left of Mosul? The battle to save the city 
and its people,” BBC News, 9 August 2017, www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-9d41ef6c-97c9-4953-ba43-
284cc62ffdd0.
States with the most recorded 











Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty 
are indicated in bold.
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CASUALTY DEMOGRAPHICS12
There were at least 2,452 child casualties in 2017. Child casualties in 2017 accounted for 
47% of all civilian casualties for whom the age group was known (5,183).13 Children were 
killed (773) or injured (1,679) by mines/ERW in 38 countries and other areas in 2017.14
As in previous years, in 2017 the vast majority of child casualties where the sex was 
known were boys (84%).15
ERW caused the most child casualties (1,332, or 54% of child casualties). Child casualties 
made up more than half (48, or 52%) of all casualties caused by unexploded cluster 
submunitions. (For more information on child casualties and assistance see the annual Monitor 
publication on landmines/ERW and children.)
In 2017, men and boys made up the vast majority of all casualties, with 87% of all 
casualties for which the sex was known (4,874 of 5,614). Women and girls made up 13% of 
all casualties for which the sex was known (740).
Civilians represented 87% of casualties in 2017 where the civilian/military status was 
known (5,802 of 6,701). 
There were 839 military casualties. The country with the most recorded military casualties 
of mines/ERW in 2017 was Ukraine, with 189; followed by Nigeria, with 151 military and 
combatant casualties (including militia); and Pakistan with 93 military casualties recorded 
(including soldiers, militia, and militants). 
In 2017, the Monitor identified 60 casualties among deminers in 14 countries (18 deminers 
were killed and 42 injured).16
MINE/ERW TYPES RESULTING IN CASUALTIES
In 2017, landmines of all types caused at least 4,795 casualties—these were recorded as 
being caused by factory-made antipersonnel mines (748), antivehicle mines (488), improvised 
mines (2,716), and other unspecified mine types (843). 
Unexploded submunitions caused 93 casualties and other ERW caused 2,038 casualties. 
A total of 313 casualties were the result of mine/ERW items that were not disaggregated in 
data.
Casualties recorded as caused by factory-made antipersonnel mines (thus, not including 
improvised mines) were documented in 23 states and areas in 2017.17
Casualties from improvised mines (not included among casualties recorded as from 
factory-made antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, or other unspecified types of mines) 
12 The Monitor tracks the age, sex, civilian status, and deminer status of mine/ERW casualties to the extent 
that data is available and disaggregated.
13 Child casualties are defined as all casualties where the victim is less than 18-years of age at the time of 
the incident. Child casualties made up 40% of the total recorded casualties.
14 In 2017, child casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, DRC, 
India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Russia, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, 
Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen, and two other areas, Kosovo and Somaliland.
15 There were 1,775 boys and 329 girls recorded as casualties in 2017; the sex of 348 child casualties was 
not recorded.
16 In 2017, casualties among deminers occurred in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chile, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, 
Libya, Russia, Serbia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen.
17 In 2017, antipersonnel mine casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, 
Chile, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mozambique, Myanmar, Pakistan, Senegal, South Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, 








were identified in 18 states in 2017.18 Most improvised mine casualties in 2017 occurred in 
Afghanistan (1,093) and Syria (887). 
For 16 countries and areas, 862 casualties were recorded under the category of other 
unspecified mine types.19 Some three quarters of those casualties were recorded for Syria 
(1,208, or 74%).
In 2017, antivehicle mines caused at least 488 casualties in 20 states and areas.20 The 
states with the greatest numbers of casualties reported from antivehicle mines were 
Pakistan (132) and Ukraine (103).21
18 In 2017, improvised mine casualties were recorded in 17 states: Afghanistan, Algeria, Cameroon, Colombia, 
India, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen. 
Additionally, improvised mine casualties were known to have occurred in Myanmar, but these are 
undifferentiated from other mine casualties in data. Among sources used by the Monitor for calendar 
year 2017 data on improvised mine casualties included data from among the casualties of explosive 
incidents categorized as “victim-activated” in the Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) explosive violence 
data set for 2017. AOAV casualty data for 2017 provided by email from Jennifer Dathan, Researcher, AOAV, 
29 August 2018; and Monitor analysis of Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED) data 
for calendar year 2017.  Approved citation: Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim 
Karlsen, “Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data,” Journal of Peace Research, Issue 
47(5), 2010, pp. 651–660.
19 In 2017, unspecified mine casualties were recorded in Algeria, Armenia, Cameroon, Chad, Iran, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Pakistan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine, Yemen, and other area Nagorno-Karabakh.
20 In 2017, casualties from antivehicle mines were identified in the following states: Afghanistan, Angola, 
Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Mali, Myanmar, Pakistan, Russia, South Sudan, Sudan, 
Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, and other areas, Nagorno-Karabakh and Western Sahara.
21 The Monitor shares, cross-references, and compares data with the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Anti-
vehicle mines (AVM) project. That project recorded 491 casualties from both confirmed and suspected 
antivehicle mines in 24 countries in 2016. GICHD-SIPRI casualty data provided by email from Ursign 
Hofmann, Policy Advisor, GICHD, 22 February 2018. See also, GICHD-SIPRI, “Anti-Vehicle Mines,” undated, 
www.gichd.org/avm. Monitor and GICHD-SIPRI methodologies used to enter data differ, resulting in 
the differences in annual casualties reported. For example, Monitor data does not include casualties 
that occur to persons engaged in laying or emplacing mines. Monitor reporting does include politically 
disputed geographic “other areas” in reporting, and tends to use the definitions employed in original 
whole data sets when possible. In some cases, when an incident was attributed to both antivehicle mines 











































Casualties by type of mine/ERW in 2017
54 
Casualties caused by ERW numbered 2,038 in 38 states and areas in 2017. Of the annual 
total, 1,124 ERW casualties occurred in Afghanistan.22 In 2017, globally, children made up 
69% (1,324) of civilian ERW casualties, when the age group was recorded.23
Unknown or undifferentiated mine/ERW items were recorded as the cause of 313 
casualties in 16 countries in 2017.24
States/areas with mine/ERW casualties in 2017
Sub-Saharan 
Africa Americas




































































Note: Mine Ban Treaty States Parties indicated in bold; other areas in italics.
22 In 2017, Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Kenya, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, 
Poland, Russia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, and other 
areas Kosovo, Somaliland, and Western Sahara. In addition to other types of ERW in 2017, casualties of 
unexploded submunitions were identified in Cambodia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Serbia, Syria, Vietnam, 
Yemen, and other areas Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara. For more information on casualties 
caused by unexploded submunitions and the annual increase in those casualties recorded for the year 
2017, see ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2018.
23 Of the total ERW casualties in 2016, 586 were adults.
24 Casualties from unknown mine/ERW items were recorded in: Angola, Azerbaijan, DRC, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, 








Annex: Mine/ERW types causing casualties
Category of mine/
ERW Term Description
Mines* Antipersonnel mines A munition designed to be exploded by the 
presence, proximity, or contact of a person, 
and therefore prohibited under the Mine 
Ban Treaty
Antivehicle mines Also referred to as “antitank mines,” 
and included among Mines Other Than 
Antipersonnel Mines (MOTAPM), these 
are designed to be detonated by the 
presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle 
as opposed to that of a person and tend 
to contain a larger explosive charge than 
antipersonnel mines. Antivehicle mines are 
not prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty 
unless they are fitted with fuses that can 
be detonated by the presence, proximity, or 
contact of a person 
Improvised mines Improvised mines are types of improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs). IEDs are 
“homemade” explosive weapons that 
are designed to cause death or injury. 
Improvised mines are IEDs that are 
detonated by the presence, proximity, or 
contact of a person or a vehicle. These are 
landmines and are sometimes referred to 
as artisanal mines, victim-operated IEDs 
(VO-IEDs), or by the type of construction, 
such as pressure plate IEDs (PP-IEDs)
Antipersonnel improvised mines, including 
booby-traps (also included among 
“improvised mines”)**
Antipersonnel improvised mines, including 
booby-traps that can be detonated by 
the presence, proximity, or contact of a 
person, fit the definition of antipersonnel 
landmines and are therefore prohibited 
under the Mine Ban Treaty. A booby-trap 
is an antipersonnel explosive device 
deliberately placed to cause casualties 
when an apparently harmless object 
is disturbed or a normally safe act is 
performed
Other unspecified mine 
type
When reported as a “mine” or “landmine” 
incident, lacking other details regarding the 









Submunitions or bomblets dispersed or 
released by, or otherwise separated from, 
a cluster munition and failed to explode 
or that have not been used and that have 
been left behind or dumped 
Explosive 






ERW Unexploded ordnance (UXO): Explosive 
weapons that have been primed, fused, 
armed, or otherwise prepared for use or 
used. It may have been fired, dropped, 
launched, or projected yet remained 
unexploded
Abandoned ordnance (AXO): Explosive 
weapons that have not been used during 






Unknown mines/ERW are explosive items 
causing casualties that were detonated 
by the presence, proximity, or contact of a 
person or a vehicle that were not attributed 
to a specific mine/ERW type either because 
it was not known what type of mine or ERW 
caused the casualty when information was 
recorded, or due to a lack of disaggregation 
between mines explosives and ERW 
causing casualties within a dataset, 
including when mine/ERW casualties are 
differentiated from other weapon victims
Note: * The use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel IEDs are prohibited under the 
Mine Ban Treaty. According to the Mine Ban Treaty definition, a mine is “placed under, on or near the 
ground or other surface area” and an antipersonnel mine is a munition “designed to be exploded by 
the presence, proximity or contact of a person…” Antivehicle mines are not prohibited under the Mine 
Ban Treaty unless the fuzing allows them to be activated by a person.
** In most cases, it is not possible to distinguish between antivehicle and antipersonnel improvised 
mines that caused casualties because reporting does not provide a clear means of determining the 




























































Technician at the Artificial Limbs and Polio Centre prepares prosthetic legs in the Gaza strip, 
Palestine.















The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty was the first disarmament convention committing States Parties to 
provide assistance to the victims of a specific weapon. The components of victim assistance 
include, but are not restricted to: data collection and needs assessment with referral to 
emergency and continuing medical care; physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics and 
other assistive devices; psychological support; social and economic inclusion; and relevant 
laws and public policies. 
The definition of “landmine victim” was agreed by States Parties in the Final Report of 
the First Review Conference (paragraph 64) formally adopted at the Nairobi Summit in 2004 
as based on the then generally accepted understanding as “those who either individually 
or collectively have suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss or substantial 
impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or omissions related to mine utilization.” 
Landmine victim, according to this widely accepted understanding of the term, includes 
survivors,1 as well as affected families and communities.2
In the penultimate year for the Mine Ban Treaty’s Maputo Action Plan 2014–2019, this 
chapter principally takes stock of changes, progress, and challenges to the provision of 
assistance in States Parties with significant numbers of survivors and needs. It draws from 
reporting on the activities and challenges of hundreds of relevant programs implemented 
through government agencies, international and national organizations and NGOs, survivors 
networks and similar community-based organizations, as well as other service providers.
In most States Parties some efforts to improve the quality and quantity of health and 
physical rehabilitation programs for survivors were undertaken. However, after a trend 
of large reductions in services available in recent years due to decreases in resources, in 
2017–2018 many countries saw near-stagnation in the remaining core assistance services 
for mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) victims. Services remained largely centralized, 
1 A “survivor” is a person who was injured by mines/explosive remnants of war (ERW) and lived.
2 See, “Final Report of the First Review Conference,” APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005; and “Nairobi 
Action Plan 2005–2009,” www.icbl.org/media/933290/Nairobi-Action-Plan-2005.pdf.
60 
preventing many mine/ERW survivors who live in remote and rural areas from accessing 
those services. The needs remain great, including in the newest States Parties, Palestine and 
Sri Lanka.
Many existing coordination mechanisms had some survivor participation, but States 
Parties were yet to fulfill their commitments to building the capacity of survivors through 
their representative organizations. Most survivor networks struggled to provide essential 
local support not available through larger NGOs or existing state services.
The Monitor website includes comprehensive country profiles detailing the human impact 
of mines, cluster munitions, and other ERW and examining progress in victim assistance in 
some 70 countries, including both States Parties and states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty 
and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.3 A collection of thematic overviews, briefing papers, 
factsheets, and infographics related to victim assistance produced since 1999 is available 
through the Victim Assistance Resources portal on the Monitor website.4



















































VICTIM ASSISTANCE UNDER THE MAPUTO 
ACTION PLAN
At the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference held in Maputo in 2014, States Parties 
formally declared that they remain very much aware of their “enduring obligations to 
mine victims.”6 The actions of the Maputo Action Plan adopted at that conference can be 
summarized as follows:
  Assess the needs; evaluate the availability and gaps in services; and make referrals 
to existing services.
3 Country profiles are available on the Monitor website, www.the-monitor.org/cp. Findings specific to victim 
assistance in states and other areas with victims of cluster munitions are available through Landmine 
Monitor 2018’s companion publication, Cluster Munition Monitor 2018, www.the-monitor.org/CMM18.
4 See, the Monitor, “Victim Assistance Resources,” undated, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/our-research/
victim-assistance.aspx.
5 In addition, States Parties Mali and Ukraine, both of which have had hundreds of mine/ERW casualties 
in the past two years, may be considered to have significant numbers of survivors with great needs for 
assistance that remain unreported.
6 “MAPUTO +15: Declaration of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 













  Ensure the inclusion as well as the full and active participation of mine victims and 
their representative organizations in all matters that affect them; enhance their 
capacity.
  Increase the availability of and accessibility to services, opportunities, and social 
protection measures; strengthen local capacities and enhance coordination.
  Address needs and guarantee rights in an age- and gender-sensitive manner.
  Develop time-bound and measurable objectives and communicate progress annually.
  Enhance plans, policies, and legal frameworks.
  Report on measurable improvements in advance of the next review conference.
States Parties commit to addressing victim assistance objectives “with the same precision 
and intensity as for other aims of the Convention.”7 The plan also affirms the need for States 
Parties to continue carrying out the actions of the previous Cartagena Action Plan in order 
to make assistance available, affordable, accessible, and sustainable.8
ASSESSING THE NEEDS
States Parties commit to assess the needs of mine victims. This commitment includes 
assessing the availability and gaps in services and support, and existing or new requirements 
activities needed to meet the needs of mine victims in the frameworks of disability, health, 
education, employment, development, and poverty reduction. They should also use this 
assessment activity as an opportunity to refer mine victims to existing services.9
In most States Parties no structured national needs assessments surveys were conducted 
in 2017 or into 2018. However, Mine Action Centers and service providers often collected 
information on mine victims in an ongoing manner in conjunction with other victim 
assistance and program activities. 
Disability survey, including through national census questions, was discussed in many 
national victim assistance contexts. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD) (Article 31) calls on States Parties to collect information, including statistical and 
research data, and to disaggregate this information to identify barriers faced by persons 
with disabilities in exercising their rights. A common theme linking CRPD obligations and 
victim assistance data collections was the potential use of the Washington Group disability 
measurement tools.10 These are believed to be able to improve disability statistics and 
monitor the 2030 Agenda against indicators.11
PLANS AND POLICIES
At the national level and within the community of the Mine Ban Treaty, the Maputo Action 
Plan calls for activities addressing the specific needs of victims, while incorporating relevant 
actions into the appropriate sectors including disability, health, social welfare, education, 
employment, development, and poverty reduction.12
States Parties committed to have time-bound and measurable objectives to implement 
national policies and plans that will tangibly contribute to the main goals of victim 
7 “Maputo Action Plan,” Maputo, 27 June 2014, p. 3, bit.ly/MaputoActionPlan. 
8 “Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014: Ending the Suffering Caused by Anti-Personnel Mines,” Cartagena, 11 
December 2009, bit.ly/MBTCartagenaPlan.
9 Maputo Action Plan Action #12.
10 The Washington Group on Disability Statistics was established under the United Nations Statistical 
Commission to develop internationally comparable population-based measures of disability. Washington 
Group on Disability Statistics, www.washingtongroup-disability.com.
11 UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Demographic and Social Statistics, Statistics Division, 
United Nations Disability Statistics Programme, https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic-social/
sconcerns/disability/.













assistance.13 In 2017–2018, 13 of the 33 States Parties with victims and needs had victim 
assistance plans or relevant disability plans in place.14
Sudan adopted a victim assistance plan in 2017 through an approval process that started 
in 2016. Through 2017 in Colombia, some 19 municipalities had adopted area official plans 
for assistance for mine/ERW victims, and 20 municipalities had mapped out specific referral 
“pathways,” guiding survivors to their rights, services, and benefits available. This almost 
already reached the planned target for 2014–2018 of 22 municipal pathways for assistance. 
In 2018, Albania was in the process of national plan review. In BiH, the Victim Assistance 
Sub-Strategy 2009–2019 of the Mine Action Strategy remains in place, but a mid-way review 
was not yet adopted. Iraq continued to report that it developed annual victim assistance 
planning. Guinea-Bissau had reported on objectives of a victim assistance strategy in 2013, 
but the objectives, including establishing a new victim assistance coordination mechanism, 
were not reported against.
In 2018, victim assistance dialogues focused on the development of tangible strategic 
planning were held in Iraq and Uganda, in September and October respectively, hosted by 
national authorities with Implementation Support Unit (ISU) support and European Union 
(EU) funding.15
Coordination
In 2017, 21 of the 33 States Parties had active victim assistance coordination mechanisms 
linked with disability coordination mechanisms that considered the issues relating to the 
needs of mine/ERW survivors.16
A coordination mechanism for victim assistance in BiH received an official mandate in 
2018 for the first time, after having restarted informal coordination in 2017 after a long 
pause. 
Chad renewed victim assistance coordination in 2017. 
INCLUSION AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF MINE VICTIMS
In the Maputo Action Plan, each State Party has committed to do its “utmost to enhance 
the capacity and ensure the inclusion and full and active participation of mine victims. 
and their representative organisations in all matters that affect them.”17 In 2017, survivors 
and their representative organizations, including survivor networks and disabled persons’ 
organizations (DPOs), participated in coordination activities in at least 18 of the 21 States 
Parties with active mechanisms.18 However, states almost never report how survivor input 
is considered or acted upon. Survivors’ representative organizations and other service 
providers reported in some states that the contributions of survivors were not seriously 
taken into account. 
13 Maputo Action Plan Action #13.
14 Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Sudan, 
Tajikistan, and Thailand. Algeria, Chad, Senegal, and Sri Lanka had plans pending approval or formal 
adoption.
15 In August 2017, the Council of the EU adopted Decision (CFSP) 2017/1428 in support of the implementation 
of the Mine Ban Treaty through the treaty’s ISU as the technical implementer to support efforts on the 
part of States Parties, including towards the implementation of victim assistance. 
16 The states with coordination mechanisms in 2017–2018 were: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, 
Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, DRC, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Serbia, 
South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Turkey. Angola had intermittent and infrequent coordination 
meetings that lacked disability sector integration, which is a key sustainability issue. 
17 Maputo Action Plan Action #16. 
18 Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, 
Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand.
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Action plan commitments also include capacity-building, but as is the case with full and 
active participation, state initiatives for capacity-building for participation of mine victims 
were also almost never reported. One exception was the Quality of Life survey in Cambodia. 
Also, the need for improved education for survivor representation in Uganda was recognized. 
In addition to examining the 33 States Parties, the Monitor identified many states 
and areas with mine victims where survivors networks reported developments in 2017 
and into 2018. Unfortunately, in most countries, survivor networks struggled to maintain 
their operations with decreasing resources available. Networks in States Parties Croatia, 
Mozambique, and Somalia were largely unable to implement essential activities in much of 
2017 and 2018. Activities of the national survivors’ network in Afghanistan were primarily 
advocacy and awareness-raising. Many others managed to maintain essential linkages at the 
community level and provide support, advice, and referrals as possible.
Survivors networks
Country Examples of survivor networks
Afghanistan Afghan Landmine Survivor Organization (ALSO)
Albania Albanian Assistance for Integration and Development (ALB-AID) 
Survivor Network
Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines (AzBL) Survivor Network
BiH Organization of amputees UDAS Republic of Srpska (UDAS)
Cambodia Cambodia Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Munitions 
(CamCBLCM) Survivor Network; Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) 
Cambodia
Colombia ADISMAM; the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCCM)
DRC National Association of Mine Survivors and Victims Advocacy 
(ANASDIV)
El Salvador Foundation Network of Survivors and Person with Disabilities
Ethiopia Survivors Recovery and Rehabilitation Organization (SRARO)
Mozambique Network for Mine Victims (RAVIM)
Nepal Nepalese Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL) Survivor Network
Senegal Solidarity Initiative for Development Actions (ISAD)
Serbia Assistance, Advocacy, Access Serbia (AAAS)
Tajikistan Tajikistan Survivor Network
Uganda Uganda Landmine Survivors Association (ULSA)
Vietnam Association for Empowerment of Person of Persons with Disabilities 
(AEPD)
Western Sahara Sahrawi Association of Mine Victims (ASAVIM) 
Yemen Yemen Association of Landmine Survivors (YALS)
Note: Mine Ban Treaty States Parties are indicated in bold; other areas are indicated in italics.
AVAILABILITY OF AND ACCESSIBILITY TO SERVICES 
States Parties committed to “increase availability of and accessibility to appropriate 
comprehensive rehabilitation services, economic inclusion opportunities and social 
protection measures…including expanding quality services in rural and remote areas and 
paying particular attention to vulnerable groups.”19 The following changes, progress, and 












challenges were reported for 2017 in the 33 States Parties with significant numbers of 
survivors and needs.
Medical care and physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics 
Medical care services for mine/ERW survivors were strengthened in some countries in the 
Sub-Saharan Africa region, including in Ethiopia and Senegal. In many countries, however, 
survivors continued to have to travel long distances in order to access services. In Chad, 
health services in mine-contaminated areas were limited, with few qualified personnel. In 
Guinea-Bissau, large parts of the population do not have access to healthcare. In Mozambique, 
survivors reported a general lack of medication, especially anti-retroviral medications for 
persons living with HIV/AIDS. In Uganda, there were regular shortages of medicines during 
gaps in the scope of budget allocations and quality healthcare remained unaffordable and 
inaccessible to many survivors.
In Iraq and Yemen, increased training and resources were provided in response to the 
greater demand for services caused by conflict. In Iraq, healthcare services for persons with 
disabilities decreased over time. However, international organizations and NGOs provided 
specific interventions, including for surgical care to the war-injured persons of Mosul. In 
Yemen, there was no specific mechanism in place for managing the responses to new mine/
ERW survivors. Only 50% of health facilities remained functional, while the half that remained 
faced severe shortages in medicines, equipment, and staff. The influx of Syrian refugees into 
Jordan put a strain on available public health services and resources.
In Afghanistan, the health sector was not reaching as many people as needed and the 
quality of the services provided by the governmental hospitals dropped.
In Croatia, improved emergency response time also benefited mine/ERW survivors. 
Medical staff and trauma doctors from hospitals located in mine/ERW-contaminated areas 
in Tajikistan received training on managing weapon wounds.
The World Health Organization (WHO) released recommendations on health-related 
rehabilitation linked to the Sustainable Development Goals in 2017. In January 2018, the 
WHO held a general consultation outlining its activities for the next three years. This includes 
integrating rehabilitation into universal health coverage (UHC) budgeting and planning, 
developing a package of priority rehabilitation interventions, and establishing tools and 
resources to strengthen the health workforce for rehabilitation. 
Measures taken to increase availability of physical rehabilitation services were reported 
in several Sub-Saharan States Parties, including Burundi, Chad, Eritrea, Somalia, and 
Sudan. However, shortages of raw materials and financial resources were an obstacle to 
the development of the physical rehabilitation sector in most countries, even those where 
improvements were noted, including Angola, Somalia, and Zimbabwe. In the DRC, the decrease 
in available resources in recent years significantly impacts the capacities of NGOs to operate. 
An international NGO started a new physical rehabilitation pilot project in 2017 in the DRC. 
In Senegal, due to deteriorating equipment and a constant shortage of raw materials, the 
physical rehabilitation center in the mine-affected region did not deliver any new prosthetic 
devices in 2017. Access to rehabilitation for survivors from Senegal was available through an 
agreement with a center in Guinea-Bissau. 
In Afghanistan, four new physical rehabilitation centers were established during the 
Maputo Action Plan period, however several more such centers were still needed. In Cambodia, 
some progress was reported in creating consistent reporting systems for the rehabilitation 
sector and the planning for handover of centers to government funding and management.
In Colombia, there was a significant increase in geographical coverage of rehabilitation 
due to the signing of agreements between the government and a non-state armed group that 
allowed access to areas that were previously labeled difficult access “red zones.” However, 
overall physical rehabilitation remained largely centralized in large cities. Survivors in rural 
areas faced challenges to access rehabilitation services due to transport and food costs. For 
the first time, a regional forum was held with representatives of rehabilitation centers from 
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Ecuador, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. In Nicaragua, a central body for physical rehabilitation 
actors was under development. In El Salvador, planning for the construction of a new satellite 
prosthetics unit began.
In Albania, raw materials and components for the repair and production of prostheses were 
secured for the rehabilitation center in the area where most survivors live. In BiH and Serbia, 
while provision of orthopedic devices is mandated by law, access was sometimes impeded 
by excessive procedural demands. Staff from municipal centers for physical rehabilitation in 
BiH were introduced to the method of integrating peer support during the rehabilitation of 
mine survivors. 
In Algeria, mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities continued to have 
access to most prosthetic and assistive devices free-of-charge. In Iraq, a 30% decrease in 
the number of assistive devices between 2014 and 2017 was an indicator of the ongoing 
necessity to enhance support to existing rehabilitation services for survivors. A much-needed 
new rehabilitation center was launched in Mosul in 2018. In Palestine, the only prosthetic 
center in Gaza faced significant strain on its limited resources while addressing an increase 
in patients with amputations among protesters who had been shot in the legs. In Yemen, 
increased support to the physical rehabilitation centers sector was reported in response to 
the needs caused by ongoing conflict, but availability of assistance overall remained far from 
adequate for meeting those needs. 
Economic inclusion, education, psychosocial support 
Projects to encourage the economic inclusion of survivors were severely lacking in Angola, 
the DRC, Ethiopia, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda. Some economic-inclusion 
programs were reported in Burundi, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Ethiopia, Senegal, South Sudan, 
and Sudan. 
In Albania, some vocational training was reported. However, the number of available 
economic-inclusion activities and beneficiaries has declined. A two-year socio-economic 
inclusion project for mine/ERW survivors in BiH was underway. In Croatia, regulations on 
the employment of persons with disabilities and professional rehabilitation needed to be 
amended to be aligned with existing legislation. Also in Croatia, a new center for professional 
rehabilitation was established.
In Iraq, DPOs reported that the number of persons with disabilities who received state-
run vocational training seemed insignificant to the size of the population of persons with 
disabilities. Economic-inclusion activities were nearly nonexistent in Yemen, where livelihood 
activities by the survivors’ network stopped due to lack of funding. 
Psychosocial services were deployed to four regions that had previously not been 
reached in Eritrea. Psychological support services in a mine/ERW victim assistance context 
were extremely limited, or near to non-existent, in Angola, the DRC, Mozambique, Senegal, 
Disability and victim assistance experts meet in Uganda with financial support from the 
European Union.












Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. In South Sudan, where public mental health 
services are virtually non-existent, some 40% of the population show psychological effects 
of trauma from conflict and violence. South Sudan has one of the highest rates of suicides, 
and suicide rates in the refugee camps have spiked, while the lives of survivors and other 
persons with disabilities is increasingly precarious.20 Ethiopia launched safety net programs 
intended to benefit persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors. 
Afghanistan and Cambodia required planning and structures to make available 
psychosocial support.
Psychological support was among the most serious needs of survivors in Albania, but no 
recent progress was reported. The provision of continuing psychosocial support remained 
weak in Croatia throughout 2017, despite there being 21 psychosocial centers.
The availability of psychological support and follow-up trauma care in Iraq, including for 
internally displaced persons, remained inadequate to meet needs. At least two new projects 
providing ongoing psychosocial support were reported in 2018. In Yemen, international 
NGOs continued to provide some mental health and psychosocial support activities to the 
war-wounded and their families. However, the national survivors’ network was only able to 
provide psychological support to a very small number of survivors. 
Since 2010, the WHO community-based rehabilitation (CBR) guidelines, and how they can 
be used to start or strengthen CBR programs for victims of landmines, have been promoted 
among victim assistance actors in States Parties.21 Monitor reporting includes many 
examples of CBR programs that contribute to victim assistance implementation, including 
the following:
In Peru, a regional-targeted program continued to improve the quality of life of persons 
with disabilities and their families in the mine-affected Tumbes region in 2017.
In Angola, an NGO-run CBR program expanded to seven new provinces. In Ethiopia, an 
NGO provides CBR in three regional states. In Eritrea, the CBR program is the main provider 
of physical therapy and psychosocial support to landmine and ERW survivors and persons 
with disabilities. In Senegal, a national CBR program was on the verge of being approved. 
In Afghanistan, NGO-led CBR activities are implemented in 12 of 34 provinces. In 
Cambodia, CBR services are available in 25 provinces.
GUARANTEEING RIGHTS IN AN AGE- AND GENDER-
SENSITIVE MANNER
The Maputo Action Plan speaks of “the imperative to address the needs and guarantee the 
rights of mine victims, in an age- and gender-sensitive manner.”22
Gender considerations
While men and boys are the majority of reported casualties, women and girls may be 
disproportionally disadvantaged as a result of mine/ERW incidents and suffer multiple forms 
of discrimination as survivors. To guide a rights-based approach to victim assistance for 
women and girls, States Parties can apply the principles of the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).23 Implementation of 
20 South Sudan reported that landmine survivors and other persons with disabilities “now experience death 
as a result of poverty.” Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), p. 13.
21 The WHO CBR Guidelines were the subject of focused training for government victim assistance focal 
points at the Mine Ban Treaty Tenth Meeting of States Parties in 2010; a victim assistance experts’ program 
was dedicated to their Geneva launch and training on their practical application, bit.ly/MBT10MSPVA.
22 Maputo Action Plan Action #17.
23 Of the 33 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, all except Somalia and Sudan are also States Parties to 
CEDAW.
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CEDAW by States Parties to that convention should ensure the rights of women and girls and 
protect them from discrimination and exploitation.24
Gender was a key consideration in victim assistance programming, but reporting was 
often limited to statistical disaggregation of casualties and service beneficiaries. Some 
other details, however, were available. In Somalia women with disabilities continue to be 
vulnerable to sexual violence and forced marriage. The government of Somalia proposed 
to focus on women and girls in their efforts to support persons with disabilities to address 
the double stigma of gender and disability. In Iraq, gender sensitive services are provided 
to most females through the provision of specialized female staff in rehabilitation and 
medical centers. The same applies to males. In Yemen, women faced additional challenges 
accessing medical care due to the lack of gender-sensitive services, including a lack of 
female rehabilitation professionals.
Age considerations
Child survivors have specific and additional needs in all aspects of assistance. In 2017 and 
2018, inclusive education and age-sensitive assistance were far from adequate in most 
countries. In this regard, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is particularly 
relevant to the implementation of victim assistance with a rights-based approach.25
The annually updated Monitor factsheet on the Impact of Mines/ERW on Children contains 
more details on issues pertaining to children, youth, and adolescents.26
NATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
According to the Maputo Action Plan, States Parties collectively agree that victim assistance 
should be integrated into broader national policies, plans, and legal frameworks and that they 
will make “enhancements” to the legal frameworks in effect as a means of operationalizing 
the integration. Some new plans and policies were adopted in the reporting period, and 
several more had been drafted and were pending endorsement.
Ethiopia National Disability adopted the Mainstreaming Guideline with specific guidance 
for the health sector and vocational training providers. Mozambique is in the process of 
drafting a national law for the protection and promotion of the rights of persons with 
disabilities. In Somalia, a bill to establish a National Agency for Persons with Disabilities 
was approved in 2018. South Sudan has developed a National Disability and Inclusion Policy.
Jordan adopted a new comprehensive law on the rights of persons with disabilities.
The process of amending discriminatory national disability legislation in Afghanistan was 
completed. 
Tajikistan, not party to the CRPD, introduced a National Program on Rehabilitation of 
Persons with Disabilities, covering physical rehabilitation services and social inclusion.
24 The Committee of CEDAW General Recommendation 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict, and 
post-conflict situations and General Recommendation 27 on older women and protection of their human 
rights are also particularly applicable.
25 Some of the resources on children and victim assistance include: Sebastian Kasack, Assistance to Victims of 
Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War: Guidance on Child-focused Victim Assistance (UNICEF, November 
2014); Austria and Colombia, “Strengthening the Assistance to Child Victims,” Maputo Review Conference 
Documents, June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Austria-Colombia-
Paper.pdf; and Colombia, “Guide for Comprehensive assistance to boys, girls and adolescent landmine 
victims – Guidelines for the constructions of plans, programmes, projects and protocols,” Bogota, 2014, bit.
ly/ColombiaLandmineVA2014.













BROADER FRAMEWORKS FOR ASSISTANCE
The Maputo Action Plan calls for activities addressing the specific needs of victims and also 
emphasizes the need to simultaneously integrate victim assistance into other frameworks, 
including disability, health, social welfare, education, employment, development, and poverty 
reduction.27 It also recognizes that in addition to integrating victim assistance, States Parties 
need to, in actual fact, “ensure that broader frameworks are reaching mine victims.”
Many of these frameworks have their own representative international administrations, 
guidance documents, plans, and objectives that may also be reflected in national-level 
activities that can reach survivors, families, and communities.
Since the emergence of victim assistance through the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, other weapons-
related conventions have adopted this rapidly emerging norm. The 2008 Convention on 
Cluster Munitions codified the expanded principles and commitments of victim assistance 
into binding international law; these were introduced into the planning of the Convention 
on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V on ERW in 2008, and most recently included in 
the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
The CRPD is the international human rights legal instrument that has been most discussed 
in relation to the implementation of victim assistance. The linkages between rights-
based victim assistance and the CRPD are particularly useful for implementation through 
integration and synergy. Only five States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant 
numbers of survivors are not party to the CRPD. Three of those are signatories to the CRPD: 
Chad, Somalia, and Tajikistan. Tajikistan signed in March 2018 and Somalia in October 2018. 
Eritrea and South Sudan have not yet signed or acceded to the CRPD. Victim assistance 
is very often linked with, or included in, the national CRPD coordination mechanisms of 
countries that are party to both the Mine Ban Treaty and the CRPD. Furthermore, some states 
initial reports submitted under Article 35 of the CRPD have referred to victim assistance and 
landmine survivors. Although the CRPD does not establish new human rights, it does provide 
much greater clarity to the obligations of states to promote, protect, and ensure the rights 
of persons with disabilities and presents the concepts for those rights to become reality 
through implementation of the convention.
Adopted 70 years ago this year, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
established for the first time the fundamental human rights to be universally protected. 
The basis of many elements of the CRPD that inform understandings of the components, or 
pillars, of victim assistance are found in the UDHR, including healthcare (and rehabilitation), 
employment, education, and participation.28
THE RIGHTS OF PEASANTS AND OTHER PEOPLE WORKING 
IN RURAL AREAS
In September 2018, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other 
People Working in Rural Areas was adopted by the Human Rights Council. It includes several 
aspects relevant to survivors and indirect victims of mines.29
The declaration is compatible with the implementation of Maputo Action Plan Article 
15, which “entails removing physical, social, cultural, economic, political and other barriers, 
including expanding quality services in rural and remote areas and paying particular attention 
to vulnerable groups.” State delegations that endorsed the declaration on the Rights of 
Peasants included Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with recorded mines/ERW victims: Algeria, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Kenya, Nicaragua, Palestine, and the Philippines.
27 Maputo Action Plan Actions #12 to #18.
28 Drawn from Marianne Schulze, “Understanding the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities,” Handicap International, September 2009.
29 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas, Human 
Rights Council 39th Session, A/HRC/39/L.16, 26 September 2018.
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SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are highly 
complementary to the rights-based aims of victim assistance 
under the Mine Ban Treaty. They also offer opportunities for 
bridging between relevant frameworks. The SDGs, a set of 17 
aspirational goals with corresponding targets and indicators 
that all UN member states are expected to use to frame policies 
and stimulate action for positive change in 2015–2030, are 
designed to address the economic, social, and environmental 
dimensions of sustainable development. Their emphasis is on 
reaching the most marginalized persons, commonly phrased 
as “leaving no-one behind.”30 
CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN 
EMERGENCIES
An Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Task Team 
on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian 
Action established in 2016 continued to develop and refine 
implementation guidelines related to the charter on the 
Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities into Humanitarian 
Action in 2018.31
Two States Parties with significant numbers of survivors 
and ongoing conflict, the DRC and Yemen, had a Level-3 IASC 
system-wide response activated in 2017–2018.32 Syria, a state 
not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, was the only other country to have a Level-3 response 
active in the period.
In Yemen, the ongoing conflict dramatically increased demand for emergency and ongoing 
medical care beyond the capacity of the medical system. Additionally, the mine action center 
had to suspend victim assistance activities in 2018.
A UN strategic review for 2018 reclassified Afghanistan from a post-conflict country to 
one in active conflict.33 Movement restrictions due to conflict in Afghanistan were among the 
persistent obstacles to victim assistance in some parts of the country. Conflict continued to 
cause damage and disruption to social healthcare services, while trauma, physical injuries, 
and mass displacement increased the need for those services. Security constraints prevented 
some rehabilitation outreach services from operating. Other States Parties where conflict 
and unstable security situations similarly impacted implementation of victim assistance 
included Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, and South Sudan. In Somalia, insecurity was widespread 
and the indistinct nature of conflict front lines hindered delivery of assistance by many 
international humanitarian agencies, particularly to areas under the control of non-state 
armed groups.
30 Persons with disabilities are referred to directly in the SDGs: education (Goal 4), employment (Goal 8), 
reducing inequality (Goal 10), and accessibility of human settlements (Goal 11), in addition to including 
persons with disabilities in data collection and monitoring (Goal 17). With an emphasis on poverty 
reduction, equality, and inclusion, the SDGs also recognize the need for the “achievement of durable peace 
and sustainable development in countries in conflict and post-conflict situations.”
31 “Charter on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action,” undated but 2016, http://
humanitariandisabilitycharter.org/.
32 Such an activation occurs when a humanitarian situation suddenly and significantly changes, and it is 
clear that the existing capacity to coordinate and deliver humanitarian assistance and protection does 
not match the scale, complexity, and urgency of the crisis. Based on an analysis of five criteria: scale, 
complexity, urgency, capacity, and reputational risk. IASC, “L3 IASC System-wide response activations and 
deactivations,” 4 April, 2017, bit.ly/IASCL3.
33 UNOCHA, “2018 Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs Overview,” 1 December 2017, 
bit.ly/2018AgfHumNeedsOCHA.
Winad, from Mosul, is recovering from losing 
her leg with the help of daily rehabilitation 
sessions at Hamdaniyah hospital in Iraq.
© T. Mayer/HI, May 2017

Abdullah Abdullah, Chief Executive of Afghanistan, Suraya Dalil, Ambassador of Afghanistan 
at the United Nations in Geneva, and Juan Carlos Ruan, Director of the Anti-Personnel Mine 
Ban Convention Implementation Support Unit, at the Third Pledging Conference for the 
Implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.














SUPPORT FOR  
MINE ACTION
Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty on international cooperation and assistance recognizes 
the right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance from other States Parties in 
order to fulfill its treaty obligations. This chapter focuses on financial support for mine 
action provided for calendar year 2017 by affected countries and international donors. It 
also documents new funding announcements made by some donors in 2018 to support 
mine action efforts. Cooperation and assistance, however, is not only limited to financial 
assistance. Other forms of assistance can include the provision of equipment, expertise, and 
personnel, as well as the exchange of experience, know-how, and best-practice sharing. 
2017 FIGURES AND TRENDS
Total Support to Mine Action—Thirty-seven donors and 10 affected states reported 
contributing US$771.5 million in international and national support for mine action in 
20171; this is $203.6 million more than the revised 2016 amount (a 36% increase). Taking 
into consideration inflation, it represents the second highest annual total of international 
and national mine action funding since the Monitor began reporting.2
International contributions accounted for 87% of overall support for mine action in 2017, 
while states’ contributions to their own national mine action programs accounted for the 
remaining 13% of global funding. 
1 This figure represents reported government contributions under bilateral and international programs 
for calendar year 2017, as of October 2018. All dollar values presented in this chapter are expressed in 
current dollars. Mine action support includes funding specifically related to landmines, cluster munitions, 
explosive remnants of war (ERW), and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) but is rarely disaggregated as 
such. State reporting on contributions is varied in the level of detail and some utilize a fiscal year rather 
than the calendar year. The total amounts of international support between 2012 and 2016 were updated 
to include revised contributions from the European Union (EU) and the United States (US).
2 In 2012, international and national support totaled US$756.2 million. Adjusted for inflation, 2012 global 
support is $807.3 million in 2017 dollars, the highest annual total on record. The Monitor used the 
annual average of US All Urban Consumers Price Index (for all items) to adjust data on support for mine 
action for inflation. US Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject: CPI-All 
Urban Consumers (Current Series),” Data extracted on 4 November 2018, https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/
CUUR0000SA0.  
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International Contributions—The level of international support for mine action provided 
by donors increased for the second consecutive year, rising from $482.9 million in 2016 to 
$673.2 million in 2017 (a 39% increase). This represents the highest level of international 
support recorded by the Monitor.3 The 2017 rise was primarily driven by massive increases in 
the contributions of the United States (US) and Germany.
  The majority of the funding came from just a few donors, with the top five donors—
the US, Germany, the European Union (EU), Norway, and Japan—contributing a total 
of $532.7 million, or 79% of all international funding for 2017.
  The top five recipient states—Iraq, Syria, Colombia, Afghanistan, and Lao PDR—
received a combined total of nearly $435.4 million, representing 65% of all 
international contributions.
  International funding was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and 
risk education (59% of all funding), victim assistance (2%), capacity-building (1%), 
and advocacy (1%). The remaining 37% was not disaggregated by the donors. 
National Contributions—The Monitor identified 10 affected states that provided $98.3 
million in contributions to their own national mine action programs, $13.3 million more than 
in 2016 (a 16% increase), when 11 affected countries reported contributing $85.0 million.
INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2017
For the second year running, donors increased their international mine action assistance in 
2017 and provided $673.2 million in funding to 38 affected states and three other areas. This 
represents an increase of more than $190 million (39%) from the $482.9 million reported in 
2016, and almost twice as much as the $376.5 million reported in 2015.4
International support for mine action: 2007–2017*
Note: * Not adjusted for inflation.
3 The Monitor maintains records of international support to mine action back to 1996, and national support 
back to 2002. The 2017 international support total is the highest in nominal and inflation-adjusted terms. 
4 Data for 2017 on international support to mine action is based on reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 
Reports, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Reports, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) 
Amended Protocol II Annual Reports, ITF Enhancing Human Security Annual Report 2017, UNMAS Annual 
Report 2017, and answers from donors to questionnaires. Thirteen of the 28 States Parties documented in 
this chapter reported international funding for mine action in a Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report for 2017, 











































The 2017 rise is in large part due to the substantial increases in the contributions of the 
US and Germany: 
  US funding in 2017 ($309.0 million) doubled from 2016. More than half of the US 
contribution ($169.6 million) went to mine action projects in Iraq and Syria.5 In 
comparison, this is $17 million more than its 2016 total contribution of $152.4 
million. The US provided $106.6 million to activities in Iraq aimed at clearing Islamic 
State explosive remnants of war (ERW) in order to facilitate the restoration of critical 
infrastructure and services, as well as the safe return of displaced populations. This 
represents a tripling in its contribution to this country compared to the $30.9 million 
provided in 2016. In addition, the US contributed $63 million to support clearance 
in areas liberated from Islamic State in northeast Syria, as well as risk education 
activities. This is six-times higher than US funding provided to this country in 2016.
  Germany’s funding in 2017 ($84.4 million) more than doubled from 2016. Germany’s 
largest contribution went to Iraq ($47.3 million) for clearance, victim assistance, and 
capacity-building activities. This represents more than half of its total contribution 
for the year, and more than double the funding provided to Iraq in 2016. Syria also 
received substantial funds from Germany, with $13.9 million provided.
PLEDGES IN 2018
At the Maputo Review Conference, in June 2014, States Parties committed to complete 
their respective time-bound obligations by 2025. This commitment has led to a number 
of initiatives and announcements aimed at strengthening international cooperation and 
assistance, and promoting the need for predictable adequate funding in order to meet the 
goal of a mine-free world by 2025.6
In February 2018, 33 States Parties, one state not party, the EU, as well as non-
governmental and international organizations attended the Third Pledging Conference for 
the Implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, hosted by Afghanistan in Geneva. In total, 11 States 
Parties7 made pledges to the treaty’s Implementation Support Unit (ISU) and sponsorship 
program. Four additional States Parties—Austria, Belgium, Canada, and Sweden—indicated 
their intention to support the work of the treaty but were not in a position to pledge a 
specific amount as their respective budgets were still under review.
In addition, some mine action donors renewed their commitment to providing financial 
resources:
  In March 2018, South Korea announced a pledge of $20 million to support clearance 
and capacity-building activities in the provinces of Quand Binh and Binh Dinh as 
part of the Korea-Vietnam Mine Action Project.8
5 Amounts indicate the country in which funds were to be used. Funds often are not used by the governments 
in recipient countries, but instead by those providing services.
6 In 2016, mine action donors reiterated their commitment to provide resources to support mine action 
efforts in the coming years through three pledging conferences in support of: the implementation of the 
Mine Ban Treaty (First Pledging Conference, Geneva, March 2016), Iraq (Washington, DC, July 2016), and 
Colombia (in New York City, September 2016). In 2016–2017, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom (UK), and the US announced significant increases in their funding to support 
mine action efforts. See, Monitor factsheet, “Extraordinary Pledges to Support Mine Action in 2016,” 22 
November 2016, www.the-monitor.org/media/2388355/2016-Pledging-Conferences-fact-sheet_final.
pdf; and Landmine and Cluster Munition Blog, “Pledges of New Funding in Support of Humanitarian Mine 
Action,” 13 April 2017, bit.ly/MBT2017Pledgeblog.
7 Australia, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, and 
Thailand. Mine Ban Treaty, Third Pledging Conference Report, 27 February 2018, bit.ly/MBT3rdPledging.
8 UNDP, “Viet Nam: Mine Action Project launched with support from Korea,” Press release, 9 March 2018, bit.
ly/MaVietnamKoreaMar2018. 
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  In June 2018, Australia announced new funding to mine action activities conducted 
by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in Iraq (A$11 million/US$8.2 
million over 2019–2021) and Syria (A$8 million/US$6 million over 2018–2019).9
  In September 2018, the United Kingdom (UK) announced the provision of an 
additional £46 million (some $58 million) to support demining, risk education, and 
capacity development projects in Angola, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Myanmar, 
Somalia, South Sudan, and Vietnam.10
DONORS IN 2017
In 2017, 28 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties, two states not party, the EU, and six other 
institutions11 contributed a total of $673.2 million to mine action. 
A small group of donors continued to provide the majority of international mine action 
support with the five largest donors (the US, Germany, the EU, Norway, and Japan) accounting 
for nearly four-fifths of all international support with a combined total of $532.7 million. 
The US remained the largest mine action donor with $309 million and it alone provided 
nearly half of all international mine action support in 2017. Germany ranked second with 
$84.4 million, or 13% of all contributions, while the next three donors—the EU, Norway, and 
Japan—provided more than $30 million 
each. 
Another 17 donors contributed less 
than $1 million each, compared to 11 
contributing in that range in 2016.
Support from States Parties in 2017 
accounted for two-fifths of all donor 
funding, with 28 countries providing 
some $269.2 million. This represents 
a 9% increase from the $246 million 
recorded in 2015.
In 2017, the EU and its member 
states12 contributed a total of $233.1 
million and accounted for 35% of the 
total international support, up from 
$194 million provided in 2016 (40% of 
the total international funding for that 
year).
9 Statement of Australia, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Session on International Cooperation 
and Assistance, Geneva, Switzerland, 8 June 2018, bit.ly/AustraliaISM2018. Exchange rate for June 2018: 
A$1=US$0.7498. US Federal Reserve, “Foreign Exchange Rates (monthly),” 4 September 2018, www.
federalreserve.gov/releases/g5/current/default.htm.
10 Department for International Development, “UK aid will protect more than 820,000 people from threat 
of lethal landmines,” Press release, 6 September 2018, www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-aid-will-
protect-more-than-820000-people-from-threat-of-lethal-landmines. Exchange rate for 6 September 
2018: £1=US$1.2933. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Weekly),” 10 September 2018, www.
federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/20180910/.
11 South Korea and the US are the two states not party. The six institutions are Howard Buffett Foundation, 
the Organization for the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Fund for International Development 
(OFID), the Sudan Humanitarian Fund, the United Nations Association (UNA)-Sweden, the UN, and the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 
12 Eighteen EU Member States provided funding in 2017: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, and the UK. 
Carmen Magariños-Casal, Chargee d’Affaires 
representing the European Union in Dakar, takes 
questions from the media at a meeting the EU 
supported in Senegal with more than 75 mine 
clearance and mine action experts.  
© Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention Implementation 


















2017 2016 2015 2014 2013
US 309.0 152.4 159.3 113.1 113.5 847.3
Germany 84.4 37.3 15.2 17.5 22.1 176.5
EU 67.6 76.9 23.5 85.7 47.9 301.6
Norway 39.2 31.7 22.3 41.8 49.6 184.6
Japan 32.5 40.7 49.3 49.1 64.0 235.6
UK 26.7 24.9 15.4 13.1 22.8 102.9
Switzerland 19.5 16.6 17.4 18.1 20.6 92.2
Netherlands 19.2 25.2 22.1 25.9 23.4 115.8
Howard Buffet Fndn 16.1 0 0 0 0 16.1
Denmark 15.5 10.2 9.2 12.1 9.3 56.3
Canada 10.9 13.3 10.8 7.7 7.9 50.6
New Zealand 5.4 12.5 3.2 7.5 6.7 35.3
Sweden 5.2 6.5 6.1 7.8 12.9 38.5
Australia 4.0 11.1 4.1 6.6 14.5 40.3
Italy 3.9 2.8 3.0 2.2 1.5 13.4
Finland 3.3 0 5.5 8.0 7.7 24.5
Ireland 1.8 3.3 3.6 4.5 4.1 17.3
OCHA 1.6 4.1 0.4 0 0 6.1
Luxembourg 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.9 7.7
Austria 1.2 1.1 0.02 0.02 1.2 3.5
Other donors* 4.8 11.0 4.5 8.5 17.2 46.0
Total 673.2 482.9 376.5 430.7 448.8 2412.1
Note: * Other donors in 2017 included: Andorra, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, 
Liechtenstein, Monaco, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, the Organization 
for the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Fund for International Development (OFID), Sudan 
Humanitarian Fund, United Nations Association (UNA)-Sweden, and the UN. 
Fifteen donors contributed more in 2017 than they did in 2016; including a $157 million 
increase from the US (103%), and a $47 million increase from Germany (126%). Additionally, 
Norway increased its assistance by $7.5 million. Five new donors were also identified in 
2017: Finland,14 Monaco, Portugal, the Howard Buffett Foundation, and the UN.
In contrast, 17 donors decreased their funding, led by the EU (down $9.3 million, a 12% 
decrease) and Japan (down $8.3 million, a 20% decrease). Additionally, Australia, New Zealand, 
and the Netherlands decreased their assistance by more than $6 million each.
13 The amount for each donor has been rounded to the nearest hundred thousand. The total amount of 
international support for 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016 were updated as a result of revised EU and US 
funding totals. 
14 Finland budgeted funding for mine action in 2016, but it was reported that payments could not be 
executed due to changes in the administration and the extension of the tender-processes. As a result, 
no support was reported in 2016, and the 2017 total included some of the funding initially budgeted for 
2016.
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Summary of changes in 2017
Change Donors Combined Total
Increase of more than 
$10 million
Germany and the US $203.7 million 
increase
Increase of less than 
$10 million
Andorra, Austria, the Czech Republic 
Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, 
Poland, Slovenia, Switzerland, the UK, 
OPEC OFID, and UNA-Sweden
$19.4 million 
increase
Decrease of more than 
$1 million
Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Ireland, 
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
South Korea, Sweden, the EU, and OCHA
$52.4 million 
decrease
Decrease of less than $1 
million




New donors in 2017 Finland, Monaco, Portugal, the Howard 
Buffett Foundation, and the UN
$20.4 million 
provided in 2017
The table below summarizes the changes in mine action funding from the top 15 donors, 
expressed in their respective national currencies and US$ terms.















Germany + €41.0 million +121% + 47.1 million +126%
US + US$156.6 million +103% + 156.6 million +103%
Denmark + DKK33.6 million +49% +5.3 million +52%
Italy + €0.9 million +37% +1.1 million +40%
Norway + NOK57.9 million +22% +7.5 million +24%
Switzerland + CHF2.9 million +18% +2.9 million +18%
UK + £2.4 million +13% +1.8 million +7%
EU - €9.7 million -14% -9.3 million -12%
Canada - C$3.4 million -19% -2.4 million -18%
Japan - ¥787.8 million -18% -8.2 million -20%
Sweden - SEK11.0 million -20% -1.3 million -20%
Netherlands - €5.8 million -25% - 6.0 million -24%
Ireland - €1.4 million -46% -1.5 million -45%
New Zealand - NZ$10.3 million -58% -7.1 million -57%
Australia - A$9.7 million -65% -7.1 million -64%
15 Average exchange rates for 2017: A$1=US$0.7671; C$1.2984=US$1; DKK6.5957=US$1; €1=US$1.1301; 
¥112.1=US$1; NZ$0.7111=US$1; NOK8.2679=US$1; SEK8.5430=US$1; CHF0.9842=US$1; and 
















Donors contributed to mine action through several trust fund mechanisms, notably the UN 
Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) administered by UNMAS and ITF 
Enhancing Human Security (established by the government of Slovenia and formerly known 
as the International Trust Fund).
In 2017, contributions through UNMAS totaled $81.7 million from 24 donors. Several small 
donors used the VTF to contribute to mine action.16 Six donors as well as the OPEC Fund for 
International Development (OFID) and the UN allocated $3.8 million in 2017 through the 
ITF for mine action programs in seven states and one area.
While donor funding frequently is used for national activities, implementation is often 
carried out by an array of partnering institutions, NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies. 
Organizations that received a significant proportion of contributions in 2017 included Mines 
Advisory Group ($32.9 million), Norwegian People’s Aid ($23.2 million), HALO Trust ($20.5 
million), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) ($11.3 million), DanChurchAid 
($11.5 million), the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ($11.3 million), 
and Humanity & Inclusion ($8.6 million).
RECIPIENTS
A total of 38 states and three other areas received $627.3 million from 37 donors in 2017. A 
further $46 million, designated as “global” in the table below, was provided to institutions, 
NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies without a designated recipient state or area.
As in previous years, a small number of countries received the majority of funding. The 
top five recipient states—Iraq, Syria, Colombia, Afghanistan, and Lao PDR—received 65% of 
all international support in 2017. 
Iraq received the largest amount of funding (30% of all international support) from the 
largest number of donors (17).17 Eleven states and one area, or 29% of all recipients, had only 
one donor.18
More than three-fifths of international support (63%, or $423.2 million) went to 16 
countries or one other area with massive contamination ($320.2 million) and heavy 
contamination ($103.0 million).19 Most of this funding went to clearance and risk education 
projects. 
In 2017, 29 states and areas experienced a change of more than 20% in funding compared 
to 2016, including 14 recipients receiving more support, and 15 recipients receiving less 
support, four of which received no support. These fluctuations may be a reflection of shifts 
in donor priorities and changes in local situations.
16 The small donors included Andorra, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Poland, and Portugal, as 
well as OCHA, the Sudan Humanitarian Fund, and UNA-Sweden.
17 Only Afghanistan had the same number of donors in 2017.
18 Recipients with one donor included: Albania, Azerbaijan, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Mozambique, 
Nepal, the Philippines, Senegal, Serbia, Solomon Islands, Thailand, and other area Somaliland.
19 Recipients of international support with massive contamination included: Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, 
BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Iraq, Thailand, Yemen, and the other area Western Sahara. Recipients with 
heavy contamination included: Colombia, Lebanon, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe.
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Iraq and Syria were the recipients with the largest increases, receiving respectively $120 
million and $70.8 million more than in 2016, notably following the massive increases in 
the contributions of the US and Germany as previously detailed. In addition, three countries 
saw a substantial increase in support received: Colombia ($39.3 million more), Chad ($25.3 
million more), and Libya ($18.6 million more).
  Support to Colombia ($65.5 million) more than doubled from 2016. In 2017, the 
Howard Buffett Foundation made a $16.1 million donation to support clearance 
activities in Colombia. Three donors considerably increased their contributions 
compared to 2016: the US ($12.5 million more), Japan ($7.8 million more), and 
Switzerland ($1.2 million more). These three countries participated in the Global 
Demining Initiative for Colombia ministerial-level meeting in September 2016, 
during which they pledged financial assistance to support Colombia’s mine action 
activities in the context of the peace process.20
20 At the Global Demining Initiative for Colombia ministerial-level meeting, the US pledged $36 million 
over 2016–2018, and Switzerland pledged $4.1 million over 2016–2020. Japan pledged $1.5 million 
without specifying the timeframe, but this seems to correspond to the amount provided in 2016. See, 
Monitor factsheet, “Extraordinary Pledges to Support Mine Action in 2016,” 22 November 2016, www.the-
monitor.org/media/2388355/2016-Pledging-Conferences-fact-sheet_final.pdf.









Iraq 200.7 Angola 3.1
Syria 89.4 Western Sahara 2.9
Colombia 65.5 Tajikistan 1.7
Global 46.0 Palestine 1.7
Afghanistan 42.0 Sudan 1.6
Lao PDR 37.9 Georgia 1.5
Libya 26.5 Mali 1.4
Chad 25.7 Serbia 1.3
Vietnam 13.8 Palau 1.1
Cambodia 13.0 Philippines 1.1
Croatia 12.9 Albania 1.0
Yemen 11.9 Central African Republic (CAR) 0.8
Somalia 8.8 Solomon Islands 0.8
Ukraine 8.6 Jordan 0.6
Sri Lanka 8.5 Senegal 0.5
South Sudan 7.8 Mozambique 0.4
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 7.6 Thailand 0.3
Lebanon 6.8 Kosovo 0.2
Myanmar 6.2 Nepal 0.1
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC)
5.7 Azerbaijan 0.1
Zimbabwe 5.6 Somaliland 0.1
Total 673.2














  Support to Chad jumped from $0.4 million in 2016 to $25.7 million in 2017, following 
the awarding of EU funding to support capacity-building, clearance, risk education, 
and victim assistance activities. The EU was Chad’s sole international donor in 2017.
  Support to Libya ($26.5 million) more than tripled from 2016. This was due to the 
increase in the US contribution ($16 million provided in 2017 compared to $2.5 
million in 2016) in order to build the operational capacity to dispose of improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) and to support clearance operations in Sirte, as well as to 
contribute to the development of the Libya Mine Action Center. Libya also received 
significant contributions from the EU and Germany, both providing more than $3.5 
million each.
Croatia was the recipient with the largest decrease, receiving $37.8 million less than in 
2016. Three additional countries experienced a high-value decline in support received in 
2017: Cambodia ($20.2 million less), Afghanistan ($15.3 million less), and Lebanon ($10.1 
million less). These decreases were the result of changes in donors’ contributions:
  Support to Croatia in 2017 ($12.9 million) was one quarter of that in 2016, primarily 
due to a decline after massive EU contributions to support clearance activities with 
$50.7 million provided in 2016. 
  Support to Cambodia ($13.0 million) was reduced by more than half in 2017. The 
drop was mainly due to lower contributions from Australia (a decrease of $3.3 
million less compared to 2016) and Japan (a decrease of $15.1 million).
  Support to Afghanistan dropped by a quarter in 2017. This was in large part a result 
of decreases in funding provided by the US ($11.6 million less than in 2016) and 
Canada ($2.9 million less). Despite these decreases, Afghanistan was the fourth 
largest recipient of mine action support.
  Support to Lebanon ($6.8 million) more than halved in 2017 and marked the return 
to a level of funding closer to that reported in 2014 ($7.0 million) and 2015 ($8.7 
million). 
Summary of changes in 2017
Change Recipients Combined Total
Increase of more than 
$10 million
Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Libya, and 
Syria
$273.9 million increase
Increase between $10 
and $1 million
Georgia, Lao PDR, Sri Lanka, 
South Sudan, Vietnam, and 
Yemen
$18.4 million increase
Increase of less than $1 
million
BiH, CAR, Jordan, Palau, the 
Philippines, Senegal, Serbia, 
the Solomon Islands, Western 
Sahara, and Zimbabwe
$4.9 increase
Decrease of more than 
$10 million
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Croatia, 
“Global,” and Lebanon
$94.4 million decrease
Decrease between $10 
and $1 million
Angola, Palestine, Somalia, and 
Ukraine
$8.1 million decrease
Decrease of less than $1 
million
Albania, Azerbaijan, DRC, Kosovo, 
Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, 
Somaliland, Sudan, Tajikistan, 
and Thailand 
$3.5 decrease
Recipients from 2016 
that did not receive new 
support in 2017
Benin, Marshall Islands, Nigeria, 
and Peru
$1 million received in 2016
New recipients in 2017 Nepal $0.1 million received in 2017
82 
FUNDING BY THEMATIC SECTOR
In 2017, 59% of mine action funding supported clearance and risk education activities, while 
support to victim assistance represented 2% of the total international support to mine action. 
“Various” funding represented 37% of all international support to mine action. This 
includes contributions not disaggregated by the donors, as well as funding not earmarked 
for any sectors. 









% of total 
dedicated 
contribution
Clearance and risk 
education
395.9 59% 24 93%
Various 249.9 37% 27 N/A
Victim assistance 15.8 2% 14 4%
Capacity-building 8.0 1% 12 2%
Advocacy 3.6 1% 10 1%
Stockpile destruction 0 0% 0 0%
Total 673.2 100% N/A
Notes: N/A = not applicable. “Dedicated contribution” (non-various funding) totaled $423.2 million 
in 2017 and included funding set for a specific sector (advocacy, capacity-building, clearance, risk 
education, stockpile destruction, or victim assistance). The “0” in stockpile destruction in 2017 does not 
mean states expended no funds for that activity, but rather that none of the contributions reported in 
2017 detailed dedicated stockpile destruction funding.
Distribution of dedicated contributions by thematic sector
21 In 2016, international support was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and risk education 
($346.8 million, or 72% of total international support), victim assistance ($21.0 million, or 4%), capacity-
building ($12.5 million, or 3%), advocacy ($2.5 million, or 1%), stockpile destruction ($0 million, or 0%), 
and various activities ($100.1 million, or 20%). Data for 2016 was revised—based on new figures that 
detailed dedicated clearance and risk education funding as well as contributions that were not previously 
reported by donors.
Victim Assistance 
$15.8 million / 4%
Capacity-building 
$8.0 million / 2%
Advocacy 
$3.6 million / 1%
Various funding $249.9 million
Dedicated funding $423.3 million
Clearance and  
risk education  














Clearance and risk education
In 2017, $395.9 million, or 59% of all reported support for mine action, went toward clearance 
and risk education activities. This represents an increase of $49.1 million from 2016.22
Five of the 10 largest donors—the US, Germany, Norway, the UK, and the EU—provided 
80% of all support to clearance and risk education ($315.6 million). 
Many donors reported clearance and risk education as a combined figure. Twenty-two 
donors did, however, indicate contributions specifically for clearance activities, providing a 
total of $187.8 million in 32 countries and other areas (21 States Parties, eight states not 
party, and three other areas).23 
Twelve donors reported contributions totaling $7.2 million specifically for risk education 
projects in 13 countries.24 Iraq received the most risk education-specific funding with $1.8 
million. 
Victim assistance
Direct international support for victim assistance activities remained below the level of most 
previous years, and decreased significantly as a percentage of total mine action funding. 
Based on information available as of October 2018, in 2017, $15.8 million was reported, 
down from $21 million in 2016. This represents just 2% of all reported support for mine 
action, in comparison, victim assistance funding ranged between 4% and 7% of all support 
from 2013 to 2016. This estimate may be conservative in that some donors were not able to 
provide specific details on dedicated victim assistance funding at the time of writing, but it 
still provides an informative picture of the global victim assistance funding situation. 
Fourteen25 donors reported contributing to victim assistance projects in 10 States 
Parties, and four states not party.26 Most mine-affected countries did not receive any direct 
international support for victim assistance. Funding for victim assistance activities, however, 
is especially difficult to track because many donors report that they provide support for 
victims through more general programs for development and for the rights of persons with 
disabilities. Since such contributions are not disaggregated, it is not possible to include 
them in Monitor reporting.
The top three victim assistance donors—Germany, Switzerland, and Norway—provided 
60% ($9.5 million) of all victim assistance funding in 2017. 
Eight donors reported contributing $12.3 million, more than three-quarters (78%) of 
all support to victim assistance in 2017, through the ICRC or national Red Cross and Red 
Crescent societies. 
22 Albania, Chad, Nepal, Serbia, and Sudan were the five recipients which did not receive funding dedicated 
to clearance and risk education in 2017. This does not mean that donors did not support activities related 
to this sector, but that none of the contributions reported detailed specific funding going to clearance and 
risk education only.
23 States Parties recipients of international assistance for clearance were: Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, 
Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, DRC, Iraq, Mali, Mozambique, Palau, Palestine, the Solomon Islands, Somalia, 
South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. States not party that received 
international assistance for clearance were: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Syria, 
and Vietnam. Other areas that received international assistance for clearance activities were: Kosovo, 
Somaliland, and Western Sahara.
24 Recipients of international assistance for risk education were: Cambodia, CAR, Colombia, DRC, Iraq, Jordan, 
Lao PDR, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.
25 Victim assistance donors included: Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, New 
Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland, Turkey, the EU, and the OFID. 
26 States Parties recipients of international assistance for victim assistance were: Afghanistan, BiH, 
Cambodia, Colombia, DRC, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, and Ukraine. States not party that 
received international assistance for victim assistance were: Lao PDR, Lebanon, Myanmar, and Nepal. 
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Advocacy and capacity-building
In 2017, just 1% of all reported support for mine action went toward advocacy activities 
($3.6 million).27 Of the 37 donors reporting international contributions to mine action, 10 
reported supporting advocacy activities.
Thirteen donors provided $8 million—1% of all international support—to support 
capacity-building activities in seven States Parties and two states not party. 
NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2017
While there has been more transparency from affected 
states, overall national contributions to mine action 
continue to be under-reported. Few States Parties 
report national funding in their annual Article 7 
reports.28 States Parties such as Iraq and Sri Lanka, as 
well as states not party India and Vietnam—all mine-
affected states with significant contamination and 
major clearance operations, usually conducted by the 
army—have never reported annual expenditures. 
Ten affected states reported $98.3 million in 
contributions to mine action from their national 
budget in 2017, $13.3 million more than the $85.0 
million reported in 2016, but far from the $131.2 
million reported in 2015.29
In 2017, one state completely funded its own 
mine action program: Chile.30 Additionally, four States 
Parties reported funding more than half of their own 
mine action programs: Angola, BiH, Croatia, and Sudan.
FIVE-YEAR SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION  
2013–2017
Over the past five years (2013–2017), total support to mine action amounted to some $3.1 
billion, an average of about $623 million per year. 
Although data about national support remains incomplete, such support has accounted 
for about one-quarter of total mine action funding over the period, and amounted to 
approximately $709.1 million. 
International support totaled $2.4 billion, an average of $481 million per year, and 
27 Advocacy activities generally include, but are not limited to, contributions to the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions and the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Units, the Gender Mine Action Programme 
(GMAP), the Geneva Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Geneva Call, and the ICBL-CMC and its 
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.
28 Two of the 10 affected states analyzed in this chapter reported national funding for mine action in a 
Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for 2017: Cambodia and Zimbabwe. Four others provided details on their 
national contribution for mine action in their extension requests: BiH, Croatia, Serbia, and Sudan. Lao PDR 
and Lebanon reported their national contributions in their Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 
reports for 2017. Information on national mine action provided in 2017 by Angola and Chile is available 
in their respective annual national budget laws. 
29 Eleven affected states reported on their national contributions in 2016: Angola, BiH, Chad, Chile, Croatia, 
Ecuador, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.






























represented 77% of all support. Three donors—the US ($847.4 million), the EU ($301.5 
million), and Japan ($235.5 million)—contributed $1.4 billion, more than 50% of total 
international support. Four other donors—Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the UK—
contributed more than $100 million each. Support from States Parties accounted for half of 
all international funding with $1.2 billion provided.
Between 2013–2017, the top five recipients—Iraq ($402.6 million), Afghanistan ($261.6 
million), Lao PDR ($182.3 million), Cambodia ($132.5 million), and Colombia ($131.0 
million)—received 46% of all international contributions. Syria was the only other country 
receiving more than $100 million over this five-year period. 
Summary of contributions: 2013–2017



















































Some of the victim assistance and survivors’ rights materials in print over the past 20 
years, displayed at the Mine Ban Treaty 16th Meeting of States Parties in 2017.















STATUS OF THE 
CONVENTION
1997 CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, 
STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF  
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION  
(1997 MINE BAN TREATY)
Under Article 15, the treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into 
force, which was 1 March 1999. On the following list, the first date is signature; the second 
date is ratification. Now that the treaty has entered into force, states may no longer sign 
rather they may become bound without signature through a one step procedure known as 
accession. According to Article 16 (2), the treaty is open for accession by any state that has 
not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a) and succession is indicated below with (s). 
As of 1 November 2018 there were 164 States Parties.  
STATES PARTIES
Afghanistan 11 Sep 02 (a) 
Albania 8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00 
Algeria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01 
Andorra 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98 
Angola 4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 02 
Antigua and Barbuda 3 Dec 97; 3 May 99 
Argentina 4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99 
Australia 3 Dec 97; 14 Jan 99 
Austria 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98 
Bahamas 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98 
Bangladesh 7 May 98; 6 Sep 00 
Barbados 3 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99 
Belarus 3 Sep 03 (a) 
Belgium 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98 
Belize 27 Feb 98; 23 Apr 98 
Benin 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 98 
Bhutan 18 Aug 05 (a) 
Bolivia 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98 
Botswana 3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00 
Brazil 3 Dec 97; 30 Apr 99 
Brunei Darussalam 4 Dec 97; 24 Apr 06 
Bulgaria 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98 
Burkina Faso 3 Dec 97; 16 Sep 98 
Burundi 3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03 
Cambodia 3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99 
Cameroon 3 Dec 97; 19 Sep 02 
Canada 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97 
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Cape Verde 4 Dec 97; 14 May 01 
Central African Republic 8 Nov 02 (a) 
Chad 6 Jul 98; 6 May 99 
Chile 3 Dec 97; 10 Sep 01 
Colombia 3 Dec 97; 6 Sep 00 
Comoros 19 Sep 02 (a)
Congo, Rep 4 May 01 (a) 
Cook Islands 3 Dec 97; 15 Mar 06
Costa Rica 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 99 
Côte d’Ivoire 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00 
Croatia 4 Dec 97; 20 May 98 
Cyprus 4 Dec 97; 17 Jan 03 
Czech Republic 3 Dec 97; 26 Oct 99
Dem Rep of Congo 2 May 02 (a)
Denmark 4 Dec 97; 8 Jun 98 
Djibouti 3 Dec 97; 18 May 98 
Dominica 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99 
Dominican Republic 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00 
Ecuador 4 Dec 97; 29 Apr 99 
El Salvador 4 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99 
Equatorial Guinea 16 Sep 98 (a) 
Eritrea 27 Aug 01 (a) 
Estonia 12 May 04 (a)
Eswatini 4 Dec 97; 22 Dec 98 
Ethiopia 3 Dec 97; 17 Dec 04
Fiji 3 Dec 97; 10 Jun 98
Finland 9 Jan 12 (a) 
France 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98 
Gabon 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00 
Gambia 4 Dec 97; 23 Sep 02 
Germany 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98 
Ghana 4 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00 
Greece 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 03 
Grenada 3 Dec 97; 19 Aug 98 
Guatemala 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99 
Guinea 4 Dec 97; 8 Oct 98 
Guinea-Bissau 3 Dec 97; 22 May 01 
Guyana 4 Dec 97; 5 Aug 03 
Haiti 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 06 
Holy See 4 Dec 97; 17 Feb 98 
Honduras 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98 
Hungary 3 Dec 97; 6 Apr 98 
Iceland 4 Dec 97; 5 May 99 
Indonesia 4 Dec 97; 16 Feb 07
Iraq 15 Aug 07 (a)
Ireland 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97 
Italy 3 Dec 97; 23 Apr 99 
Jamaica 3 Dec 97; 17 Jul 98 
Japan 3 Dec 97; 30 Sep 98 
Jordan 11 Aug 98; 13 Nov 98 
Kenya 5 Dec 97; 23 Jan 01 
Kiribati 7 Sep 00 (a) 
Kuwait 30 Jul 07 (a)
Latvia 1 Jul 05 (a)
Lesotho 4 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98 
Liberia 23 Dec 99 (a) 
Liechtenstein 3 Dec 97; 5 Oct 99 
Lithuania 26 Feb 99; 12 May 03 
Luxembourg 4 Dec 97; 14 Jun 99 
Macedonia FYR 9 Sep 98 (a) 
Madagascar 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 99 
Malawi 4 Dec 97; 13 Aug 98 
Malaysia 3 Dec 97; 22 Apr 99 
Maldives 1 Oct 98; 7 Sep 00 
Mali 3 Dec 97; 2 Jun 98 
Malta 4 Dec 97; 7 May 01 
Mauritania 3 Dec 97; 21 Jul 00 
Mauritius 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97 
Mexico 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98 
Moldova 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00 
Monaco 4 Dec 97; 17 Nov 98 
Montenegro 23 Oct 06 (s)
Mozambique 3 Dec 97; 25 Aug 98 
Namibia 3 Dec 97; 21 Sep 98 
Nauru 7 Aug 00 (a) 
Netherlands 3 Dec 97; 12 Apr 99 
New Zealand 3 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99 
Nicaragua 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98 
Niger 4 Dec 97; 23 Mar 99 
Nigeria 27 Sep 01 (a) 
Niue 3 Dec 97; 15 Apr 98 
Norway 3 Dec 97; 9 Jul 98 
Oman 20 Aug 14 (a)
Palau 18 Nov 07 (a)
Palestine 29 Dec 2017 (a)
Panama 4 Dec 97; 7 Oct 98 
Papua New Guinea 28 Jun 04 (a) 
Paraguay 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 98 
Peru 3 Dec 97; 17 Jun 98 
Philippines 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 00
Poland 4 Dec 97; 27 Dec 12 
Portugal 3 Dec 97; 19 Feb 99 
Qatar 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 98 















Rwanda 3 Dec 97; 8 Jun 00 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 3 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98 
Saint Lucia 3 Dec 97; 13 Apr 99 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3 Dec 97; 
   1 Aug 01 
Samoa 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98 
San Marino 3 Dec 97; 18 Mar 98 
São Tomé & Príncipe 30 Apr 98; 31 Mar 03 
Senegal 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98 
Serbia 18 Sep 03 (a) 
Seychelles 4 Dec 97; 2 Jun 00 
Sierra Leone 29 Jul 98; 25 Apr 01 
Slovak Republic 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99 
Slovenia 3 Dec 97; 27 Oct 98 
Solomon Islands 4 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
Somalia 16 Apr 12 (a) 
South Africa 3 Dec 97; 26 Jun 98 
South Sudan 11 Nov 11 (s)
Spain 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 99 
Sri Lanka 13 Dec 2017 (a)
Sudan 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 03 
Suriname 4 Dec 97; 23 May 02 
Sweden 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98 
Switzerland 3 Dec 97; 24 Mar 98 
Tajikistan 12 Oct 99 (a) 
Tanzania 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 00 
Thailand 3 Dec 97; 27 Nov 98 
Timor-Leste 7 May 03 (a) 
Togo 4 Dec 97; 9 Mar 00 
Trinidad and Tobago 4 Dec 97; 27 Apr 98 
Tunisia 4 Dec 97; 9 Jul 99 
Turkey 25 Sep 03 (a) 
Turkmenistan 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 98 
Tuvalu 13 September 2011 (a)
Uganda 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99 
Ukraine 24 Feb 99; 27 Dec 05
United Kingdom 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98 
Uruguay 3 Dec 97; 7 Jun 01 
Vanuatu 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 05
Venezuela 3 Dec 97; 14 Apr 99 
Yemen 4 Dec 97; 1 Sep 98 
Zambia 12 Dec 97; 23 Feb 01 
Zimbabwe 3 Dec 97; 18 Jun 98
SIGNATORY





































CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, 
STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF  
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION
PREAMBLE
The States Parties
Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel 
mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless 
civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, 
inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe 
consequences for years after emplacement,
Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated 
manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the 
world, and to assure their destruction, 
Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, 
including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,
Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important 
confidence-building measure,
Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, 
Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the 
early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,
Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 
1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international 
agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines, 
Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and 
multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production 
and transfer of anti-personnel mines,
Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced 
by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end 
undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around 
the world, 
Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 
June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally 
binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel 
mines, 
Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, 
and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all 
relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, 
regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 















Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of 
the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on 
the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and 
materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and 
combatants, 
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
General obligations
1.  Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
a) To use anti-personnel mines;
b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or 
indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to 
a State Party under this Convention.
2.  Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel 
mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
ARTICLE 2
Definitions
1.  “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity 
or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines 
designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to 
a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel 
mines as a result of being so equipped.
2.  “Mine” means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other 
surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a 
vehicle.
3.  “Anti-handling device” means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, 
linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is 
made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine. 
4.  “Transfer” involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into 
or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not 
involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.




1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a 
number of anti- personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, 
mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall 
not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.
2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.
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ARTICLE 4
Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines
Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the 
destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its 
jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into 
force of this Convention for that State Party.
ARTICLE 5
Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas
1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel 
mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than 
ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.
2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or 
control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall 
ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction 
or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to 
ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein 
have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol 
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as 
amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or 
to Have Indiscriminate Effects. 
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of 
all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit 
a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the 
deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to 
ten years.
4. Each request shall contain:
 a) The duration of the proposed extension;
  b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
   (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;
   (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of 
all the anti-personnel mines; and 
   (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-
personnel mines in mined areas; 
  c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
  d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension. 
5.  The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration 
the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of 
States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.
6.  Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance 
with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State 
Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the 
















International cooperation and assistance
1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek 
and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.
2.  Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the 
fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information 
concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose 
undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological 
information for humanitarian purposes.
3.   Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and 
rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness 
programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, 
international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International 
Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.
4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance 
and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United 
Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental 
organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations 
Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with 
demining. 
5.  Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of 
stockpiled anti- personnel mines.
6.  Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance 
established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various 
means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national 
points of contact on mine clearance. 
7.  States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties 
or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in 
the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:
  a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;
  b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementa-
tion of the program;
  c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined 
areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;
  d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;
 e) Assistance to mine victims;
  f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the rel-
evant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the 
implementation of the program. 
8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall 





1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon 
as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this 
Convention for that State Party on:
  a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;
  b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its 
jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot 
numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
  c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to 
contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as 
possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined 
area and when they were emplaced;
  d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or 
transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine 
destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institu-
tions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance 
with Article 3; 
  e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine 
production facilities;
  f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with 
Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the 
location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to 
be observed; 
  g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of 
this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of 
anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, 
if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in 
accordance with Article 4;
  h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent 
known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably 
possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of 
anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, 
explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may 
facilitate mine clearance; and
  i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in 
relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.
2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States 
Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year. 
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to 
the States Parties.
ARTICLE 8
Facilitation and clarification of compliance
1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the 
implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of 
















2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to 
compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, 
through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter 
to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. 
Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken 
to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all 
information which would assist in clarifying this matter.
3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be 
unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the 
next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the 
submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, 
to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which 
shall have the right to respond. 
4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties 
concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her 
good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.
5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal 
and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a 
request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for 
the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such 
communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States 
Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of 
States Parties.
6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case 
may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all 
information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties 
or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by 
consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this 
decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.
7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the 
Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including 
any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.
8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting 
of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a 
majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite 
a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a 
Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a 
mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance 
with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places 
directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the 
requested State Party.
9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the 
names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties 
and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded 
as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party declares its non-acceptance 
in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact- finding 
missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting 
State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to 
such missions.
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10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of 
the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with 
the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals 
of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be 
appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges 
and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.
11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the 
territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party 
shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the 
mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum 
extent possible while they are on territory under its control.
12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding 
mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment 
which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. 
Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it 
intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.
13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission 
is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide 
information related to the alleged compliance issue.
14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas 
and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be 
expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State 
Party considers necessary for:
  a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;
  b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have 
with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or
  c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.
In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every 
reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention. 
15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no 
more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.
16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-
finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.
17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the 
results of its findings. 
18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider 
all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may 
request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a 
specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response 
to this request.
19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may 
suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the 
matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity 
with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due 
to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States 
Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, 
including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.
20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall 
make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, 

















Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including 
the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State 




1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that 
may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State 
Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.
2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by 
whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the 
States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending 
a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and 
clarification of compliance.
ARTICLE 11
Meetings of the States Parties
1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the 
application or implementation of this Convention, including:
 a) The operation and status of this Convention;
  b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention; 
  c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
  d) The development of technologies to clear anti- 
personnel mines;
  e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
  f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.
2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent 
meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until 
the first Review Conference. 
3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.
4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant 
international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to 
attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure. 
ARTICLE 12
Review Conferences
1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be 
convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States 
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Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five 
years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.
2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
  a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
  b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties 
referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11; 
  c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
  d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this 
Convention.
3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant 
international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited 




1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose 
amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated 
to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views 
on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a 
majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation 
that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an 
Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.
2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant 
international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited 
to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of 
Procedure.
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States 
Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held 
earlier.
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of 
the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall 
communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.
5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this 
Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments 
of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any 
remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.
ARTICLE 14 
Costs
1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States 
Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the 
States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance 
with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 
and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance 

















This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature 
at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the 
United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.
ARTICLE 16
Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with 
the Depositary. 
ARTICLE 17
Entry into force 
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month 
in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been 
deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth 
month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession.
ARTICLE 18
Provisional application
Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it 
will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.
ARTICLE 19
Reservations
The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.
ARTICLE 20
Duration and withdrawal
1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw 
from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the 
Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall 
include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument 
of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six- month period, the 
withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect 
before the end of the armed conflict.
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4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the 








The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and 
Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations.

